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Page 1 of 11 
icial District Court - Kootenai Coun 
Case: CV-2014-0004713 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, etal. 
User: MITCHELL 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, Heather Montee, Shawn Montee Inc, ABCO Wood Recycling LLC 
Date Code User Judge 
6/11/2014 NCOC MCCOY New Case Filed - Other Claims John T. Mitchell 
MCCOY Filing: A -All initial civil case filings of any type not John T. Mitchell 
listed in categories 8-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: Ellingsen, Mark A (attorney for 
Wolford, Robert) Receipt number: 0024793 
Dated: 6/11/2014 Amount: $96.00 (Check) For: 
Wolford, Robert (plaintiff) 
COMP DIXON Complaint For Money Due John T. Mitchell 
SUMI DIXON Summons Issued John T. Mitchell 
6/16/2014 AFSV VICTORIN Affidavit Of Service/6-11-14/PD John T. Mitchell 
6/17/2014 MITCHELL Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any John T. Mitchell 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Nick Wagner Receipt number: 0025550 Dated: 
6/17/2014 Amount: $11.00 (Cash) 
6/30/2014 MITCHELL Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other John T. Mitchell 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Paul 
Daugharty Receipt number: 0027583 Dated: 
6/30/2014 Amount $66.00 {Check) For: Montee, 
Shawn (defendant) 
NOAP MCCOY Notice Of Appearance - Paul Daugharty obo John T. Mitchell 
Defendants 
7/1/2014 AFSV LEU Amended Affidavit Of Service-6/11/14 John T. Mitchell 
7/2/2014 NITD GRESHAM Three Day Notice Of Intent To Take Default John T. Mitchell 
7/7/2014 ANSW VICTORIN Answer and Affirmative Defenses/Paul Daugharty John T. Mitchell 
8/1/2014 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 09/17/2014 04:00 PM) Ellingsen 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference John T. Mitchell 
09/17/2014 04:00 PM) RE: Set Date for Trial 
CLAUSEN Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
8/7/2014 MITCHELL Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any John T. Mitchell 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Nick Wagoner Receipt number: 0032870 Dated: 
8/7/2014 Amount: $5.00 (E-payment) 
8/15/2014 NOTH JLEIGH Notice Of Hearing On Plaintiffs Motion For John T. Mitchell 
Summary Judgment 
MNSJ JLEIGH Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
MEMS JLEIGH Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion For John T. Mitchell 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD JLEIGH Affidavit Of Robert Wolford In Support Of John T. Mitchell 
Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment 
8/28/2014 MITCHELL Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any John T. Mitchell 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Nick 'vVeidner Receipt number: 0035728 Dated: 
8/28/2014 Amount: $18.00 (E-payment) 
9/2/2014 AFFD JLEIGH Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Continue John T. Mitchell 
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icial District Court - Kootenai Coun~ 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0004713 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, etal. 
User: MITCHELL 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, Heather Montee, Shawn Montee Inc, ABCO Wood Recycling LLC 
Date Code User Judge 
9/2/2014 MNCN JLEIGH Motion To Continue John T. Mitchell 
NOTH JLEIGH Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
9/4/2014 AFFD JLEIGH Affidavit Of Shawn Montee In Opposition To John T. Mitchell 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
Document sealed 
MEMO JLEIGH Memorandum In Opposition To Motion For John T. Mitchell 
Summary Judgment 
9/10/2014 NOHG LEU Notice Of Hearing On Plaintiff's Motion For John T. Mitchell 
Summary Judgment 
MEMO LEU Memorandum In Support Of Elizabeth Alvord's John T. Mitchell 
Motion To Seal/Redact Portions Of The Affidavit 
Of Shawn Montee 
OBJT LEU Plaintiff's Objection To Defendants' Motion To John T. Mitchell 
Continue Summary Judgment Hearing 
ANSW LEU Reply Memorandum In Support Of Plaintinff's John T. Mitchell 
Motion For Summary Judgmnt 
MOTN JLEIGH Motion To Seal/Redact Portions Of The Affidavit John T. Mitchell 
Of Shawn Montee Filed In Opposition To Motion 
For Summary Judgment 
9/15/2014 NOTH JLEIGH Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
MOTN JLEIGH Motion To Shorten Time John T. Mitchell 
MOTN JLEIGH Motion For Examination Pursuant To IRCP 35(a) John T. Mitchell 
9/17/2014 DCHH CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
scheduled on 09/17/2014 04:00 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
DCHH CLAUSEN Hearing result for Scheduling Conference John T. Mitchell 
scheduled on 09/17/2014 04:00 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled John T. Mitchell 
04/06/2015 09:00 AM) 3 DAYS 
ORDR CLAUSEN Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and John T. Mitchell 
Initial Pretrial Order 
9/19/2014 MEMO LUCKEY Memorandum Decision And Order 1) Denying John T. Mitchell 
Defendants' Motion to Continue Summary 
Judgment 2) Granting Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 3) Sealing the Affidavit of 
Shawn Monte and 4) Denying IRCP 35 
Examination 
9/25/2014 LEU Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any John T. Mitchell 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Nick Widner Receipt number: 0039516 Dated: 
9/25/2014 Amount: $67.00 {E-payment) 
AFCI DEGLMAN Affidavit Of Computation In Support of Entry of John T. Mitchell 
Judgments 
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Fi icial District Court - Kootenai Coun 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0004713 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, etal. 
User: MITCHELL 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, Heather Montee, Shawn Montee Inc, ABCO Wood Recycling LLC 
Date Code User Judge 
9/25/2014 CERT DEGLMAN Certificate Of Service of Affidavit of Computation John T. Mitchell 
In Support of Entry of Judgments and Proposed 
Judgments 
9/26/2014 OBJT DIXON Objection To Proposed Judgments John T. Mitchell 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/04/2014 03:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Obj to Proposed Judgments; Daugherty 
NOTH JLEIGH Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
MISC DIXON Certificate Of Service Of Response To John T. Mitchell 
Defendants Objection To Proposed Judgments 
And Proposed Judgments 
MISC DIXON Response To Defendants' Objection To Proposed John T. Mitchell 
Judgments 
CVDI HUFFMAN Civil Disposition entered for: ABCO Wood John T. Mitchell 
Recycling LLC, Defendant; Montee, Heather, 
Defendant; Montee, Shawn, Defendant; Shawn 
Montee Inc, Defendant; Wolford, Robert, Plaintiff. 
Filing date: 9/26/2014 
FJDE HUFFMAN Judgment Against Defendant Shawn Montee and John T. Mitchell 
the Marital Community Comprised of Shawn 
Montee and Heather Montee, Husband and Wife 
FJDE HUFFMAN Judgment Against Defendants Shawn Montee, John T. Mitchell 
Inc., an Idaho Corporation dba Shawn Montee 
Timber Company and ABCO Wood Recycling, 
LLC, and Idaho Limited Liability Company 
FILE LEU New File Created----#2----CREATED John T. Mitchell 
10/2/2014 AFFD HUFFMAN Affidavit of Mark A Ellingsen in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs and Fees/Claim 
for Attorney's Fees 
MEMO HUFFMAN Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs and Fees/Claim John T. Mitchell 
for Attorney's Fees 
10/6/2014 NOTH JLEIGH Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
MOTN JLEIGH Motion To Prohibit Issuance Of Writ Of Exeuction John T. Mitchell 
AFFD JLEIGH Affidavit Of Paul W Daugharty In Support Of John T. Mitchell 
Motion To Prohibit Issuance Of Writ Of Execution 
10/9/2014 AFFD JLEIGH Affidavit Of Paul W Daugharty In Support Of John T. Mitchell 
Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment 
MOTN JLEIGH Motion To Alter Or Amend Judgment John T. Mitchell 
NOTH JLEIGH Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
10/14/2014 DEGLMAN Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid John T. Mitchell 
by: Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport Receipt 
number: 0041652 Dated: 10/14/2014 Amount: 
$4.00 (Check) 
MOTN DEGLMAN Motion For Bank Gamishment and Issuance of John T. Mitchell 
Writ of Execution 
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icial District Court - Kootenai Coun 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0004713 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, etal. 
User: MITCHELL 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, Heather Montee, Shawn Montee Inc, ABCO Wood Recycling LLC 
Date Code User Judge 
10/14/2014 AFFD DEGLMAN Affidavit of Amount Due and Owing on Judgment John T. Mitchell 
Against Defendants Shawn Montee, Inc d/b/a 
Shawn Montee Timber Company and ABCO 
Wood Recycling, LLC In Support of Writ of 
Execution and Bank Garnishment 
WRIT DEGLMAN Writ Issued $2,149,506.29 John T. Mitchell 
MOTN DEGLMAN Motion For Bank Garnishment and Issuance of John T. Mitchell 
Writ of Execution 
AFFD DEGLMAN Affidavit of Amount Due and Owing on Judgment John T. Mitchell 
Against Shawn Montee and Heather Montee, 
Husband and Wife In Support of Writ of 
Execution and Bank Garnishment 
WRIT DEGLMAN Writ Issued $2,309,370.29 John T. Mitchell 
10/15/2014 LEU Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any John T. Mitchell 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Nick Widner Receipt number: 0041944 Dated: 
10/15/2014 Amount: $31.00 (E-payment) 
10/16/2014 OBJT JLEIGH Objection To Memorandum Of Attorney's Fees John T. Mitchell 
And Costs And Motion To Disallow 
AFFD JLEIGH Affidavit Of Paul W Daugharty In Support Of John T. Mitchell 
Objection To Memorandum Of Attorney's Fees 
And Costs And Motion To Disallow 
10/17/2014 AFIS DIXON Affidavit Of Paul W Daugharty in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Motion To Quash Writs Of Execution 
MOTN DIXON Emergency Motion To Quash Writs Of Execution John T. Mitchell 
AFSV DIXON Declaration Of Service John T. Mitchell 
10/22/2014 MISC CLEVELAND Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Emergency John T. Mitchell 
Motion to Quash Writ of Execution 
NOTE CLEVELAND Sent to Judge for Review John T. Mitchell 
10/29/2014 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/06/2014 01 :00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Objection to Proposed Judgments; 
Daugherty 
CONT CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
11/04/2014 03:00 PM: Continued Obj to 
Proposed Judgments; Daugherty 
CLAUSEN AMENDED Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/06/2014 01 :00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Attorney Fees 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/06/2014 01 :00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Shorten Time; Ellingsen 
10/30/2014 NOTH JLEIGH Notice Of Hearing On Plaintiffs Memorandum Of John T. Mitchell 
Costs And Fee/Claim For Attorney's Fees And 
Defendants' Objection Thereto 
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icial District Court - Kootenai Coun 
ROA Report 
User: MITCHELL Date: 5/6/2015 
Time: 07:29 AM 
Page 5 of11 Case: CV-2014-0004713 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, etal. 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, Heather Montee, Shawn Montee Inc, ABCO Wood Recycling LLC 
Date Code User Judge 
10/31/2014 DIXON Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to John T. Mitchell 
Supreme Court Paid by: Daugharty, Paul W. 
(attorney for Montee, Shawn) Receipt number: 
0044122 Dated: 10/31/2014 Amount $129.00 
(Check) For: Montee, Shawn (defendant) 
BNDC DIXON Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 44123 Dated John T. Mitchell 
10/31/2014 for 109.00) 
BNDC DIXON Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 44124 Dated John T. Mitchell 
10/31/2014 for 200.00) 
APSC DIXON Appealed To The Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
11/6/2014 DCHH CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
11/06/2014 01 :00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
DCHH CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
11/06/2014 01:00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
DCHH CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
11/06/2014 01 :00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
11/7/2014 CERT MITCHELL Certificate Of Mailing - Clerk's Certificate of John T. Mitchell 
Appeal ****7011 2000 0001 1293 8030*** 
AMOR MCCOY AMENDED Judgment Against Defendants Shawn John T. Mitchell 
Montee Inc, and Idaho Corporation dba/Shawn 
Montee Timber Company and ABCO Wood 
Recycling LLC, an Idaho Limited Liability Compan 
11/12/2014 RTCT MITCHELL Return Certificate John T. Mitchell 
7011 2000 0001 1293 8030 
11/13/2014 AMOR MCCOY AMENDED Judgment Against Defendant Shawn John T. Mitchell 
Montee and the Marital Community Comprised of 
Shawn Montee and Heather Montee, Husband 
and Wife 
11/20/2014 WRNS DIGIOVANNI Writ Returned/Not Satisfied-Final-USB John T. Mitchell 
WRNS DIGIOVANNI Writ Returned/Not Satisfied-Final-WFB John T. Mitchell 
WRNS DIGIOVANNI Writ Returned/Not Satisfied-Final-MWB John T. Mitchell 
WRNS DIGIOVANNI Writ Returned/Not Satisfied-Final-US John T. Mitchell 
WRNS DIGIOVANNI Writ Returned/Not Satisfied-Final-CTC John T. Mitchell 
WRNS DIGIOVANNI Writ Returned/Not Satisfied John T. Mitchell 
WRNS DIGIOVANNI Writ Returned/Not Satisfied-Final-USS John T. Mitchell 
WRNS DIGIOVANNI Writ Returned/Not Satisfied-Final-WFB John T. Mitchell 
WRNS DIGIOVANNI · Writ Returned/Not Satisfied-Final-MWB John T. Mitchell 
WRNS DIGIOVANNI Writ Returned/Not Satisfied-Final-US John T. Mitchell 
WRNS DIGIOVANNI Writ Returned/Not Satisfied-Final-CTC John T. Mitchell 
11/24/2014 MOTN HUFFMAN Motion for Order for Examination of Judgment John T. Mitchell 
Debtors 
12/1/2014 Wolfqr;d.~ontee , ~U""-·. VI"\ I.., ;:;t:N Ordir~Ht~x(iBi\1n~t/6R1 MfJJgWi~nt Debtors John T. Mlt~ee~of 149 
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Fi icial District Court - Kootenai Coun 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0004713 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, etal. 
User: MITCHELL 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, Heather Montee, Shawn Montee Inc, ABCO Wood Recycling LLC 
Date Code User Judge 
12/10/2014 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Quash John T. Mitchell 
01/21/2015 11:30 AM) Doherty 
AFFD JLEIGH Affidavit Of Paul W Daugharty In Support of John T. Mitchell 
Motion To Quash Order For Examination Of 
Judgment Debtors 
MOTN JLEIGH Motion To Quash Order For Examination Of John T. Mitchell 
Judgment Debtors 
NOTH JLEIGH Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
APSC MITCHELL Second Notice of Appeal John T. Mitchell 
12/16/2014 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Order to Show Cause John T. Mitchell 
01/05/2015 11 :30 AM) RE: Debtors Exam, 
Injunction 
Ellingsen 
12/17/2014 ORDR MITCHELL Supreme Court Order Conditionally Dismissing John T. Mitchell 
Appeal 
12/23/2014 AFFD JLEIGH Affidavit Of Mark A Ellingsen In Support Of John T. Mitchell 
Motion For Non-Summary Contempt 
Proceeding/Charges Of Contempt Against 
Judgment Debtors Shawn T Montee And Heather 
Montee 
MOTN JLEIGH Motion For Injunctive Relief John T. Mitchell 
AFFD JLEIGH Affidavit Of Mark A Ellingsen Filed In Support Of John T. Mitchell 
Plaintiffs Motion For Injunctive Relief 
NOTH JLEIGH Application For Charging Order Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
AFFD JLEIGH Affidavit Of Mark A Ellingsen In Support Of John T. Mitchell 
Application For Charging Order 
MOTN JLEIGH Motion/For Non-Summary Contempt John T. Mitchell 
Procedding/Charges Of Contempt As Against 
Judgment Debtors Shawn T Montee And Heather 
Montee And Notice Of Hearing 
MEMS JLEIGH Memorandum In Support Of Motion For John T. Mitchell 
Non-Summary Contempt Procedding/Charges Of 
Contempt As Against Judgment Debtors Shawn T 
Montee And Heather Montee 
MEMO JLEIGH Memorandum In Support Of Plaintiffs Motion For John T. Mitchell 
Injunctive Relief 
12/26/2014 MISC WOOSLEY Notice of Nonappearance John T. Mitchell 
12/31/2014 MITCHELL Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any John T. Mitchell 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Paine Hamblen Receipt number: 0050714 Dated: 
12/31/2014 Amount: $54.00 (E-payment) 
1/5/2015 ORDR CLAUSEN Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Prohibit John T. Mitchell 
Issuance of Writ of Execution and Denying 
Defendants' Motion to Quash Writs of 
Execution/Order Granting Defendants' Motion to 
Alter/Amend Judgments 
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icial District Court - Kootenai Coun 
ROA Report 
User: MITCHELL Date: 5/6/2015 
Time: 07:29 AM 
Page 7 of 11 Case: CV-2014-0004713 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, etal. 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, Heather Montee, Shawn Montee Inc, ABCO Wood Recycling LLC 
Date Code User Judge 
1/7/2015 MISC CLEVELAND Written Appearance by Counsel, Denial of John T. Mitchell 
allegations of Contempt, Affirmative Defenses 
and Request for Trial 
DCHH CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T Mitchel! 
01/07/201511:30AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
1/9/2015 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled John T. Mitchell 
03/09/2015 09:00 AM) 2 DAYS 
HRVC CLAUSEN Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled John T. Mitchell 
scheduled on 04/06/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing 
Vacated 3 DAYS 
CLAUSEN Notice of Trial John T. Mitchell 
1/12/2015 AFWR WOOSLEY Application and Affidavit in Support of Issuance of John T. Mitchell 
Writ of Execution 
WOOSLEY Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Of Execution Paid John T. Mitchell 
by: Mark A Ellingen of Witherspoon, Kelly, 
Davenport Receipt number: 0000959 Dated: 
1/12/2015 Amount: $2.00 (Check) 
WRIT WOOSLEY Writ Issued - $2,355,258.16 John T. Mitchell 
1/15/2015 NLTR MITCHELL Notice of Lodging Transcript John T. Mitchell 
1/16/2015 MITCHELL Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any John T. Mitchell 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Nick Widner Receipt number: 0001546 Dated: 
1/16/2015 Amount: $7.00 (E-payment) 
1/20/2015 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Quash John T. Mitchell 
03/09/2015 09:00 AM) Doherty 
HRVC CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion to Quash scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
01/21/201511:30AM: Hearing Vacated Doherty 
NOTH LUNNEN Amended Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
2/5/2015 BNDC DIXON Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 4127 Dated John T. Mitchell 
2/5/2015 for 343.10) 
CERT LEU Certificate Of Service - Mark A Ellingsen John T. Mitchell 
2/6/2015 CERT MITCHELL Clerk's Certificate Of Service - Clerk's Record on John T. Mitchell 
Appeal (Paul Daugharty) 
2/11/2015 BNDV LEU Bond Converted (Transaction number 206 dated John T. Mitchell 
2/11/2015 amount 109.00) 
BNDV LEU Bond Converted (Transaction number 207 dated John T. Mitchell 
2/11/2015 amount 343.10) 
BNDV LEU Bond Converted {Transaction number 208 dated John T. Mitchell 
2/11/2015 amount 195.00) 
BNDE LEU Cash Bond Exonerated (Amount 5.00) John T. Mitchell 
2/13/2015 RTCT DIXON Return Certificate-7014 2120 0003 7649 9650 John T. Mitchell 
2/19/2015 WRNS LUNNEN Writ Returned/Not Satisfied John T. Mitchell 
WRNS LUNNEN Writ Returned/Not Satisfied John T. Mitchell 
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Fi icial District Court - Kootenai Coun 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0004713 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, etal. 
User. MITCHELL 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, Heather Montee, Shawn Montee Inc, ABCO Wood Recycling LLC 
Date Code User Judge 
2/24/2015 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/03/2015 11 :30 John T. Mitchell 
AM) Shorten Time to Hear Motion to Quash; 
Daugherty 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Quash John T. Mitchell 
03/03/2015 11 :30 AM) Writs; Daugherty 
NOHG HUFFMAN Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
NOHG HUFFMAN Amended Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
MOTN HUFFMAN Motion to Shorten Time John T. Mitchell 
MOTN HUFFMAN Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order John T. Mitchell 
and Injunction 
AFFD LUNNEN Affidavit Of Mark A Ellingsen In Support Of Ex John T. Mitchell 
Parte Temporary Restraining Order And 
Preliminary Injunction 
2/25/2015 ORDR CLAUSEN Order Granting Temporary Restraining Order John T. Mitchell 
3/2/2015 MEMO MCKEON Supplemental Memorandum In Response To John T. Mitchell 
Motion To Quash Debtor's Exam Order 
HRVC CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion to Quash scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
03/09/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated Doherty 
3/3/2015 DCHH CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
03/03/2015 11 :30 AM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
MOTION GRANTED 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Injunction John T. Mitchell 
03/09/2015 09:00 AM) 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Quash John T. Mitchell 
03/03/2015 11 :30 AM) Daugherty 
DCHH CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion to Quash scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
03/03/2015 11 :30 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
MOTION DENIED 
ORDR CLAUSEN Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Shorten John T. Mitchell 
Time 
3/4/2015 ORDR CLAUSEN Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Quash John T. Mitchell 
Order for Examination of Judgment Debtors 
DEGLMAN Filing: L3a - Petition for Review of Judgment of John T. Mitchell 
IDWR, Admin. of Water Rights Paid by: 
Daugharty, Paul W. (attorney for Montee, 
Heather) Receipt number: 0008357 Dated: 
3/4/2015 Amount: $221.00 (Check) For: ABCO 
Wood Recycling LLC (defendant}, Montee, 
Heather ( defendant) and Montee, Shawn 
( defendant) 
BNDC DEGLMAN Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 8358 Dated John T. Mitchell 
3/4/2015 for 100.00) 
NOTC MITCHELL Notice of Appeal John T. Mitchell 
woJM>~Montee M!ifCHELL App§ij~Snl<cJ~h!m~~.@~'i5 John T. ~~et,~I of 149 
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Fi icial District Court - Kootenai Coun 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2014-0004713 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, etal. 
User: MITCHELL 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, Heather Montee, Shawn Montee Inc, ABCO Wood Recycling LLC 
Date Code User Judge 
3/9/2015 DCHH CLAUSEN Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled John T. Mitchell 
scheduled on 03/09/2015 09:00 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
CONT CLAUSEN Hearing result for Preliminary Injunction John T. Mitchell 
scheduled on 03/09/2015 09:00 AM: Continued 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Injunction John T. Mitchell 
03/23/2015 11 :00 AM) 1 HOUR 
CLAUSEN Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
3/11/2015 FACT CLAUSEN Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order John T. Mitchell 
of Contempt Regarding Defendant Shawn 
Montee and Heather Montee 
STAT CLAUSEN Case status changed: Closed pending clerk John T. Mitchell 
action 
3/19/2015 BRIE LUNNEN Brief In Support Of Injunction John T. Mitchell 
MEMO CLEVELAND Memorandum in Opposition to Extension of John T. Mitchell 
Temporary Restraining Order Issued Without 
Notice 
3/23/2015 DCHH HODGE Hearing result for Preliminary Injunction John T. Mitchell 
scheduled on 03/23/201511:00 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Julie Foland 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Under 100 pages 
3/24/2015 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/14/2015 10:00 John T. Mitchell 
AM) Charging Order; Ellingsen 
AFFD STAMPER Affidavit Of Mark A Ellingsen In Support Of John T. Mitchell 
Plaintifrs Memorandum Of Costs And Fees/Claim 
For Attorney's Fee 
MCAF STAMPER Plaintifrs Memorandum Of Costs And Fees/Claim John T. Mitchell 
For Attorney's Fees 
3/25/2015 HUFFMAN Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to John T. Mitchell 
Supreme Court Paid by: Daugharty, Paul 
Wilson (attorney for ABCO Wood Recycling LLC) 
Receipt number: 0011536 Dated: 3/25/2015 
Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Wolford, Robert 
(plaintiff) 
BNDC HUFFMAN Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 11538 Dated John T. Mitchell 
3/25/2015 for 100.00) 
AFIS DIXON Affidavit Of Mark A Ellingsen in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Application For Charging Order/Appointment Of 
Receiver, And Foreclosure 
APPL DIXON Application For Charging Order RE: BKSMM John T. Mitchell 
Investments, LLC, An Idaho Limited Liability 
Company And BKSMM Investments, LLC, A 
Florida Limited Liability Company And Notice Of 
Hearing 
Wolt,"~b'ttlontee , ~~USEN I njuff~ffilrt>r8ij~ Docket #43007-2015 John T. rtfflchl:iJi0 f 149 
Fi icial District Court - Kootenai Coun~ User: MITCHELL 
ROA Report 
Date: 5/6/2015 
Time: 07:29 AM 
Page 10 of 11 Case: CV-2014-0004713 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, etal. 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, Heather Montee, Shawn Montee Inc, ABCO Wood Recycling LLC 
Date Code User Judge 
3/25/2015 APSC MITCHELL Appealed To The Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
3/26/2015 AFSV DIXON Affidavit Of Service-3/25/15-SM and HM John T. Mitchell 
AFSV DIXON Affidavit Of Service-3/25/15-PWD John T. Mitchell 
'l l'>f\l">rl "IC uoc-r- l"'I A I 1r.r-.. I Hearing Scheduied (Motion 04i14i2015 10:00 John T. Mitchell v1vv1,r..v tv nr.vv vL/"\U;::>C::l'I 
AM) ABCO - Jason Piskel 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Debtor's Exam 05/13/2015 John T. Mitchell 
09:00 AM) Jury Room #8 Entire Day - Ellingsen 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/22/2015 02:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Charging Order; Ellingsen 
HRVC CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
04/14/2015 10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Charging Order; Ellingsen 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/22/2015 02:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Charging Order, ABCO - Jason Piskel 
HRVC CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
04/14/201510:00 AM: Hearing Vacated ABCO -
Jason Piskel 
AFFD MCKEON Affidavit Of Kirk Owsley In Support Of Motion For John T. Mitchell 
Approval To Make Regular Distribution To 
BKSMM Investments, LLC 
MOTN MCKEON Third-Party Motion For Approval To Make John T. Mitchell 
Regular Distribution To BKSMM Investments, 
LLC 
NOHG MCKEON Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
4/1/2015 ANHR MCKEON Amended Notice Of Hearing Re: Application For John T. Mitchell 
Charging Order Re: BKSMM Investments, LLC, 
An Idaho Limited Liability Company And BKSMM 
Investments, LLC, A Florida Limited Liability 
Company 
4/6/2015 AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-S.M. & H.M.-4/1/15 John T. Mitchell 
AFSV LEU Affidavit Of Service-P.d.-4/6/15 John T. Mitchell 
4/8/2015 AFFD MCKEON Affidavit Of Paul W. Daugharty In Support Of John T. Mitchell 
Defendants' Objection To Plaintiffs Memorandum 
Of Costs And Fees/Claim For Attorney Fees And 
Morion To Disallow 
OBJT MCKEON Defendants' Objection To Plaintiffs Memorandum John T. Mitchell 
Of Costs And Fees/Claim For Attorney Fees And 
Morion To Disallow 
4/9/2015 NOTC ROBB Notice of Delivery of Original Transcipt John T. Mitchell 
4/15/2015 MISC DIXON Plaintiffs Response To Third-Party ABCO's John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Approval Regarding Distribution To 
BKSMM Investments, LLC 
AFFD DIXON Affidavit Of Mark A Ellingsen Regarding 30(b)(6) John T. Mitchell 
Deposition Of ABCO Recycling, LLC, A 
Washington Limited Liability Company 
4/21/2015 wo1SANl.<Montee , miGLMAN NotioopafrfJliogi$~~Y-Rr1JCeeding John T. f'fi~~l!!M of 149 
Fi icial District Court - Kootenai Coun User: MITCHELL 
ROA Report 
Date: 5/6/2015 
Time: 07:29 AM 
Page 11 of 11 Case: CV-2014-0004713 Current Judge: John T. Mitchell 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, etal. 
Robert Wolford vs. Shawn Montee, Heather Montee, Shawn Montee Inc, ABCO Wood Recycling LLC 
Date Code User Judge 
4/21/2015 STAT DEGLMAN Case status changed: Inactive John T. Mitchell 
4/22/2015 DCHH CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
04/22/2015 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
DCHH CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
04/22/2015 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel, 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
5/4/2015 NLTR MITCHELL Notice of Lodging Transcript On Appeal - Julie John T. Mitchell 
Foland (3/3/15 and 3/9/15 and 3/23/15) 
ORDR DEGLMAN Order on Third-Party Motion for Approval to Make John T. Mitchell 
Regular Distributions to BKSMM Investments LLC 
Wolford vs Montee , etal Supreme Court Docket #43007-2015 Page 14 of 149 
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2 
Mark A. Ellingsen, ISB No. 4720 
l WITHERSPOON KELLEY 
4 Attomeya & CounseJon 
The Spokesman Review Building 
, 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alono; Ida..lto 838 t S 
6 Telephone: (208) 667-4000 
7 Facsimile: (208) 667-8470 
8 Attomeysfor Plaintiff Robert Wolford 




!N THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDIClAL DISTRICT OF 














SHAWN MONTEE ·and HEATHER MONTEE, 
husband and wife; SHAWN MONTEE, INC., an 
Idaho Corporation d/b/a SHA W'N MONTEE 
TIMBER COMPANY; and ABCO WOOD 
RBCYCLINO, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
company, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2014-4713 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK A. ELLINGSEN 
IN SUPPORT OP MOTION FOR NON-
SUMMARY CONTEMPT 
PROCEBDINO/CHARG'ES OF 
CONTEMPT AGAINST JUDGMENT 
DEBTORS SHAWN T. MONTEE AND 
HEATHER MONTEE 
21 
State ofldaho ) 
: ss. 
22 County of Kootenai ) 
Mark A. Ellingsen. being first duly swom on oath, deposes and says: 23 
24 
1. That I am the attorney for the Plaintiff above-named. That I am over the age of 
25 
eighteen years of age and am competent to testify in this matter. 
26 
27 2. On December 1, 2014, this Court entered an Order for Examination of 
28 Judgment Debtors {hereinafter referred to as "Order") which required that Judgment Debtors, 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK A. ELLINGSEN IN SUPPORT OF MOTION POR NON-SUMMARY CONTEMPT 
PR.OCEED1NOS1CHAR.05S OF CONTEMPT AOAINSi JUDOMBNT D5BTOllS SHAWN T. MONm1$ AND 
H6ATHi'R MONTEi---·~'PAGE 1 
K:\wd~\Odl111alil\95IOAIUUOl\t:Ol ll4~1.1Xk,'X 














WlIH~H~¥00N KELLEY ~.2-23-14 11: 56 Pg: 1b,l.ts 
Shawn Montee and Heather Montee produce tor inspection and copying at Plaintiffs counsel's 
office located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300, Coeur d'Alene:, ldaho 83814 a variety of 
financial documents which were more particularly describccl in Exhibit A whioh was att1:tohed to 
the Order. These financial do~uments wore required to be produced not later than December 11, 
2014. 
3, Judgmont Debtors: Shawn Montee and Heather Montee did not comply with this 
Court's· order as referenced above and failed to produce for inspection and copying those 
financial documents at Plaintiff's counsel's office located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 
300. Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 by December 11, 2014. As of the date of this affidaVit, 
Judgment Debtors Shawn Montee and Heather Montee still have failed to produce any financial 
documents tbr copying and inspection as required by the Order. 
4. On December 1, 2014 this Court entered an Order for Examination of Judgm.ont 
15 Debtors which required that Judgment Debtor Shawn Montee appear at the offices of 
16 
Witherspoon Kelley, located at 608 Northwest Boulovard, Suite 300, Coour d'Alene, Idaho 
17 
18 
83814 on the 18111 day of December, 2014, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. to make discovery under 





10:00 a.m. at the offices of Witherspoon Kelley, located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300, 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 on the 181b day of December 2014, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. and 
was prepared to depose Shawn T. Montee pursuant to the Order. However, 1udgment Debtor 
Shawn Montee failed to appear at the offi~s of Witherspoon Kelley, located at 608 Northwest 
2.4i Boulevard, Suite 300, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 on the 13th day of December 2014, at the 




AfflOAVJT OP MARK A. ELLlNOSEN IN SUP.'PORT OF MOTION FOR NOJ.'11°SUMMARY CONTBMPT 
PROC!EDJNCiSICHAROBS OP CONTaMPT AGAINST ruDOMBNT l)ESTOP.S SHAWN T. MONTE£ AND 
HEATHi~ MON1'E£-PAGF. 2 
K;\wdolll\w&m"n\t51MIOOOI\U'111241 l.l)QQX 
olford vs Montee , etal Supreme Court Docket #43007-2015 Page 16 of 14 
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5. On December 1, 2014 this Court entered an Order for Examination of Judgment. 
2 Debtors which required that Judgment Debtor Heather Montee appear at the offices of 
3 Witherspoon Kelley, located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
4 
83814 on the H>tb day of December, 20141 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. to make discovery under 
oath. Your affi.ant. along with a court reporter from M k M Court Reporting, was preser.t a.t 
6 
7 10:00 a.m. at the offices of Witherspoon Kelley, lo~atecl at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300, 
Coeur d'Alene, tdaho 83814 on the 19th day of Decem'ber 2014. at the hour of 10:00 a.m. and 
9 was prepared to depose Heather Montee pursuant to the Order. However, Judgment Debtor 
10 
Heather Montee failed to appear at the offices of Witherspoon Kelley, located at 608 Northwest 
11 
Boulevard, Suite 300, Coeur d'Alene, ldaho 8·3814 on the 191h day of December, 2014, at the 
12 
13 hour of 10:00 a.m. to make discovery 1mdcr oath as required by the Order. 
14 6. At all times material, Judgment Debtors Shawn Montee and Heather Montee 
15 have been represented by attorney Paul w. Daugharty. Paul W. Daugharty was served with a 
16 
copy of the Order via ta.csimile on D~eember 1, 2014 as cvidcnoed by the CcrtinQate of Service 
17 
which is contained on page 3 of the Order. Furthermore, Judgment Debtor's Motion to Quuh 
18 










APFIDAV IT OF MARK A. ELLINGSEN lN SUPPORT OP MOTION FOR NON-SUMMARY CONTEMPT 
PROCEEDJNGS/CHAROl!S OP CONT~MPT AGAINST 1Vl)OM.ENT DEBTORS SHAWN T. MONTEE AND 
HEATHER MONTJm-PAGE 3 
i,1\Wlluo1lwlm1uM,104\0C!OIICOlll411.l>OCX 
olford vs Montee , etal Supreme Court Docket #43007-2015 Page 17 of 1 
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II 
2014 by attorney Paul Daugharty clearly demonstrates that Judgment Dt1btors, and their 
2 counsel~ received a copy of the Order. 













~ ../'l J 
MmkA~04 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me tm.23rdday of December, 2014. 
IS 
1 certify that on th.is~ day of Deoombcr, 2014, I caused a true and correct copy of 












SUMMARY CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS/CHARGES OF CONTEMPT AGAINST 
JUDGMENT DEBTORS SHAWN T. MONTEE AND HEATHER MONT.EE to be forwarded, 
with all required charges prepaid, by the mcthod(s) indicated below, to the following person(s): 
Paul W. Daugherty 
Paul\V. Daugharty,P.A. 
Attorney at Law 
110 East Wallace A venue 




Via fax: (208) 666-0SSO 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK A. ~LUNGSEN IN SUPPORT OP MOTION FOR NON•SUMMARY CONTEMPT 
PROC:EEDINGS/CHAR.O!S 01' CONTEMPT AOAJNST Jl)l)OM.EN'i' .Df!BTORS SHAWN T. MONTcf: AND 
HJlATHER MONTEE-PAO!:. 4 
K:lwdoos~\95104\UUOl\(~1124' t.oor.x 
Wolford vs Montee , etal Supreme Court Docket #43007-2015 · Page 18 of 1 9 
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t 
2 Mark A. Ellingsen, JSB No. 4720 
3 
WITHERSPOON KELLEY 
Attorneys & Counselors 
.. ;· .... 
.. The Spokesman Review Building 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300 





Anorneys for Plaintiff Robert Wofford 
8 
9 
,, .".',. \ ,• 
10 
11 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TH.B f1RST 1UDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE· 
STATE OF IDAHO; IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
12 




SHAWN MONTEE and HEATHER MONTEB, 
17 husband and wife, SHAWN MONTEE, INC., an 
18 
Idaho corporation dba SHAWN MONTEE 
TIMBER COMPANY; and ABCO WOOD 




Case No. CV-2014-4713 
MOTTON/FOR NON-SUMMARY 
CONTEMPT PR.OCEED1NG/CHAR.0ES 
OF CONTEMPT AS AGAINST 
JUDGMENT DEBTORS SHA:\VN T. 
MONTEE AND HEATHER MONTEE, 
AND NOTlCE OF HEARING 
Date: January 7, 201S 
Time: 11 :30 a.m. 
Judge: John T. Mitchell 
21 
22 COMES NOW Robert Wolford, PlaintifE/Petitioner, by and through his attomeys af 
23 
record. Mark A. BlHnssen of Witherspoon Kelley, and moves this Court. pursuant to Idaho 
. 24 
23 
Rule of Civil Procedure 75 and Idaho Code § 7-601. et seq .• for commencement of a non-
26 summary contempt proceedings. Plaintiff alleges the following Charges of Contempt 
27 respecting Defendants/Respondents, Shawn Montee and Heather Montee Judgment Debtors. 
21\ 
II 
This Motion/Charges of Contempt is supported by the Affidavit of Mark A. Emngsen filed 
MOTION FOR NON•SUMMARV CONTEMPT PROCEEOlNG 
AND NOTlC.E OP ffEAR!NO-PAOE 1 
K:\wlloM'oo..,,...;..IOI IOII\OOOll(,'0112161,I IIOI'! 
Wolford vs Montee , etal Supreme Court Docket #43007-2015 
c;. "'...., ~. -----.. ( ... · ,I ' ' 
. . /.I . 
1 hercWith, the pleadings, mt>tions and records filed in this matter, and the arguments to be made· 
2 
at the time set for hearing this Motion. 
3 
' 
This motion fbr commencemant of a non-summary contempt proceeding/Charges of 
s Contempt respecting Defendants/Respondents, Shawn Montee and Heather Montee Judgment 
6 Dehtoni is based on the following undisputed faots which support two separate charges of 





CONTEMPT CHARGE J; .rupGMENJ DEBTOR SHAWN M.OXCIE MD 
BEATBQ MQNTQ'S·fAJLURE JO PRODUCE FINANCIAL RECQRQS AS 
REQUIRED PURSUANT TO Tms COURT'S DECEMBER 1, 2014 ORDER. 
On December 1, 2014, this Court entered an Order for Examination of Judgment 





Montee and Heather Montee produce for inspection and copying at Plaintiffs counsel's office 
located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 a variety of 
financial documents which were more particularly described in Exhibit A which was attadlc,d 











December 11, 2014. As identified in the Affidavit of Mark A. Ellingsen and the deposition 
transcripts which are filed and served concWTently with this motion, Judgment Debtor's Shawn 
Montee and Heather Montee did not comply with this Court's order as referenced above and 
failed to produce for inspection and c01>:vina those financial documents at Plaintiffs C01:ll1Se1 's 
office located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 by 
December 11, 2014. As of the date of tbis motion, to date, Judgment Debtors Sha~ Montee 
and Heather Montee still have failed to produce any financial documents for copying and 
inspection. Judgment Debtors Shawn Montee and Heather Montee should both be tbund in 
MOTTON FOR NON-SUMMARY CONTEMPT PROCEEDING 
AND NOTIC:ll: ()f H~AIUNO-l"AGE 2 
C:llJSIJUICONN!BMW'l'OATA\WC'-AJ..\'l"HMl'\WTICilC\21il6\0l'tWIOOIIMiltiuD rurCow.Glllll (l.VI ll)li.SIXIIJll),doc 
Wolford vs Montee , etal Supreme Court Docket #43007-2015 
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CONTEMPT CHARGE 2: JUDGMENT DEBTORS SHAWN MONTEE'S AND 
HEATH.ER MONTEE'§ FAILURE TO APPEAR AND PROVIDE TESTIMONY 
AS REQUIRED BY DECEMBER 1. 2014 COURT ORDER. 
On December 1, 2014 this Court entered an Order for Examination of Judgment 
7 Debtors which required that Judgment Debtor Shawn Montee appear at the offices of 
8 
Witherspoon Kelley, located at 608 Northwest Boulevard~ Suite 300~ Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
9 
83814 on the 18th day of December, 2014, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. to make discovery under 
10 
11 oath, an.cl that Judgment Debtor Heather Montee appear at the offices of Witherspoon Kelley, 
12 located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 on the 19111 day of 
13 D~ember, 2014, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. to make discovery under oath. Judgment Debtor 
14 
Shawn Montee failed. to appear at the offices of Witherspoon Kelley,.lncated at 608 Northwest 1, 
16 
Boulevard, Suite 300, Coew- d'Alene, Idaho 83814 on the 18111 day of Dc,ombcr, 2014, it the 
17 hour of l 0:00 a.m. to make discovery under oath. Furthermore Judgment Debtor Heather 
11:1 Montee failed to appear at the offices of Witherspoon Kelley, located at 608 Northwest 





hour of 10:00 a.m. to make discovery under oath. Judgment Debtors Shawn Montee and 
Heather Montee should both be fowid in contempt for their failure to comply with the Court's 
order requiring them to appear at the offices of Witherspoon Kelley, located at 608 Northwest 
'· 






hour of 10:00 a.m. to make discovery under oath. 
MOTION FOR NON•SUMM~RY CONTEMPT PROCEEDINO 
AND NOTICE Of ~0-PAOJS 3 
IC.!\wdoa1\ild1111Al4\9$104\000 I\C'.111125418,'Mr. 
Wolford vs Montee , etal Supreme Court Docket #43007-2015 Page 21 rf 149 
2 
SERVICE OF COURT ORDER ON COUNSEL FOR JUDGMENT DEBTOR'S 
SHAWN MONTEE AND H§ATHQ MONTEE. 
At all times material, Judgment Debtors Shawn Montee and Heather Montee have been 
4 represented by attorney Paul W. Daugharty. Paul W. Daugharty was served with a copy of the 
s 
Order via fawaimilc by on December 1, 2014 as evidenced by the Certificate of Service which is 
6 
contained on page 3 of the Order. Furthermore, Judgment Debtor's Motion to Quash Order for ., 
8 Examination of ludgmont Debtors which was filed with this Court on DKember 10, 2014 by 
9 attorney Paul Daugharty clearly demonstrates that Judgment Debtors, and their counsel, 





Plaintiff requests that this Court impose against Judgment Debtors Shawn Montee and 
14 Heather Montee those criminal and/or civil sanctions as provided by I.R.C.P. Rule 75 and 
1s Idaho Code§ 7-601, et seq. as this Court deems just and equitable. Plaintiff submits that given 














for contempt by this Court which is limited to a civil (monetary) sanction will be ineffective in 
pUJlisbing the disobedience of th; lawful Order which wu committed by Judgment Debtors 
Sluiwn Montee and Hoa.thor Montee. Instead, this Court should fashion a aanotion order which 
will accomplish what was required J)Ut'Suant to the Order and adequately punish Judgment 
Debtors Shawn Montee and Heather Montee for their disrcaard of the Order. The Court should 
enter an order that Judgment Debtors Shawn Montee and Heather Montee produce those 
financial records which were required pursuant to the Order within five (S) days. Thereafter, 
Judgment Debtors Shawn Montee and Heather Montee should each be ordered incarcerated for 
five (5) days as provided by Idaho § 7-601, et seq. Furthermore, during this period. of 
incarceration, this Court should order that Judgment Debtors Shawn Montee and Heather 
MOTION FOR NON-SUMMARY CONTEMPTPROC.EED1NO 
AND NOTJCB OF HEARINO-PAOR 4 
K,lwdoceladA•11•ln\OS I 04\000 I \(XI I ,l!!dUJOC 
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1 Montee appear at the Kootenai County 1 ail Contact Room located in the Kootenai County Jail, 
2 
5500 North Government way, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815 to make discovery under oath as 
3 
previously required pursuant to this Court's Order. Further, Plaintiff requests an award of bis 
4 
5 a.ttomey's fees and '-0Sts u incurred in prosecuting this motion as provided by I.R.C.P. 7S(m) 
























DATED this _j_ day of December, 2014. 
WITHERSPOON KELLEY 
/l!Jbc 
Mark A. Ellingsen " 
Attorneys for Plamti:m'Petitioner 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOT1FIED that e hearing on Wol~rd's Motion for Non-summary 
Contempt Proceedings/Charges of Contempt will be held on the 7th day of January, 2015 at 
11:30 a.m. or as soon thereafter as oounse1 may be heard, before the Honorable John T. 
Mitchell, District Judge, at the Kootenai County Courthouse, 324 W. Garden Avenue, 
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho 83814, or as soon thereafter as Petitioner's Motion may be heard. 
DATED this ~ S day of December. 2014. 
WITHERSPOON KELLEY 
~ 
Mark A. Ellingsen f 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Petitioner 
MOTION FOR NON-SUMMARY CONTEMPT PR.OCEBDJNO 
AND NOTICE OF .HEAR.JNG--P ~OE S 
~l111docalr.damnln\1)$104\0Cl!II IC(I I IZS68,tl()C 
Wolford vs Montee , etal Supreme Court Docket #43007-2015 Page 23 f 149 
C RTlFlCAT SERVlCE 
2 l. the undersigned, certify that on the day of December, 2014, 1 caused a true an 
3 correct copy of the MOTION/FOR NON-SUMMARY co 
4 PROCEEDING/CHARGES OF CONTEMPT AS AGAINST JUDGMENT DEBTORS SHA 
5 
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TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIR.ST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 







SHAWN MONTEE and HEATHeR MONTEE, 
17 husband and wife, SHAWN MONTEB, IC., an 
Idaho corporation dba SHAWN MONTEE 
TIMBER COMPANY; and ABCO WOOD . 




Case No. CV .. 2014.4713 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OP 
MOTION fOR NON-SUM.MARY 
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINO/CHAROES 
Of CONTEMPT AOAlNST 
JUDGMENT DEBTORS SHA'WN T. 









Petitioner/Plaintiff Robert Wolford (hereinafter referred to as ttWolford") has tiled a 
Motion for Non-Summary Contempt Proceedings/Charges of Contempt against Judgment 
Debtors Shawn T. Montee and Heather Montee(hereinafter "Contempt Motion") Wolford 
provides this Memorandum in Support of his Contempt Motion/Charges. 
MEMORAND\JM IN SUPPORT Of MOTION FOR. CONTEMPT-PAOE I 
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Judgment was inJt!ally entered in favor of Wolford in this matter on September 261 2014 
as against J1.1dgment Debtors Shawn T. Montee and Heather Montee (hereinafter collectively 
4 
5 referred to as "the Montecs") in the a.mount of $2·130S1160.71. On October 6, 2014, the 
6 Montccs tiled a motion with the Court to prohibit the issuance of a writ of exeoution md A 
























pmish the funds which may have been held by the Montees at a variety of banks. Thereafter, 
on Ot.,1ober 6, 2014, the Montees filed a motion to quash the writs of execution. On 
November 6, 2014' at a hearing on the matter, the Court ultimately denied ~e Montees' motion 
to quash the writs of ~xecution. Instead, the Court simply granted the Montees' pcndin& motion 
to amend the judgments and on November 10, 2014, entered an amended judgment in the sum 
of 52,321,037.71. On November 21, 2014, the Sherlt'fofKootcnaf County submJtted a return 
on the outstanding writs of execution which reflected only that $47 .19 had been collc:ctod from 
the Montees' accounts from the bank garnishment. However, Wolford incurred the su.m of 
$364.81 in expenses charged ~y the Kootenai County Sheriff's office for service of the writ of 
execution. 
At thi~ point, Wolford was unaware of the nature, extent, or location of any accounts, 
personal property, or other assets of the Montees which could be successfully executed upon in 
order to satisfy the outstanding judgment. Therefore, on November 24, 2014 Wolford filed a 
motion with this Court setskjng an order requiring the Mon tees to produce a variety of financial 
documents to counsel and to later appear at a deposition in order that Wolford's counsel could 
inqwre about tne nature and extent of the Montees' assets whtch could be executed upon. On 
Noveanber 24, 2014, the Court entered an Order for Examination of Judgment Debtors 
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1 (hereinafter referred to as "Order") which required the Montees to produce for inspection and 
2 
copying the requested financial documents not later than December 11, 2014 and for Montee to 





7 by this Order. Furtbonnorc, despite this Order, Shawn Montee and Heather Montee failed tQ 
8 
appear and submit to questioning under oath as required. Instead, on December 10, 2014 th~ 
9 
Montees filed a 1notion to quash the Order. Jn their motion. the Montees challenge the legality 
I 0 
11 of this Court's Order. Plaintiff submits that the challenge made by the Montees for the reasons 





delaying Wolford's lawful right to obtain ~a.ncial records and to depose the Montees about 
assets which could be executed upon in order to satisfy the unpaid judgment. 
Wolford submits that the Montees' disregard of this Court's Order justifies the charges 
17 . of contempt which are sou&ht by Wolford and the relief which is requested in Wolfotd's 











1. NON-SUMMARY CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS 
Pursuant to IRCP 75(c)(2);Wolford may initiate a proceeding for contempt via a motion 
and affidavit. The written charge of contempt or affidavit must alleae the specific facts 
constituting the contempt. IRCP 75(c)(3). Fwther, as in the case at hand, if the alleged 
contempt is a violation of a court order, the written charge or affidavit must allege that either 
the respondent or respondent's attomey was served with a copy of the order or had actual 
knowledge of it. lRCP 75(e)(3). The written charge or affidavit need not allege facts showing 
that the respondent's failure to comply with the court order was willful. IRCP 7S(c)(J). 
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II 
J In this case, Wolford has set out in both his written charges/motion and supportina 
2 
affidavit those specific facts which support the contempt charges (i.e., Shawn Montec's and 
3 
Heather Montcc's failure to appear for the Court Orclercd Debtor's Examination ancl failure to 
4 
5 produce any financial docum~ts as required by the: Court Order). Fl.litbcnno~, the court 
o record reflects, via. Montee's Motion to Quash Omer for Debt.or's Exa..'!'., t.1-iat Shawn Montee's 
7 and Heather Montee's counsel obtained a copy of tho Order. 
8 
9 
Accordin9ly, this Court must proceed forward with the conteinpt proceedings against 
Shawn Montee and Heather Montee as promulaatcd by lRCP 75(fJ, IRCP 7S(g) and 75(i). This 
10 
11 would include giving the Montees their required advice at the initial al)pearance scheduled for 

















initial hearing, and setting the matter for a trial if the Montccs deny the charges of contempt. 
Since Wolford is seeking incarceration as a penalty, the Court will have to advise Shawn 
Montee and Heather Montee at this initial hearing of their right _to counsel through this 
contempt proceeding. IRCP 7S(t)(3), 
2. MONTEE'S CHALLENGE TO THIS COURT'S ORDER IS WITHOUT 
MERIT, 
There is simply no dispute that the Montees violated the Order by failing to appear for 
the debtor's examination and by failing to produce any financial documents as required by the 
Court order. Instead, the Montees claim that they were not required to comply with this Order 
due to the arguments which they assert in their Motion to Quash which was filed on 
December 1, 2014. 
In this case, Wolford previously moved forward and executed upon the judgment he 
obtained against Montee via the writ of execution. The writ of execution was returned 
unsatisfied by the Kootenai County Sheriffs office and was filed with this Court on 
I MEMORANDUM lN SUPPORT OF MOTION POR CONTEMPT-PAO£ 4 J(.,l..a-'4d.a-.•in\fl!ln.llMOI\Olll.?4J7J)OC I Wolford vs Montee , etal Supreme Court Docket #4,3007-2015 Page 28I f 149 
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.11 
1 November 21. 2014. In these returns, the Kootenai County Sheriff's Deputy Carey L. Holicek 
2 
executed a number of documents which certified that the writ of execution was being returned 
3 
to the Court unsatisfied-in that the Writ process failed to obtain funds which would satisfy the 
4 
5 outstanding judgment. 
6 











Chapter S, afthe Idaho Code. l.R.C.P. 69(c) states: 
In aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor or successor in interest 
when that interest appears of record, may obtain discovery from any person, 
including the judgment debtor, as provided in these rules and may examine any 
person. including the judgment debtor. in the manner provided by the practice of 
this state. 
Based upo11 the broad language provided by I.R.C.P. 69(c), Wolford has every right to 
obtain a court order which would pennit Wolford to examine Shawn Montee and Heather 
Montee under oath about their assets and in a fashion which would aid in future executions 
upon the underlying judgment-regardless of whether a writ of execution had been issued by 









I.R'.C.P. 69(c), Wolford has the a'1thority to compel the Montecs to produce financial records 
which, again, might aid in Wolford's future executions upon the underlying judgment. 
Furthermore, Idaho Code § 11-501 (not Idaho Code § 11.so2 as argued by the Montees 
in their motion to quash) is the statute which pertains to the debtor's examination requested by 
Wolford via his motion. Idaho Code§ 11-501 states: 
When an execution against property of the judgment debtor or of any of several 
debtors in the same judgment, issued to the sheriff of the county where he 
resides ... is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part the judgment creditor, at any 
ii.me after such return is made, is entitled to an order from the judge of the court 
requiring such judgment debtor to appear and answer upon oath concerning his 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR CONTEMPT-PAOE S 
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property, before such judge, or a referee appointed by him, at a time and place 
specified in the order .... 
~ ~. --~ --
3 In this case, it is an undisputed fact that a writ of execution had been issued by this court on the 
4 judgment was returned unsatisfied by the Kootenai County Sheriffs Office. Given this fact, 
5 
Wolford haa a statutory right, pursuant to Idaho Code § l 1•501, tl) seek a court order requiring 
Ci 
a debtor's exam so that assets might be identified which could ultimately result in another writ 
? 
8 · of exec\ltion being suc~essfully executed upon. In thia case, the Montees challenge the Court's 
9 ability to enter an order regarding a judgment debtor exam on the premise that the underlying 


















However, we have already dealt with the issue of the legality of this particular writ of 
execution in previous arguments which the Montees made before this Court (i.e .• see Montees' 
Motion to Quash the Writ of' Execution). The C".,ourt has already considered these arguments in 
the past and denied Montees' challenges to the Writ of execution. Regardless, the purported 
"legality" of the writ of execution should not be a factor when considering whether a court 
ordered debtor's examination ga.n o,Q\11' purs\l&llt to ldaho Code: f ll·S01. The pwposc of 
Idaho Code § l l•SOl is to give a judgment creditor the authority to compel an examination of 
the judgment debtor when the judgment creditor has attempted an e"ecution on the judgment 
and these actions ultimately failed to satisfy a judgment. The whole point of this statute is 
when it is clear that a judgment creditor has unsuccessfully executed upon a judament. then the 
judgment creditor has the right to obtain a court order to depose the Judgment debtor so that a 
subsequent execution may be successful. ~ere is nothing in this statute, or the case law 
interpreting this particular statute, which states that a debtor's examination cannot be ordered 
when there 1nay have been some purported defect to an underlying writ of execution which was 
returned unsatisfied. 
MEMORANDUM 1N SUPPORT Of MOTION FOR C:ONTEMPT-PAOE 6 
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As stated above, the Montees' challenge to this Court's Order is without merit. Instead, 
the Montees blatantly disregard this Court's order and unjustifiably block Wolford's lawful 
4 
s attempts to obtain infonnation about assets whieh might be executed upon in order to satisfy· 
6 the large judgment which is due and owing hm the Montees to Wolford. Therefore, both 
7 Shawn Montee and Heather Montee must bo found in contempt for. their disregard of the Order. 
8 
And, when the Court consider1r1 the sanctioa/pmalty to l,e imposed upon the Montees, Wolford 
g 
submits that incarceration must be utili2ed as the only effective sanction. In this case. the 
10 
11 Montees already owe in excess of S2 million to Wolford. An additional monetary/civil 
















Instead, this Court should fashion a sanction order which will accomplish what was required 
pursuant to the Order and adequately punish the Montees for their disregard of the Court's 
order. As such, Wolford proposes that the Montees be ordered to produce those financial 
records which were required pursuant to the Order within five (S) days. Thereafter, Shawn 
Montee and Heather Montee would be ordered in~arQCITTl.ted in jail for a period of five (S) days 
as a penalty for their ~ntempt pursuant to Idaho Code § 7-601 . During their incarceration 
period, Shawn Montee and Heather Montee would bo required to appear at the Kootenai 
County Jail Contact Room loc:ated in the Kootenai County Jail to make discovery under oath as 
proviously required pursuant to this Court's Order. 
DATED this --Z.. '?day of December, 2014. 
Ma.rlc A. El1ingsen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff' 
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4 CONTEMPT PROCEEDING/CHARGES OF CONTEMPT AS AGAINST JUDOMEN 
5 
DBBTORS SHAWN T. MONTEE AND HEATHER MONTEE, AND NOTICE Of HEARIN 
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Paw W. Daugharty 
Paul W. Da.ugharty, P.A. 
Attomey at Law 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDIClAL DISTRICT OP THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 





.Plaintiff.. · EXP ARTE MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTAINlNG ORDER 
AND INJUNCTION 
SHAWN MONTEE and HEATHER MONTEE, 
17 bus.band and ~ife, -SHAWN MONTE~, INC., an 
18 
. ~d~~ coxporation; dba· SHA~ .MON':f~I$ · · . 
· . TIMBER COMP A.NY; arid ABCO WOOD 












Plaintiff, (hereinafter.referred to as "Wolford"), by ~d through his counsel, Mark A. 
Ellingsen of the firm Witherspoon Kelley move.s the Co:urt pursuant to I.R. ~.P. 65(b) and 
I.R.C.P .. 65(e) for an Ex Pa.rte Temporary Res~g order and Preliminary Injunction against 
Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather. Montee (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Montee''). 
This motion is suppo~e.d:by the pleadings ~d case file to date and the Affidavit of 
: Mark A. Ellingsen in support of Motion fo.r:E.~ ?.~~ ~estr:aining Or.4er. and Jnj~ction. 
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Undertaking(Bond: Wolford has already obtained a judgment agamst all of the 
2 Defendants noted in this case:: in an amount in excess of$2,000,000.00. As of the date of this 
3 Motion, the entire unpaid principal balance, plus accrued interest on these judgments remains 
a 





submits that Montoc will not suffer damage: by an entry of a restraining order which enjoins 
Montee from committing those acts specified herein and which requires Montee to account for 
assets of their business entities. If the CoW1 is going to require the posting of security pursuant 
to l.R.C.P. 6S( c ), then the court should simply ent« an order whereby the Court could invoke its 
powers of offset to essentially credit any provable damages suffered by Montee against th~ 
10 . . 
11 
12 
.amount due and owi~g from Montee pursu~t to the underlyingjudgm~ts. 
As stated in the Affidavit of Mark A. Ellingsen filed with this Court, Wolford is suffering· 
. . 
13 














then making fraudulent transfers of assets :in a manner to circumvent Wolford's collection efforts. 
EX PARTE ORDER REQUIRED 
As set forth in the Affidayit ofMar:k; A. Ellingsen, Wolford has reason to believe that 
based upon Montee's co:pduct that regular notice of this motion may simply result·~ further 
immedi.ate arid inep~able injur.y-naniely·that Montee may conduct ~er acts to transfer 
.and/or conceal assefs which would further int.erfere with .w Qlford's ability to lawfully collect 
upon his ~paid judgments. 
'\VWi;REFORE, WOLFORD RES~ECl'FULLY REQUESTS: 
1. Pending the Injunction. h~g, Shawn Montee and }leather Montee. and their 
agents, servants, employees, attorneys and other p~ons acting under, in concert with, or for 
them, are enjoined and restrained ~m creating or forming any further business entities, which 
would it;iclude, ~ut not be limited to, limited liability companies, corporations, or limited 
n partnerships without first obtaining approval by tbis Court. 
28 
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2. Pending the Injunction hearing, Shawn Montee and Heather Montee, and their 
.igcnts, Ecrv:mte:, eroployeeo, uttomeyo and othor persons acting uud~r, i.t1 C.Ol\\':.¢.l.'t ·~ il.h, v.1. fU1 
them, are enjoined 11t1d restrained from removing, concealing, hiding, encumbering, 
4 
5 commingling, selling, conveying, disposing of, o.r trans_ferring any asset of BKSMM 
6 Investments, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, BKSMM Investments, LLC, an Idaho 
7 limited liability company, or any other asset of an entity in which Sha~ Montee, Heather 
8 
9 
Montee, or any other-business entity in which Shawn Montee and Heather Montee have an 
interest with.out first obtaining approval by this Court. 
10 
11 3. Pending the Injunction hearin,g, Shawn Montee and Heath.er Montee, and their 






them, are enjoined and restrained from removjng, concealing, hiding, encumbering, 
. commingling, selling, conveying, disposing of, or transferring any asset in which Shawn 
Montee and H~th.cr Montee have an interest without first obtaining approval by ~s Court. 
4. Pending the Injunction hearing, Shawn Montee and Heather Montoc shall 
18 d~sclose to Wolford th~natur.e and location Qfthose assets ofBSMM Investments~ LLC, 










Shawn Montee or Heather Montee have an interest. Shawn Montee and-Heather Montee shall 
provide this information. to counsel fQr Wolford not lat~ than March 4, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. 
5. Pending the Injunction hearing, Shawn Montee.$1d Heather Montee, and their 
agt::n.ts·, servants, em.ploy~s, attorneys and other persons acting under, in concert with, or for 
them, are enjoined and restrained from makn;tg any further inter-company or intra-company 
asset transfers, mergers, or from committing any fraudulent conveyances. This would include 
any a.ssc;t transfers between entities in whjch either Shawn Montee or Heath.a Mo~ have an 
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interest or any entitjes which are either managed or controlled by either Shawn Montee and/or 
Heather Montee. 
6. That the Court set the matter for a hearing regarding Wolford's request for an 
Injunction and that said hearing be schedu~ed. either on March 9, 2015 or March 1 O, 2015 at a 
time that the Court feels is most convenient. After the Preliminary Injunction hearing, Wolford· 
requests that the Court issue an Injunction enjoining ?v[ontee in a manner consistent viith the 
terms of the Temporary Restraming Order issued by this Court. 
7. The Court issue an order of relief as it deems just and equitable. 
Dated this 24th dayofFebruary,2015. 
WITHERSPOON KELLEY 
Mark A. Ellingsen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Attpmeys & Counselors 
The Spokesman Review Building 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene. Idaho 83815 
Telephone: (208) 667-4000 
Facsimile: (208) 667-8470 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Robert Wolford 
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 








SHAWN MONT;EE and HEATHER MONTEE, 
husband and wife;· SHAWN MONTEE, INC.1 an . 
Idaho Cor:p~ration d/b/a SHAWN MONTEE 
TIMBER COMP AW; and ABCO WOOD 
AFFIDA VJT Of MARK A. ELLINGSEN· 
1N SUPPORT OF EXP ARTE 
TEMPORARY RESTRAJNINO ORDER 
AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 










State of Idaho ) 
: ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
Mark A. Ellingsen, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. That I am the attorney for the Plaintiff abov~~amed. That I am over the age of 
2s 18 · years of age and am competent to testify in this matter_ 
26 2_ That I performed a search of bus;o.ess entities as maintained by the Idaho 
~/ 
~ ~ . 
27 
Secretary of State. That attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Arti~les . 
28 
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of Organization of S.M. Development, L.L.C. which lists Shawn Montee as a Member and 





3. That attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the ·Annual 
Report Form filed.by S.M. Developmait, L.L.C. for the year 2014 showing Shawn Montee as 
a Member snd Paul Daugharty M the Registered Agent. 
4. That attached hereto as Exluoit C is a true and correct copy of the Certificate of 
s Organization of ABCO Wood Recycling, L.LC. showing Shawn Montee as a Member ·and 





5. That ~ttached hereto as Exhibit Dis a true and correct copy of the Certificate of 
Organization of BK~MM Investmep.ts, LLC, ari·.Idaho limited liability company (hereinafter 
r~ferred to as "BK I~o") showing Heather Mon:tee as a Member and P~ul Daugharty as the 






6. That attached hereto a$ Exhibit Eis the Annual Report Form for BK Idaho filed 
on F~bruary 11, 2.014· sho~ng H~a~¢r Montee· .. and Shawn M9-~tee as a .mei;nber and Paul 
Daugharty lill the Regi..5tered.Agent. .. 
7. That ~ttached hereto· as Exhibit F is the true ~d correct copy of the Certificate 









referred. to as "ABCO Idaho") showing S.ha~ Montee as a member and Paul Oaugh.arty as the 
Registered Agent. This Certificate of Organization was filed on January 17, 2014. 
8. That attached hereto ·as Exhibit G is the Annual Report Form for ABCO Idaho 
filed on November 26, 20l4 showing Shawn Montee as a member and Paul Daugharty as the 
Registered Agent. 
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9. That all of the foregoing exhibits were obtained by me from the Idaho Secretary 



























10. On November 10, 2014, a Judgment was entered in the District Court of the ·Firs 
Judicial Djstrict of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai under case no CV-201+ 
4713 in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant Shawn Montee and Heather Montee, hu,sba,nd 
and wife, which total judgment including fees and costs was in the amount of $2,321,037.71 
With interest accruing on .the Judgment at 5.25% per annum (the "Judgment"). The Judgment . 
· remains unpaid. 
lL On December l, 2014, this Court entered an Order for Examination of Judgment 
Debtors (hereinafter .referred. to as "Order") which required that Judgment Debtors, Shawn 
Montee an.d Heather Montee pr~duce for inspection and copying at Plaintiff's counsel's offic~ 
located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite '.300, Coeur d'Alene. Idaho 83814 a variety of 
:finan~ial documents wl;rich were more particularly described·in Exhibit A which was attached to 
the .Order. These .financial documents were required t-0 be produced not later than. December 11, 
' . ' . . 
2014. 
12. Judgm,ent Debtors ~l:iawn Montee and Heather Montee did not comply with this 
Court's order as referenced above and failed to produce for inspection and copying · those 
financial documents at Plaintiff's counsel's office located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite . . . 
300, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 ~y D~ber 11, 2014. As of the date of this affidavit, 
Judgment Debtors Shawn Mont~~ and Heather ·Montee still have failed to produce any :financial 
documents for copying and jnspection as required by the Order. 
13 _ On December ·1 , 2014 this Court entered an Order for Examination of Judgment 
Debtors which required that JudgJI1ent Deb,or Shawn Montee ·appear at the offices ~f 




, olford vs Montee , etal Supreme Court Docket #43007-2015 
. '.~:. . : . : : . :· : .. . : 














' .• - ,·'. ~·:··· ,': :; " •':•, ::,·: ,'•i ,:: . ; .... ' : ..... ~ • • ~_.,,: :;.;~ ·: ••· • . : ••. ( : .:: \ .: .... , ••• '' ~ •• • • . ,, ·,;,,· • ~- • •', -··.: .•• -. 
Witherspoon Kelley, located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
83814 on the 18th day of December, 2014, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. to make discovery under 
oath. Your. affiant, along with a court reporter from M & M Court Reporting, was present at 
10:00 a.m. at the offices of Witherspoon Kelley, located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300, 
C-0eur d'Alene, ldaho 83814 on the 18th day of Dec:-..,ember 2014, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. and 
was prepared to depose Shawn T. Montee pursuant to the Order. However, Judgm~t Debtor 
Shawn Montee failed to appear at the offices of Witherspoon Kelley, located at 608 No_rthwest . 
Boulevard, Suite 300, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 on the 18th day of December 2014, at the 
hour of 10:00 a.m. to make discovery under oath as required by the Order. 
. 14. On December 1, 2014 this .Court entered an Order for Examination of JudgmeIJt 
Debtors which required that Judgment Debtor Heather Montee appear at the offices of 
14 .Witherspoon Kelley, located ·at 698 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300, Coeur d'Al~e, Idaho 
15 
}7 
83814 on _the .19th· day of December, 2014, at the h9ur of 10:00 a.rn .. t9 make discovery under 
oath. Your af1iant, ajo~_g with .. a court reporter from M & M .Court. ~eporting, was present at . 
· 10:00 a.m. at the offices of Withei:spoon Kelley, located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, ~uite 300, 
18 
19 Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 on the 19th day ofDec~ber 2014, at the hour of l0:00 a.ni. an~ 




Heather Montee failed to app_ear at the offices .of Witherspoon Kelley, located at 608 Northwest 
Boµ.levard, Suite 300, Coeur d'Alene; _Idaho 83814: on the 19th day of December, 2014, at.the 
24 
hour of 10:00 a.m. to make discovery under oath as required by the Order. 
25 15. On January 9, 2015, a Notice of Filing of Foreign Judgment was filed in th 
26' '$ Spokane County Superior Court, along with the Affidavit of Mark A. Ellingsen m upp.ort o. 
27 
Filing of foreign fodgment and an.exemplj.fied·copy of the above referenced Judgment. 
28 
lAFP1DA VJT OF~ A. ELLJ;NGSEN IN SUPPORT QF '.EK P ARTE TEMPORARY RESl"RAlNfNG · .. 
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16. On January 9, 2015, a copy of the Judgment and the Notice of filing of Forei 







17. Attached hereto is a printout that your affi.ant received from the records of :th 
State. of Washington for ABCO Recycling, LLC, a Washington limited liability ccr.mpan 
(hereinafter refen:ed to as "ABCO Washington"). This record identified that Shawn Montee was 
a member of ABCO Washington and maintained some ownership interest in ABCO W as~gton. 
A copy of this print out that your affi.ant received from the Washington Secretary of State is 





18. Based on this info1'I.I).ation· from the Washington Secretary of the State, Wolfo 
proceeded forward and obtained a charging order in the Spokane County Superior Court .against 
Shawn Montee's interest in ABCO Washington. While similar in pa.me to Shawn ,Montee's 
14 limited liabili'ly·-company ABCO 'Id'allo, ABCO Washington appeared to be a separate entity and 
' ' ' . . 




1-9. On February 4, 20i5/Plaintiff obtained from the Washington Court a chargin . 
. . . 
order against Shawn Mop.te~ an,t HE).~ther Mori~'s · interest .. in ABCO Washingt~n.. This . . . ~,: . . '. . . ' 
. . . 










Attached hereto as Exhibit. I is a true and correct copy of the Charging Order. The Char · · 
Order provided in pertinent part: 
A. All or any part of distributioQ.s or other ~ounts_ beooming 
due to Mont~; other than eam~ngs as. defined in R,CW 6.27.010 shall-be paid to 
the Clerk. of Spokane County. Super,ior Court pursuant to the Judgment enter~ in 
said Court, for the application to payment of the Judgment.in the same manner as 
proceeds from a sale on execution: · 
B. This Charging Order constitutes an immediate lien on 
Montee·s transferable interest in· ABCO Recycling, LLC. pursuant co RCW 
25.15.255. 
. APPlDAVIT OF MARK A ELLINGSEN~ SlJPPORT OF EX PA.RTE TEMPO.RA.RY RESTRATNlNG 
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C. That Shawn Montee shall appear before the Honorable 
Salvatore F. ~ozza, Presiding Judge of the above-captioned Court, 1116 W. 
Broadway, Spokane, WA 99260 on Friday,. the 20th day of February 2015, at 9:00 
a.m. and show cause why (1) the Court should vacate the Charging Order and (2) 
the-Court should not enter an order of foreclosure against Montee·s membership 
interest in ABCO Recycling, LLC and dire.cti.ng such interest to be sold in the 
same manner as personal property is sold, on execution. 
20. 
' :· 
On or about February 18, 2015, Attorney Paul Daugharty filed a Notice o . . 
Appearance in the. Washington case and a Declaration in Opposition in response to the Sho 
Cause hearing regarding the Charging Order. A true and correct copy of this Declaration i 
attached hereto as Exhibit J and incorporated by reference herein. In this D,eclaration. Attome 
Paul Daugharty represented under oath that Shawn Montee and Heather Montee did not .have 
membership interest in ABCO Recycling, LLC-rather that BK Idaho possessed .a SOo/c: 
membership interest in ABCO Washington .. As noted in Paragraphs 6 and 1 above, Sha . · 
Montee and Heather Montee are the· apparent members of.BK Idaho. 
21. However, on or about :February 11, 2015 (7 days prior to Anomer Daugharty's 
Dcclru::ation in the Washington ·Action), apparently Shawn Montee:. fom1ed a Flori~ limit· 
. ' ' . 
liability co:inpany .with exactly ~e·.same ruime as BK Idaho. A copy of th~ Am:t:l~s o· 
Orga:ni.zati~n fQr this entity (herein.after refer.red to as "BK Florida") which your affiant obtain. 
from the Secretary of the State of Florida website is attached hereto as Exhibit K.. In the Articles 
,, 
,' 








managers of this entity. 
22. On February 12, 2015 (6 days prior to Attorney Daugb.arty's declaration in th. 
Washington Action), B~ Florida apparently filed Articles of Merger designating that BK ld$o 
had now merged with BK Florida and that the surviving entity would be BK Florida. A copy o 
these Articles of Merger which ,your aftiant ~btained from the Secretary of tQ.e State of florid. 
. ', : . 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK A. ELLThJGSENlN 'SUPP.ORT OF EX p ARTE TEMPORARY RESTRAlNlNG 
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website is attached hereto as Exhibit L. Apparently, via these articles of merger, all interes 
















transfer is permitted to stand, then Wolford will not have a present ability to execute upon 
Montee's interest in BK Idaho (which is essentially whatever income stream that flows from· 
ABCO Wash1ngton, to BK Idaho to Montee) based upon bis Idaho judgment. Instead, Wolfo:r; 
will now have to file a foreign judgment in Florida and attempt to execute upon the judgmcn 
against this newly fonned BK Flotjda. Bas.ed upon the foregoing, Wolford wm no doubt suffe. 




Pending the hijun~on hearing, Shawn Montee and Heather Montee, and th · 
agents, servants, employees, attorney's and oth~· persons acting un~er, in concert with, or fo 
them, are enj.oined .and restrain~ "rorm creating or fomiing any further business entities, whic 
would include, but not be limited to, limited liability companies, corporations, or 
partnerships ~thout first obtaining .. approval. by .this Court. 
. B. Pcinding the; ~junction hearing, Shawµ Montee and Heather Montee, and thei 




them, are en.joined and rest.rain~ from . removing, concealing, biding, en.cumbering, 
commingJjng, selling, conveying, dispos:ing of, or 1:ran&ferring any asset of BKSMM 
J:nvestments, LLC, a Florida limited liability ~ompany, BKSMM mvestments. LLC. an Idaho 
23 
24 
. limited liability company, or any other asset of an entity 'in which Shawn Montee, Heat1:1~: 
25 Montee, or any other bu,sjness entity i,n which . Shawn Montee and Heather Montee have 
26 . :interest without first obtaining approval by this Court. 
27 
28 
AFFIDAVIT OFMARkA ELLINGSEN.IN SUPPORT.OF.EXP.ARTE TEMPO.AA.RY RESTRAlNlNG 
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II. 
C. Pending the Injunction hearing, Shawn Montee and Heather Montee, and th · 











them, are enjoined and restrained from removing, · concealing, hiding, encumber,ing, 
commingling, selling, conveying, disposing of, or transferring any asset in which Sru,twn Mop.tee 
and Hoa.th.er Montee have an interest of without first obtaining approval by this Court. 
D. Pending the Injunction hearing, Shawn Montee and Heather Montee 3hall disclos 
to Wolford the nature and location of those assets of BKSMM Investments, LLC a Florid 
limited liability company. BKS~ invest:l'{lents. LLC an Idaho limited liability company an 
any other entity in which Shawn Montee or Heather Montee have an interest. Shawn Monte 
and Heather Mon~ee shall provide. this information to counse, for Wolford not later th 
13 · March 4, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. 
14 E. Pending the Injunction hearing, Sh~~ Montee and Heather Montee, an4 thei 
15 
· agents, servants, _epiployees, ·attorney$ an~. other persons acting under, in concert with, or fo 
them, are enjoined· and restrain~ ftoµi: m~itig .. any ~er i~tet'::company or intra-company -asse 
17 . . 
· transfers, ·mc.,r~, or·frorn comm_it#ng ~ny frau.dulc,n.t 1;.0nveyances. This would include an 
l8 










·interest or any entities- which are either managed or controlled by either Shawn Montee and/o 
Heather Montee. 
23. Your affiant.has not contacted or given Notice to Attorney Paul Daugharty of tlii 
request for a temporazy restraining_ order and injunction. The reason being is that in yo 
affiant's opinion, if Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee are given prior notice of this 
request for a temporary restrajnin.g order and injunction they may engage in activities to co~ceal 
'AfFJDA VlT OF MARK A. ELLINGSEN IN SUPPORT OF:EX PARTE TEMPORARY REST.RA.lNJNC 
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24. Currently, there is a 2 day contempt trial set in this case for March 9th .and lOt\ 
2015 at 9:00 a.m_ Your affiant requests that pursWU1t to l.R.C.P 65(b) ·the Court set th 
injunction hearing related to this temporary restraining oTdC'f for Mar1;h 9, 2015 or March 10, 
2015 to be heard either prior to or subsequent this oontempt tii.ru.. 
DATED this 24th day of February, 2015. 
W~RSPO~,~~ 
Mark ,A. EJlings:en · 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before nie this 24~'. day of February 2015, 
.Public for the St c·o 
· g at: Hayden 
-~:ummission expires:· February 27, 2021 
AFPIDAVITOFMARKA.ELLINGSENlli'.SUPPORT.OFEX·PARTETEMPORARYRESTRAINING 
ORDER/IN.JUNCTION-P AGB 9 . . . . . . 
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~ '19 ARTICLES OF OR.GANIZAT/ON 
:f~ , LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
. To the Seen,~ of State of l~o - .... ,. . 
Corporation• Division · :~ r .-. c ,: ~ F, ; 2: t1 3 
700 West JefferaoR Room ~ 
P.O. Box 83720 • Boi&e, 10 83720-0080 ... · . · . . .. : · · ·· 
• • .J JI , ( .. _ • I J - .'\I • J 
1. The name of the limited liability compa."ly Is: S. ~i. VEVE LO'PM'ENT t. L c. 
. 2. The· address of the inrual registered offic:e. is: 11 11 E. l1Ja..Uac.e Avenue. 
(la a PO.Im) .... , ; 
Coe.wt. d'Alene., IV 83814 . -· 1 ________ __;. _ __,. ______ and the name of the initial registered·. .:.:,. i 
agent at .that address is: PALJ L w. VALlrJHARTY, p. A. 
' . 
. s~re ~ regtstered·agent: _R.w· ... ~.._,, .... , . _D~,-.... tf~J~~-~-....;._------
3. Th~ latest date eertain on whi~ the limited li~bility· ~~ wiU dissolve: ja.nWVtU lJ.i.t, 7.n 3n 
. . . . . . 
4. .ls.management of the limited .tjability com.part)' .vested in ·a manager or managers? 
·· . · D Y~ · · 1:9 No . td-*~-, 
5. lf maf'.1298ffl~· is. vestec;J . in one or ~ manager(s ), list tt'8 narJle(S) and address( es) of at 
least one initial~;, .If ~nHs ~esteQ in .·the rriembfn, Ust the name(s) and 
. •addr.eu(es) of at .least.,".initiat~t,f!r .. 
r@ne:·. 
. . 
,SHAWij T. MONTE'£ · 
6. 
~.'ffflrY . . . 
18/89/1999 WJ188 
Els Dal ·er, ?1391 a,, fflll 7 . 
it 1••• •• tlllWUC·tl 
.11 a•a a• ElJUtrr.c I 3 
'rl \ t,4 'Cl.'). . 
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n~ 1e~ ·tt-n Qac.3.1,"20~ ~ reclAgent ·l)II0,'4dnee11 ~NO·PO-iiox') -No. W. l e)o\85 
Re{\Jm m: Annual ~@part'Form ,-AI.Jl W OA1JGHAR1Y PA 
~AAV OF STATE 1.. MalJlng Add-..: Comld ii"! ~ box if needad. 110E W~Al/f 
700 WESr JEFm.SON s.M. DEVaoPMENT, LLC. COEUR ~ Al.ENE 
83814 
PO B0X83720 : ' PAUL W DAUG1ARTY PA 
BOISE, ID 83'2G-0080 110 E WAU.N:t Alie '. 
COB.JR D'ALENE 10 83814 3. tile!!~ Agent Signatise:• 
NO FIUNG FEE IF 
R.£CUYED BY DUE DATE 
~. united Uablllty Corr1)1tnlg; f:tlt:er Names and ~ rl at least one Member or Manager. 
Office Held Name 5treet or PO AOCl"ISIS State cou Postal QJde . ·-·-·- · ....... SHAWN T MONffl - . P,Q, BOX 2028 ' --- -·-· • r - COB.JR D'AU:Ni _,. ___ ,. -~·· -- ·-- ·-· -·· .... --~ MEMlilER m USA B3816 
s. oOMteO unaer tne Lbws of: 6. Mnual ~ must tJe s.gned. • 
10 Slgnown:: Poul w. D~ugharty Oal'O: 11/11/2014 .. 
W 10485 Name (type or print}: Paul W. Oaugharty Tit!~: Reolsteled Agent 
PrOCl!6Sl8d 11/11/2D14 • ~cally DltMded sl!;Ntu'cs are ac:izote:I m oriQlnal slQnatlreS.. 
., 
.. . .. · :, ,. 
' • : . .. ..... 
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Cl!RTIFICATE OF OR~IZATION 
UMrrED LIABILITY COMPANY 
(lnstruoUone on back of applloatfon) 
SECRETARY m j lATE 
STAT£ Of IDAHO 
1. The name of tho Umltod lleblnty mmpany la: 
Al3CO MCYc::UNG, L.LC. 
2. · The cmllDla ttrt11t and m,alftno lddran.1 rl U.. lnllol eleslr,r,atld af&v. 
134W Nosth Govw.11.mt Way, .. 208, Halldtn, ID 8$886 
1iiiii ..... .., llrtll....., .. 
3. The name and con,pfeC91traet ldrnu of the 119glstered agent 
1101, w.,..., Avenua, caewcr~e. ,o 11ae14 
(liiiUiiiiii),· . 
-t. n.. · nemo ond ec;ldfB80 or si .teaat one member or manager of tne ffmltad AabOlty 
company: . - ..... '. Sh~ Monti, 
e. ~liq addtaaa fut future aorreopondllnoe (snnual ntpott notieaG): 
110 I. W"'8os Avm.,a. Coeur C,AlltJla, JO 131114 
8. Fub.ne effecttwt dafe·of tulng .(opa~: _. -----------
Bfc,natura of • manaeer, member or oulhorl~d person, . . 
Signe~· 
,Yped Name: 8hlWn Monu. Mllrnbllr 
SJgnatura __________ _ 
iypeu Name: -----------..... 
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CERTIFICATE OF ORGANIZATION 
LIMIT~O LIABILITY COMPANY 11 APR 26 Pit I-= 30 
{Instructions on back of appllcatic>n) SECFir~: ?.Y OF STATE 
1. The name of the llmlted liability company is: 
STAJ t OF JON.() 
8KSMM INVESTMENTS, LLC 
2. The complete street and maiting address.es of the ,nltlal designated/principal .offioe: 
3175 W. SalliDe Way, Post FIiis. 1D·83854 
(Shel~ 
P.O. Box 1328, Post Falls, ID 88877 
3. The name and complete street·addr'88S·of the reglsteled agent 
·Paul w. Daughar1y 
(Nim/:): 
. 110 E. ·~ Ave., CoeLr .<!'Alene. IO 83814 
4. The name and address of at lei\lSt one member or manager of th& Rmited llablfly 
company: -. HealMl'MOf11"9 . 
·s. Ma~n$ ackbee~:for future co~nt,le~'(ennuat report nottcea): 
11P.E. Wlllllam A.ve., ~dWene. ID 83814 
. :-~ .. .. . : . ; · .. ·: .. 
6. Futu.ra e~lve date or nnng (optb'laij: ------------
Signature of a manager, member. or author~ed 
pellC)i1, . . . . Signarur:=~~ -,-
. Typed Na • w. Daugherty, Attorney.at law 
--------------- - · · 
,, .. . 
: .. ~ 
' ·.· 
~ . . .. 
. ·=· \· . :· ... 
• ' 1'' 
---- _ \f\loltord vs D4ontee , etal ----&l~f6111@ Ceurt !Jgsket #4JQQ7 2G15 ·-----+'fPB~!jeEH5,o-,3 ~ · .. :. : . .. · 
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.• AnnualRepo,rt for W 102752°; .Page~ of 1. 
No. Wl027S2 Due no later -titan AsJr 30, 2014 2. Registered Agent and Address 
Annual Report Form 
(NO PO BOX) 
P.etlJm to: PAUL W DAUGHAFCn' 
SEaETARY OF SfATE 1. Mailing Addrt!a: CorrC!cl: in thic box ff' needed, 110 E WALLACE AVE 
700 WEST JEFFERSON BKSMM INVESTMENTS, U.C 
COBJR DALENE IO 83814 
POBOX83720 PAUL W DAUGHARTY 
BOISE. ID 83720-0080 110 E WAI.LAC!! AVf 
COBJR O ALENE IO 83814 3. rim Raglstered Agent Si~:* · 
NO FIUNG FEE IF 
RECEIVED BY DUE DATE 
4. Umited LJabili~· Companies: Enter Names and Addresses of at least one Member or Manager. 
Office Hc:ld Name Street or PO Aaoress Otv State Countrv Postal Code -··•-·-·-•1•......,,.,..,..,...,.,...........,.•n,uu_,.,.,.. __ .,_ •. ,"'.---.·,._.,,.,,.,.N' ···--- •. ·- .. ,,.--·-·---i•,.......,...,.,.,..,... VW1n·,_~._1._.-•,---,•rr.....,.\A'•\l....,H....n.•.v..-u.•""'•••n••---,·-.n-••,,..,..,.,-,.,...~.., ....... ..i..,.#,t.W..•u--
MEMBER SHAWN T MONTEE P.O. BOX 1329 POST FALLS ID USA 8'677· 1329 
MEMBER HEATHER MONTEE P.O. BOX 1329 POST FAUS IO USA 83877· 132'3· 
... 
5. Organized Under the Laws or: 6. Annual Report must be 51gnec:1."' 
ID Sign.:iturc: P.>ul W. Daugh&rty Date; 02/11/201,4 
W1027S2 Name {type or print): Paul w. Davgharly Trt:le: Registered Agent 
Processed 02/11/2014 * Eledronical!Y prallfded slgRab.Jres. are ao:ept:@d as origlnal signaturE!li, 
•, : 
',. 
. . . . .~ 
.... :. ", 
j 
:, •• -• .I ···:· . . ;·.", 
E .L•. ·• ·. · ·x·1i1b1t· F· 
', .. ' .... '. .' 
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UMITED LJABJUTY COIIIPANV 
(lnatuaaane an bide ol IPfJM:•lon) 
1. TINI '*lie~ 118 lmltld Dlbllr m,mpeny II: 
MIOJ~LLC. 
FILED EFFeCT.NE 
SECRETARY m ~ IATE 
STllTE Of IDAHO 
2. The aam,iflfa ..... Md rnallng MftNSII ~ .. ~ d11lgn•rd alloi: 
tMCJS..,...9CrJ• art.W.,.81111-....-,m -...... : 
· w -
. 4. 'ha name . ....... d It llllt aotmer:nber ar manager ol Die lnlild lllbllly 
wq,IIIJ; . .. . . . -. . ,-~-- tGSM P.q.·tlal~~c,-..., I;) 111111 
e. --addn9'II far 1\111.n ~(anoual ~ notkllll): 
ttO&w.llOl·A--.CDM_...._ID •t4 . 
I. Fuin Offecliw difll.otllnQ·(apaanaQ: __________ _ 
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NO. W 133303 Due no later than Jan 31, 2015 2. Registered Agent and Address 
Annual Report Fonn 
(NOPOBOX) . . 
RebJm to: PAUL W DAUGHAAT'r' 
SECRETARY OF STATE 1. Malllng · Address: Correct in this ~ if needed. 110 E WAlJ.ACE. AVE 
700 WEST JEFFER.50N ABCO RECYCUNG, LLC. 
COEUR D AlfNE 83814 
PO BO){ 83720 PAUL W OAUGHARlY 
BOISE, ID 83720·0080 110 E WAUACE AVE 
COEUR DALENE ID 83814 3. New Registered .Aoent Signature:* 
NO FIUNG FEE IF 
RECEIVED DY DUE DATE 
1. Limited Ueblllty O,mpanics: enter Names 000 AOOresses or at least one Member or Manager. 
Office Held Name Street or PO Address OLy state Country POStal Code 
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MEMBER SHAWN T MONTI:E P .o. aox 20213 coaJR IO USA 83816 D'ALENE 
5. Organized Under r:he Laws of: 6. Annual Report must be signed.* 
ID Signature: Paul w. Daugharty Dail!: 11/26/2014 
W133303 Name (type or print): Paul w .. DatJQharty Title: Regi~ Agent 
PrOC.eS5ed ll/26/2014 .* Eledrol')lcally provided·sjgnatures.are actepled as original Signatures. .. 
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IN THE SUPERIO~ COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 








t4 SHAWN MONTEE and HEATIIER 
MONTEE, husb8ll;d and wife; SHAWN· 
u . MQN113E, INC., an Idaho·corporatioil d/b/a · 
16 
. SHAWN MONT.EE .TJ'.M:!3ER COMPANY; 
and ABCO WOOF RECYCLINO, LLC, an 





CHARGING ORDER AND ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE 
' ' 20 This matter came befq;re the Court.pursuant to Judgment Creditor Robert Wolfo;rd, 
21 





reviewed the Application and other documents and pl~gs on file herein, and having had an 
opportunity for argument on the.Application, ~e Court finds that th~e is good cause to grant 
the Motion and charge Shawn Montee ~d ~e marital community comprised of Shawn Montee 
an~ Heather Montee's (herein~ collectively referred to as "Montee'') mem~ership interest in 







0 CHARGING ORDER• 1 . ·.m WITHERSP··o·oN··KELiEt 
Attorneys & Counselors 
y..., ..... ...,_\!1'$lo.\000l\00l l3966,J)()O. 42:Z. w.ruvcmdeAvenue, Suite l !OD Phone: 509A24.526:5 
I· 
II 
Wolford vs Montee , etal Supreme Court ~~SOih.1~9201--0300 Fl.'!:: :'i09.418.2'?!~e 63 149 
1;··.··:1 
,.;_ 
. .: : ., ·~. 
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Ba11ed upon Wolford's Application and Memorandum for Charging Order, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED! ADJUGDED AND. DECREED AS FOLLOWS: . 
1. The limited liability company interest of Montee in ABCO Recycling LLC, a 
·· 1 
4 Washington l:imite.d liability company, is hereby charged with payment of the Foreign Judgment 
5 ("Judgment") entered with this Court as a Foreign Judgment on or about January 9, 2015, in 
· 6 favor of Wolford. 
7 2. All or any part of distnbutions or other amounts becoming due to Montee, other 
8 than earnings as defined in RCW 6.27.01.0, shall be paid to the Clerk of Spcikane County 
9 Superior Court pursuant to the Judgment entered in said, Court, for the application to payment of 
10 the Judgment in th~ same manner as proceeds from a sale on ex~cutjon. 
11 3. . This Charging, Order COil,S~tutes ~ i.mnie.diate lien on Montee's transf~able' 
12 interest in ~CO Recycling, LLC, purs~t to RCW: 25.15.255. 
13 4. This Charging Order does not deprive Montee. of any right under exemption laws 
14 with resp~ct to his m~ersbip.in.tere~t in .ABCO .Recycling, LLC. 
1.s 5. That.counsel fer y/olfor,d· shal:} serv¢.a conforp,1ed copy of this order on'Montee 
16 by U.S: ;Mail and-file pro~f of the. ~ame·~tl{the· .Comt, 
. . 
l 7 6, That S~wn, Mon.tee sha~fawear l;>efore ~e Honorable Salvatore F. Cozza, 
1 s . Presidi~g Judge of the above-captionedi a;~ 1116 W. Broadway, $pokmie, WA 99260, on 
19 Friday, ·the 20th day ·of Febm.ary 20.15, at ·9,:.00 a.m., and show cause why: (1) the Court 
' . ' .. ' . ·.· . . . ' . ' . '. ' . 
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.( 
against Montee's me;m,bcrship interest :in ABCO Recycling, LLC and <lirecting such interest to 
~ ~e sold in the same manner as personal property is sold, on execution. 
3 DATED tliis __!f_ day ofFebruary, 2015. 
4 
6 
1 Presented 'by: 
8 
9 WITHERSPOON KELLEY 
10 





















·Mark A. Ell" · en, 
. Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CHARGING ORDER - 3 
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SUPERIOR COURT~ STATE F 
ROBERT WOUORD, 
'V, 
SHAWN MONIEE.aud HEATHER. 
husbmul and wife; SHAWN'M · lNC •• an 
Idaho~.d/b/aSHAWNM· : 
TIMBERCOMPANY;~ABCOWi on· 
!WCYGIJNO. ·LLC, an Idaho limitc4 ·. ty 
company, 
February 4, 201~ fm the :fbllowing t 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION AND 
Wolford vs Montee . etal 
GTON, COUNTY OF SPOKANE 
Case NO. lj-2..()1)()80. 7 
DEFENDANI'S' OBJI:(.'"llON lll'W 
OPPOSttrON TO CHAR«lINO 
OR.DER. AND ORDBR. TO SHC·W 
CAUSE 
.Oro.er &D.d Order to Show Cause issued 
P~ige I 1 
SlOl~zo® · 
Su,_reme Court ocket #43007-2015 Page 67 of 149 
xv~ tt:eL gLoi/aLtio 
: .·' 







1. lbe members of ABC R.ccyclillg, LLC arc Prins Corpoxatio:3 and BK.$ 
mvestmen~ u.c. See Exlul>its ·A.., ·B" IUICbed to Declmation of Paul W. :Jaagharly. 
2. Montee are net members of ABCO 1tCC'ycli:ng. LLC 
Show Cause mould be vacated and stricken. Dei: 
6 have J)l'CViously DOtified .Plain1iff's el qf this and tcasonable attomey"s ~IS shQJld 
7 awmded to I>efendmm if the hearing SclidUJJ~February 20, 2015 is not canmlle,L 
B 
0ml ~ is zequested at' 
DATED this li_ day of Fe 
CER 
PAUL W. DAUGHA,RTY, P.A. 
By. V.;..:;?-::5 ·--








I:berehy.partify~on the~ ·ofFe~:201S, Iaaused to~ serve:d a true .md 
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Eveot o~te Fll~d. 
Event Effectiv.e Date 






38 SOUTH SLUE ANGEL PARKWAY, #386 
PEN$ACOLA, FL 32506 . 
Malling Address 
38 SOUTH BLUE ANGEL-PARKWAY, #386 
PENsACOLA, FL 32508 . . . 
Reglsterea.A-g;nt Name &.Address. . ,, . .. . . . 
GY CORPORATE SERVICES. INC. 
600· BRICKELL AVENUE, SUITE ·35po 
MrAMI, Fl 33131 
Authorlz~ Person(sl Detail 
Name & Add.ress 
Title MGR 
MONTEE, SHAWN T 
38 SOUTH BLUE ANGEL PARKWAY, #386 
PENSACOLA, FL 32506 
Title MGR 
MONTEE, HEATHER . 
38 SOUTH BLUE ANGEL PARKWAY, #386 
PENSACOLA, FL 32506 . 
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,, GUN81ll:.R YOAKLEY 
• 
ARTICLES OF ORGANIZA TJON 
FOR 
BKSMM INVESTMENTS, LLC 
(A Florida lJmJtt:d Liablliry Company) 
FILE Ol!oou.,008 
·tD1S FEB t l AH tQ: 2 ~ 
SE':' r·H:l.SonOOJ6062 9! • ·: yt\t... .... ~I, I v. •,,,I .... ll .. 
TALI ~1:.H·!'r-i:' rL.-•t:'.lii·,. ... i1 .. ,v.\: . •..• J '""'·H~ 
'TM &1ndtlr.rl1f'*L /or tlte pu,pose qf JONtt,ltg a liMiled liability t:Of'RP/llfY ,mdu th~ lflWS r,f lh.: Stata <tf FlorldD ==~ P'lorida Reviled Ltmitetl lJal,illt.y CC/lflpl111)1 .A.cl (rlre "da."), hreb)I odnpts 1h11 fiJ/lowii,g Aniclu af · 
ARTICLE 1. 
&It! 
· The. ~ of tho Lilllitod Uabijity Company is BKSMM INVESTMENTS, ILC (the 
"CPmAAAY"). · 
ARTICLE 11· . J)p.Qtion 
This-Com~)' sball exist on thG date of-.filinA efthese A.rpcles ~ti\ flw ~~ ofSwk 
of 1:he State af ft'lorith. TJw damion .oftlw ComJJmJY ohoU he ~tua.l. 
ARTI~JO-
. N-o:..~·~u,I9as 
This.Company is organ~ for the~ oftrat1SaL1ing.any and an lawful bw3iness. 
ARTI.CI..E JV -
A¥fes 
. Tba initial.,ptjn,cipa! .office~ ~d .m!illing a(Jdress of .the Compa:ny is 38 South Blue 
Angel Parkway~ 11386,. Pensaccla, F1orida 3iS06. . . 
ARTICLGV•-
!'!1tlA1 R~ Al,entgd-8-teNd o/'i!! 
. 1'.he me& · address. · of . -the iruti..aJ regisleJed office of tin, Company is 
600 BritkclJ Avenue, Suite J-;OO, M~.fJari~a 33131, and Che .name of the initial registered 
asent of ·the Company .m tlJ8,t addmss is: OY ~ Services, Inc. 
ARTICl,.E VI -
MJlmtle!!P! 
The Compaay shall be nuinagcr,mcmagQP·in ~ with the Opmitmg A~ of 
the C(,mpany. The initial managcn of the Company shall be: . 
S.hawn T. Montee 
3R South Blue Angel Par~y. #386 
Pensacola, Ploricta 32'°6 
Heather Montee 
38 South Blue Angel Parkway,. #386 
PCMaCola, Florida 32S06 
HJ~6062.l · 
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Each Member's ~ in the Company UJBY be evidenced by II membership 
participation or unit cerdfieate. No Membc:r of the Cowpany may trllnSfer, sell or assign its 
membership interest in the Company to any (,)the!' pemon axcept M provi.dcd for tn <he 
COtnpaDy's ()peniting Agreement. 
ARTICLE VIII• 
.l!ffl!Dlillpdo.g 
This Company sl,all indemnify to the fullest c,ctcnt peimittcd under and in accordance 
with the Jaws of the State of Fiorida any pmon who. was or is a pany or is thrcatcne4 to be ~ 
a pa,ty '° any Lhreatcned. pending ·or f.lOtnplcmd action, suit or pf'OCNding, whether. "'iviJ, 
criminal, admwstraii~ or inwsdgativc by teaSOn of thll f.act .rJ]at be or she is or was mamlQer, 
member, c,r officer or tbia Company. or is or wu serving D1 lllc request of this Com~ as a 
manager, member, director. officer, uuseee, e1111plo)'ee or :1pnt of or 1n any oth~ capacity wfth 
. another.company. partnership~ joint -venture, trust. or nth.er enterpmc. agaiost ·ex.r,enscs {i:noJudin1 
anomeys• 'fees}. judgmmta, tll'lcs and lJl110WllS paid in s~emcnt aetually and .reasouably 
IDCWTed by him or her ln ~on mlltSUch ~on, suit or pt'OOO\idiJl&. · 
Expcmes. (ioclud~ng ittome:y's fee:$} incurred l,y any member, t11J1Ha.gcr or officer in 
defending any civil. ctjminal,. ~ or in~estigative ~ing shall be paid by lbe 
Compaoy in adVitnce. of ~e ~l djspusition of .such PJQoeeding :\;ij)On receipt of an undertaking 
(secured or unseeured 8$ may be ·~ ~Y the ·~mpany) by or on behalf of su.oh. inemJ;,cr,. 
manager or offlcer to ·repay waJl ~unt 'if it sball"uJtimateJy be .det!Dlincd that such. member, 
lllanagei- or o~Gr·i,:s not cmtitlcd to be inde:n:,,niffocl by the Company as authoi:i?.Cd in this Arti~lc. 
Soch ~s (including. attomeys.~ ~) iqc;~ by othc:r: ~lo~. ~nc(ege.nw ~ ~ be 
so, ~d. uP()B· such ·1eonS ··antl~~i~ if any. ~ ~:"Compally.:der:ms appmpriate. · 
Notwithstanding the fo•~ ·indenulifi.-ion· or· atJvancement of expenses. shall not be 
a:oadc 10 or .on behalf of any ~be:r, :~anaga, omter, employee. or agent if a judgment or other. 
·final ~udi~ esw,Jishes .tbo.t ·the .adiom, or onJissiom to act,. of suc.11 member, ·manager, 
officer. cmJ)1oyee. or agtmt v,ere,.~ lP the c.aLd:e of aotion so odjudioaicd ond .oomtitutc 'Ally 
of the followma: ' . ' 
(a.)' /\ vioJaUon of. crinuru,I law,· unless the member, manager. officer, 
emplaycc, or~~ had no ~able ~qse 10 bel.Jeve such conduct was w_1lawful. 
,, 
(b) A uamaction ft'om which the member. manager, officer, employ~ or 
agent derived an improper pezsona1 bencfll 
(c) · A distribution .u:i viola,iqn of Section 60S.0406 oflbe Act. 
(dJ WiJ.U'.ul misccmd~ or a consci<tus disregard fur the 'best .interest! "f 1he 
company in a proceeding by or in tbe right of~e Company to procure a judgment iD its 
Dlvor or In a proceeding by or in the right' of a M~bcr. · 
-2-
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(e) Rocldessne~ or an act at omission committed in bad faith &r with 
malicious pwpore '!r in a mann« exhibiting wamon and willful disregard of human 
rights. safety or property jn a proceeding by or io the right of someone other than. lhe 
Company or a Member. · · 
The indemmfiC8tion provided by tfng Article shalt ·cnn(-ir\ue - co an indernnined per-GOn 
who bas ceased to be a member. manager., oflicer. emplayee. or qcnt and shall inure to the 
benefit of the estate, heirs, persowd repn:sentatives, beneficiaries, executors and ~uators 
of SUCh person, Al) rights to indemnifia1tion and advances under this Article shall ~ dacrned ~ 
be: a '10lltmct betwc:en Olo Company and eacl'l lnd.cmntned person at any time while this Article is 
in ~cot. An1 repeal « modifioatlon of this AJtiolo or any TI:pCa1 or mo.ditiQBtion of mevant 
provisians of the Florida Revised Limited Liability Company Act 01 any other applic.able laws-
shall not ·ia any way. di~ the rights to iDdcmrufication of mch indemnified penon or.the · 
obligations of the Company arising· hereunder for claims relating to matters occurring prior to the 
repeal or moclificali011. 
ARTICLEJX-
. .4.lnead111e11t 
The Company reserves I.be right to amend .OJ repeal any provision contained in these 
Articles of Or&~OD, and any right.~nf~ upon the M~bo':8 it. subject to this reservation . 
. IN, WITNl;$8 .. \V~..OF the. u~erdgneti has· e,cecut.ed tbcsp Arti~le~. BS of 1he 11th 
dayof Pebnwy. lOlS. . . . 
hi William.J. Hyland 
WilliaJD.J. Hyland. Autnori7.ed Representative 
(In acoordant:4 'With Sa:tlon 60S .. O~S(J), ·Florldt, Stabllu, t#Je euedlon of this 
""-men/~""~ .• ,,;.,. thsp,w.,ul,,I e,f P.VJ#ry.tl#:II the~ 
. . ---,«I htnfn ln:'1'Ntf..) 
-3-
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ACCEPTANCE B'V REGIST.ERlm AGENT 
Ha Ying lxx:n nMled u ~ !lgCT,lt 8lld l.9 aa:cps I.be service of process fbr the abo"e-
statcd limired liability c.ompany a1 the place deapted in thase An.ictes, GY Corporntc So,vi'CC.S, 
1.nc. hereby accepts the appointment as reeimared agant and ~ .to act jn thit capacity. GY 
Corporate Semces, .fne. further agrees. to comply with the provisiollS of all statutes .relating to 
1he proper and complete pcrfonnancc of ils duties, and is familiar with and accew,tc: the 
obligations of itS position u :n:gistered agent as provided for in Chapter 60S. F .S. 
OY CORPORATB SERVJCBS. lNC. 
Is/ WD1iam J. l-Jyland By:. ____________ _ 
Willjam J,, :~)'land,. V"tce Presidtml 
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. ART[~ OF MERGER fi1~31l~l\3s . 
OP 11\Y.t f EB \ 2 M' \O! 
BKSMM INVBSTMENTS. UC • Of S li).'t E. 
Can Idaho limited Jtability company) , ~(i;'i~t.\ ~;~\t. fLOR\O~ 
~,ll\.M°\i\ ...• 
WITH AND lNTO i~ h, 
BJCSMM JNVPKl'M~ti.lT~, l .t f'.. 
(a Florida lli:nited liabillty 4»mpa.ay) 
The~ Artides of Me,pr is submitted to merge rhe followmg limitt4 liability com;,onia i" a«ordana: 
with the Plorlda R~ised Limited 1.uJhill.ly O,mpm,y A.ct (the ~~). ,umuznt to Section 605.1025. Plonda 
Slatraes. . 
FIRST: The tDCt Dam£ and Ju.rwl.iction of the mertPas party UI aKSMM INVESTMENTS, t.LC. •n 
Idaho limitld llabiltty company. · 
SECQND: Tbe. exact name and jurfldlaJon of the swviving party is: B.KSMM INVESTMENTS. LLC, a 
Plotfda Umfled liability c:ompany{D~Dt No.: LlSOOOill6275). 
THIRDe The znerpi-·wu· &rppflWfld by each domcalic mcrglog entity that is a limited l1abll1ry company 1n 
accor~ widi Sections fi0S.l02i-60S.1tl2Ei of~ J.ct by eacb other rnefSin9 entity hl accord;ujQe 'With the 
laws of~ j~on; .and by. eac:h member of SlJ.c:b limited liabilit)' compauy who as a .mrult. of the meqJet" 
wOl have interest holder liability under Sec:tlon.60.5.1023(1)('1) o! the Act. 
FOURTil.t The survtvlnB cnUn,·exlstS before thi: merger and is a ·domestic filing ~nt1ty. The Articles of 
Orgcmimtlon of BKSMM ln~tmeius, u:.<; a Florida limited b,ebility ampany Wlll be the Arttcla of 
Orpnlzation of. the. Slll'Viv;lng entity unfl!l:$,end .. ~til ·sul>Mquen~ .amended· in a~n!aoa: with l~. terma m; 
as provided by .-ppU~le Jaw. · · 
. ~1 Tho enlity ~ to pay any memb,m with- app;aiRI righ~ ~e am~ to·which membez:s are 
·entitled UDdcr Sec;tiom 605.1006 anp 605.1061~.5.1072. P1orida Statuta. 
SIXTH; TM ~erger cbaD become~ at 12:0l a.m. on Fcbrwiry l~ 201S. 
MeR.GINO PARTY; 
BKSMM, LI.Ct s Jdaho 1imhc4 Jl.abili.lJ 
coropany 
SUR.VIVINO PAR.TY: 
. DKBMM, U.C, 21 Plona ll-.ised HabiUty 
· ·· HlSOOD037·166 3 
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II 
2 Mark A. Ellingsen, ISB No. 4720 
3 
WITHERSPOON KELLEY 
Attorneys & Counselors 
4 The Spokesman Review Building 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300 
5 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-2146 
6 
Telephone: (208) 667-4000 
Facsimile: (208) 667-8470 
7 E-mail: mae@witherspoonkelley.com 
8 Attorney for Plaintiff 







IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 






SHAWN MONTEE and HEATHER MONTEE, 
16 husband and wife; SHAWN MONTEE, INC., an 
Idaho Corporation d/b/a SHAWN MONTEE 
17 TIMBER COMP ANY; and ABCO WOOD 
18 








21 This matter having come on for hearing on February 26, 2015 at 2:30 p.m. regarding 
22 Plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as "Wolford") Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining 
23 Order and Injunction and having appeared through his counsel of record, Mark A. Ellingsen of 
24 
25 
the firm Witherspoon Kelley; and the Court having considered the Affidavit of Mark A. 
Ellingsen in Support of Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction and 
26 
27 the pleadings, files and records in this matter, with oral argument; 
28 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
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II 
(1) Wolford has already prevailed on the merits of his claims in this lawsuit and a 



























community comprised of Shawn Montee and Heather Montee (hereinafter collectively referred 
to as "Montee") in the sum of $2,321,037.71. 
(2) Wolford will suffer irreparable harm if temporary injunctive relief is not entered 
and Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee are allowed to continue those acts which 
have been identified in the Affidavit of Mark A. Ellingsen filed in support ofWolford's Motion 
for Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. The damage which will be suffered by 
Wolford will be immediate and irreparable if Montee is permitted to create further business 
entities as a vehicle to secret, transfer, and/or otherwise conceal assets which could be executed 
upon by Wolford's collections efforts on the underlying judgment. 
(3) Wolford will suffer irreparable harm if temporary injunctive relief is not entered 
and Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee are not barred from removing, concealing, 
hiding, encumbering, selling, transferring, or conveying any asset in which Shawn Montee or 
Heather Montee has an interest, or in which any business entity of Shawn Montee or Heather 
Montee has an interest without first obtaining approval of this Court. 
(4) The balance of the equities favors granting temporary injunctive relief, because 
the order the Court will impose will not create undue hardship on Montee and Wolford has 
established that Montee has been engaging in. transactions and transfers wbich are hindering 
Wolford's lawful right to effectively execute upon the underlying judgment entered by this Court 
against Montee. 
(5) Wolford has not provided regular notice to Defendant Shawn Montee and Heather 
Montee due to the likelihood that regular notice of this action may cause Defendant Shawn 
Montee and Heather Montee to do those further acts to transfer assets as a way to obstruct 
Wolford's lawful right to effectively execute upon the underlying judgment. 














Wolford's motion for Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order is hereby 
Pending the Injunction hearing, Shawn Montee and Heather Montee, and their 
agents, servants, employees, attorneys and other persons acting under, in concert with, or for 
them, are enjoined and restrained from creating or forming any further business entities, which 
would include, but not be limited to, limited liability companies, corporations, or limited 




















3. Pending the Injunction hearing, Shawn Montee and Heather Montee, and their 
agents, servants, employees, attorneys and other persons acting under, in concert with, or for 
them, are enjoined and restrained from removing, concealing, hiding, encumbering, 
commingling, selling, conveying, disposing of, or transferring any asset of BKSMM 
Investments, LLC, a Florida limited liability company, BK.SMM Investments, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, or any other asset of an entity in which Shawn Montee, Heather 
Montee, or any other business entity in which Shawn Montee and Heather Montee have an 
interest without first obtaining approval by this Court. 
'j·~ '-1 . 
d 
Pending the Injunction hearing, Shawn Montee and Heather Montee, and their 
agents, servants, employees, attorneys and other persons acting under, in concert with, or for 
them, are enjoined and restrained from removing, concealing, hiding, encumbering, 
commingling, selling, conveying, disposing of, or transferring any asset in which Shawn 
Montee and Heather Montee have an interest without first obtaining approval by this Court. 
diajose to :W:olfordJ:oo.-nature and location of those assets ofBKSMM fuyestme~LC,-
BKSMM-lnvestments,bL---e-an-Idalro--ed-liabilityUJmpanyand-any-otherentitTinWlifch 






























Shawn Mont-ee-ei:-H-eat-her-Montee-Irave-an.1nterest. Shawn Montee and Heathei tvfuntee-shall 
~-te--eounsel for-Wolford not lalet than-March 4, 2015 at 10·00 am. 
5. Pending the Injunction hearing, Shawn Montee and Heather Montee, and their 
agents, servants, employees, attorneys and other persons acting under, in concert with, or for 
them, are enjoined and restrained from making any further inter-company or intra-company 
asset transfers, mergers, or from committing any fraudulent conveyances. This would include 
any asset transfers between entities in which either Shawn Montee or Heather Montee have an 
interest or any entities which are either managed or controlled by either Shawn Montee and/or 
Heather Montee. 
6. That a hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for an injunction is set before the Honorable 
John T. Mitchell, District Judge, at the Kootenai County Courthouse, 324 W. Garden Avenue, 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 at Cf._'iSu c\.m., on March g_, 2015. 
DATED this,,+ S-1<lay of February, 2015. 
,/ 
Jpim T. Mitchell 
I)istrict Court Judge 
\ I 
ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER-PAGE 4 
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II 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2 
I, the undersigned, certify that on th~ day of February, 2015, I caused a true and 
3 
correct copy of the ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER to be 
4 forwarded, with all required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below, to the following 
























Mark A. Eiiingsen 
Witherspoon Kelley 
Attorneys & Counselors 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814 
Paul W. Daugharty 
Paul W. Daugharty, P.A. 
110 East Wallace Avenue 
















Via Fax: (208) 666-0550 
Deputy 
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2 Mark A. Ellingsen, ISB No. 4720 
3 
WITHERSPOON KELLEY 
Attorneys & Counselors 
4 The Spokesman Review Building 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300 
5 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-2146 
6 
Telephone: (208) 667-4000 
Facsimile: (208) 667-8470 
7 E-mail: mae@witherspoonkelley.com 
8 Attorney for Plaintiff 
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COUNTY OF KOOTENAIJSS 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST nIDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
12 
ROBERT WOLFORD, No. CV-2014-4713 
13 Plaintiff, 
14 v. 
FINDINGS OFF ACT/CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW & ORDER OF CONTEMPT 
REGARDING DEFENDANT SHAWN 
MONTEE AND HEATHER MONTEE 
15 
SHAWN MONTEE and HEATHER MONTEE, 
16 husband and wife; SHAWN MONTEE, INC., an 
Idaho Corporation d/b/a SHAWN MONTEE 
17 TIMBER COMP ANY; and ABCO WOOD 














This matter came on for a trial on March 10, 2015 regarding Plaintiff's (hereinafter 
referred to as "Wolford") Written Charges ofNon Summary Contempt which were filed with this 
Court on December 23, 2014. Plaintiff appeared through his counsel, Mark A. Ellingsen of the 
firm Witherspoon Kelley. Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee appeared at the trial 
and were represented by their counsel, Paul Daugharty. After considering the testimony and 
evidence presented at trial, this Court hereby enters the following Findings of Fact/Conclusions 
of Law and Order regarding Wolford's charges of contempt. 
FINDINGS OF FACT/CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER OF CONTEMPT-PAGE I 
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FIIVDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
A. 
(1) 
CONTEMPT CHARGE 1: DEFENDANTS SHAWN MONTEE AND 
HEATHER MONTEE'S FAIL URE TO PRODUCE FINANCIAL RECORDS 
AS REQUIRED PURSUANT TO THIS COURT'S DECEMBER 1, 2014 
ORDER. 
On December 1, 2014, this Court entered an Order for Examination of Judgment 
7 Debtors (hereinafter referred to as "Order") which required that Defendants Shawn Montee and 
8 Heather Montee produce for inspection and copying at Plaintiffs counsel's office located at 608 
9 
Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 a variety of financial documents 
10 
11 
which were more particularly described in Exhibit A which was attached to the Order. These 
12 

















(2) Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee did not comply with this Court's 
order as referenced above and failed to produce for inspection and copying any of those 
financial documents at Plaintiffs counsel's office located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 
300, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 by December 11, 2014. 
(3) Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee filed a Motion to Quash the 
Debtor's examination Order (hereinafter referred to as "Motion") on December 10, 2014, but 
failed to request a hearing on the Motion prior to the December 11, 2014 deadline required by 
the Order. Instead, Judgment Debtors Shawn Montee and Heather Montee, by and through 
their counsel, elected to initially notice the Motion for a hearing for January 21, 2015 which 
was then re-noticed for a hearing on March 9, 2015 and again re-noticed for a hearing on 
March 3, 2015. 
(4) Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee's actions in delaying the 
scheduling of a hearing on the Motion for January 21, 2015 and thereafter constitutes 
FINDINGS OF FACT/CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER OF CONTEMPT-PAGE 2 
K:lwdocslcdarnain\9:i I 04\000 !\CO 117031.DOC 
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1 unjustified delay tactics being conducted by either the Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather 
2 
Montee or by their counsel of record. 
3 
4 
( 5) Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee did not provide any evidence 
























documents, which included tax returns and bank statements, as required by the December 11, 
2014 deadline in the Order. While Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee's pending 
Motion challenged this Court's ability to enter the Order pursuant to the procedural 
requirements of Idaho Code§ 11-501 and-502, Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather 
Montee's Motion did not challenge the Order on the basis that they could not comply with the 
terms of the Order requiring them to produce the financial documents identified therein by the 
December 11, 2014 deadline. 
( 6) As of the date of this trial, Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee have 
not produced any of the documents which were required to be produced pursuant to the Order. 
(7) This Court finds that all the elements of contempt related to this particular 
charge as against Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee have been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt and that a criminal sanction for contempt shall be imposed. Specifically, this 
Court concludes that both Defenda..11.t Shav\rn. Montee and Defendant Heather Montee willfully 
disobeyed the Order by failing to produce any of those documents required to be produced 
pursuant to the Order. 
B. 
(1) 
CONTEMPT CHARGE 2: JUDGMENT DEBTORS SHAWN MONTEE'S 
AND HEATHERMONTEE'S FAILURE TO APPEAR AND PROVIDE 
TESTIMONY AS REQUIRED BY DECEMBER 1, 2014 COURT ORDER. 
On December 1, 2014 this Court entered an Order for Examination of Judgment 
Debtors (hereinafter referred to as "Order) which required that Defendant Shawn Montee 
FINDINGS OF FACT/CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER OF CONTEMPT-PAGE 3 
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appear at the offices of Witherspoon Kelley, located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300, 
Coeu d'Alene, Idaho 83814 on the 18th day of December, 2014, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. to 
make discovery under oath, and that Defendant Heather Montee appear at the offices of 
Witherspoon Kelley, located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
83 814 on the 19th day of December, 2014, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. to make discovery under 
oath. 
(2) Defendant Shawn Montee failed to appear at the offices of Witherspoon Kelley, 
located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 on the 18th day of 
December, 2014, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. to make discovery under oath. 
(3) Defendants Heather Montee failed to appear at the offices of Witherspoon 
Kelley, located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 on the 19th 
day of December, 2014, at the hour of 10:00 a.m. to make discovery under oath. 
(4) Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee filed a Motion to Quash the 
Debtor's examination Order (hereinafter referred to as "Motion") on December 10, 2014, but 
failed to request a hearing on the Motion prior to the dates wherein Defendants Shawn Montee 
and Heather Montee were required to appear and make discovery under oath as required by the 
Order. fastead, Defendants Shawn Montee a.rid Heather Montee, by a..11d through t.lieir counsel, 
elected to initially notice the Motion for a hearing for January 21, 2015 which was then re-
noticed for a hearing on March 9, 2015 and again re-noticed for a hearing on March 3, 2015. 
(5) Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee's actions in delaying the 
scheduling of a hearing on the Motion for January 21, 2015 and thereafter constitutes 
unjustified delay tactics being conducted by either Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather 
Montee or by their counsel of record. 
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( 6) Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee did not provide any evidence 
why they could not comply with the Order's requirement that they appear and provide 
testimony under oath as required in the Order. While Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather 
Montee's pending Motion challenged this Court's ability to enter the Order pursuant to the 
























Heather Montee's Motion did not challenge the Order on the basis that they could not comply 
with the terms of the Order requiring them to appear and provide testimony under oath as 
required in the Order. 
(7) This Court fmds that all the elements of contempt related to this particular 
charge as against Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee have been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt and that a criminal sanction for contempt shall be imposed. Specifically, this 
Court concludes that both Defendant Shavvn Montee and Defendant Heather Montee willfully 
disobeyed the Order by failing to appear and provide testimony under oath as required in the 
Order and is guilty of contempt. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That Defendants Shavvn Montee and Heather Montee are required to produce for 
inspection and copying at Plaintiffs counsel's office located at 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 
300, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814 those financial documents which were more particularly 
described in Exhibit A which was attached to the Order for Examination of Judgment Debtors 
which was previously entered by this Court on December 1, 2014. Furthermore, these 
documents shall be produced not later than 12:00 noon on March 13, 2015. 
2. That after the production of those documents identified above, Defendants Shawn 
Montee and Heather Montee shall each appear before this Court for an examination under oath to 
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be conducted by cowJ.Sel for Plaintiff. The exai.Ttl.!1ation shall occur not later than March 27, 
2 2015 unless an extension of this deadline is stipulated in writing by all o_fthe partjes. ~l-f)~~ ~~~ 
&,,\ J_~"" +~ ~ A. L<> ,~ ~~;,kl. 
3 3. In the event that Defendant Shawn Montee faiis to strictly comply with the term ,~ re1v ~\ 
4 
5 
and conditions of this order, then Defendant Shawn Montee will be required to serve five (5) ~ 
6 






4. In the event that Defendant Heather Montee fails to strictly comply with the terms 
and conditions of this order, then Defendant Heather Montee will be required to serve five (5) 
days in the Kootenai County Jail. 
5. Wolford is deemed a prevailing party in this contempt proceeding and shall 
hereby be awarded his reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this contempt 
proceeding pursuant to Idaho Code§ 7-610 and I.R.C.P. 54(e). Defendant Heather Montee and 
12 
13 
Shawn Montee shall be jointly and severally liable for these attorney's fees and costs awarded by 
















DATED this w day of March, 2015. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
2 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the Jl day of March, 2015, I caused a true and 
3 correct copy of the FINDINGS OF FACT/CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER OF 
4 CONTEMPT REGARDING DEFENDANT SHAWN MONTEE AND HEATHER MONTEE 
5 to be forwarded, with all required charges prepaid, by the method(s) indicated below, to the 























Mark A. Ellingsen 
Witherspoon Kelley 
Attorneys & Counselors 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Paul W. Daugharty 
Paul W. Daugharty, P.A. 
110 East Wallace Avenue 









Via Fax: (208) 667-8470 
D U.S. Mail 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
[X1 Via Fax: (208) 666-0550 
JIM BRANNON, Kootenai County 
Clerk of District Court 
! 
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4 Attorneys & Counselors 
The Spokesman Review Building 
5 608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300 
6 Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815 · 
Telephone: (208)667=4000 
7 Facsimile: (208)667-8470 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 






17 SHAWN MONTEE and HEATHER MONTEE, 
18 
husband and wife, SHAWN MONTEE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation dba SHAWN MONTEE 
t9 TIMBER COMPANY; and ABCO WOOD 
RECYCLING, LLC, an Idaho limited liability 
20 company, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2014-4713 




Plaintift: (hereinafter referred to as "Wolford"), by and through his counsel, Laura L. 
Aschenbrener ofthe.finn Witherspoon Kelley hereby submits the following Brief in Support of 
24 
lS In.junction against Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee (hereinafter collectively 
26 
referred to as "Montee"). This brief supplements prior argument made by counsel at the hearing 
17 held before this Court on March 9, 2015, and is supported by the pleadings, case file to date and 
28 the Affidavit of Mark A. Ellingsen in support of Motion for Ex Pa.rte Restraining Order and 
Injunction filed February 24, 2015. 
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As sta~d in the Affidavit of Mark A. Ellingsen filed with this Court. Wolford is suffering 
2 irreparable injury by Montee's activities in creating out-of-state business entities and then 










At the hearing held on March 9, 2015, this Coun ordered briefing on the issue of whether 
the Court may grant preliminary injunctive relief in pos~judgment etlforeement actions, 
specifically focusing on the language of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(e)(2X3)(4) that 
authorizes pre1iroinary injunctive relief "during the litigation," or "during the pendency of the 
action. n 
I. Injunctive Relief is Necessary Pursuant to LR.C.P. 6S{e) in These 
Proceedings to Enforce the Judgment Against the Montees. 
Wolford has already prevailed on the merits of his claims in this lawsuit and a judgment 
bas been entered in this case against Defendants Shawn Montee and the marital comm.unity 
13 
14 comprised of Shawn Montee and Heatller Montee in the smn of $2,321,037.71. A preliminary 
1 s injunction is necessary at this point to prevent the MontOC)s from transferring and hiding assets to 













obtain a preJimlnary injunction include: 
(1) When it appears by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief 
demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof. consists in restraining the 
commission or continuance of the acts complained of, either for a limited period 
or perpetually. 
(2) When it appears by the complaint or affidavit that the commission or 
continuance of some a.ct during the litigation would produce waste, or great or 
irreparable injury to the plaintiff. 
(3) When it appears during the litigation that the defendant is doing, or threatens, 
or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of 
the plaintiffs rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the 
judgment ineffectual. 
( 4) When it appears, by affidavit, that the defendant during the pc:ndc:ncy of the 
action, threatenB, or is about to remove, or to dispose of the defendant's property 
with intent to defraud the plamtifi, an injunction order may be granted to restrain 
the removal or disposition .... 
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3 Wolford is a judgment creditor entitled to the relief sought under subsection I.R.C.P. 
4 65(e)(l) due to the prior judgment entered agains.t the Defendants for an amount of 
s 
$2,321,037.71. Pursuant to lR-C.P. 65(e)(2), Wolford will be greatly and irreparably harmed 
6 
during this litigation if the Montees are not enjoined from secreting away assets by transferring 
7 
8 them to out-of-state and/or undisclosed entities, and committing other activities to avoid 
9 Wolford's enforcement of the judgment against them. See Ellingsen Aff. 11 2-8, 11-14, 17 -19, 




Heather Montee (Mar. 11, 2015). 
I.RC.P. 65(e)(3) i.s also satisfied because of evidence that Defendants have violated court 
14 orders to produce financial records, exercised delay r.actics to avoid the Court's order for 
1s discovery and debtor's exam, which threatens to render Wolford's judgment ineffectual "d:uring" 
16 these litigation proceedings to enforce the judgment. Wolford seeks a preliminary injunction, 
17 
18 
not a pe.rmanent injunction, to preclude Defenclents from circumventing Plaintift's enforcement 
19 









Under subsection ( 4) ofl.R.C.P. 65(e). as evidenced by the Affidavit of Mark A 
Ellingsen in Support of Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction, during 
the pendency of this action to locate and identify Defendants' assets to enforce the judgment, the 
injunction is necessary to prevent Defendants from removing or disposing of their property in an 
effort to defraud Wolford. 
Whjle "during the litigation" and '"during the pendency of the action" are phrases that arc 
not defined in relationship to I.R..C. P. 6S(c), such language is broad and doos not limit the rule's 
applicability to projudgm.en.t proceedings. In this matter, the injunction sought is "preliminary" 
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in nature because it is not permanent, but rathor a. temporary meas~ to aid enforcement effons 
to satisfy the judgment against the Montees. 
A preliminary injunction is also appropriate in this matter because it is an equitable 
, proceeding to enforce the judgment. A "preliminary injunction baning asset transfer is available 
6 where the suit seeks equitable relief." Johnson v. Couturier, 512 F.3d 1067, 1083-&4 (9th Cir. 
7 2009). The Ninth Circuit bas held injunctive relief to be appropriate when a defendant engages 
8 
9 
in conduct to conceal or dissipate assets, engages in fraudulent intra-family transfers, and refuses 
"to disclose asset information in defiance of court order .... 11 Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. 
10 
11 New Images of Beverly Hills, 321 F.3d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 2003). A "Court has the power to issu 
12 a preliminary injunction in order to prevent a defendant from dissipating assets in order to 
13 preserve the possibility of equitable remedies." Roederer v. Treister, No. 1: 13-CV -01021-CL, 
14 
1S 
2014 WL 878849 (D. Or. Mar. 5, 2014), appeal dismissed (Apr. 4, 2014) (citing Dargan v. 
16 













v. Marnatech Enter., Inc., 970 F.2d 552,559 (9th.Cir.1992)). 
Similarly. some states such as Texas promulgated civil rules and statutory authority 
providing that the court may issue a post-judgment ittjunctlon if the ju.dement debtor is "likely to 
dissipate or transfer its asset.s to avoid satisfaction oftb.e judgment." Emeritus Corp. v. 
Ofezarzak, 198 S.W.3d 222, 227-28 (Tex. App. 2006) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 
§ 52.006(e); Tex. R. App. P. 24.2(d)). See also FDIC v. Lewis.. No. 2:10-CV-439 JCM (VCF), 
2014 WL 4929343, "l (D. Nev. Oct. l, 2014) (recognizing state statutory authority to enjoin 
defendant from transferring assets to protect enforceability of judgment against him) (citingNRS 
33.010(3)); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 918 F. Supp. 2d 205, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding 
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In FDIC v. Lewis, an injunction prohloiting the defendant/judgment-debtor from 
5 transferring assets in a post-judgment proceeding was upheld under the ground for injunctive 
6 relief: "(w]hen it shall appear, duri.ns the litigation, that the defendant is d()ing or threatens, or is 
7 about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the plaintiffs rights 
8 
respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual." N.R.S. 
9 
33.010(3). The Court in FDIC v. Lewis found that in a post-judgment proceeding, the defendant 
JO 
11 had "transferred significant assets during the case and that any further transfers could violate the 
12 rights of [plaintiffs] ... and render the judgment against Lewis ineffectual." The Nevada 
13 Revised Statute 33.010(3) is almost identical to I.R.C.P. 6S(c)(3) (.,·upra), thus I.R.C.P.6S(e)(3) 
14 
1S 
should similarly apply in this matter to protect Wolford's rights and prevent the judgment against 















Overall, for any court to determine whether injunctive relief is appropriate, the key is 
whether the moving party will suffer irreparabl, harm. Al-Abood v. El-Shamari, 71 F. Supp. 2d 
511,514 (E.D. Va. 1999) (citing Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90, 94 S. Ct. 937, 39 L. Ed. 
2d 166 (1974)). fu.Al-Abood v. El-Shamari. the court considered a motion for injunctive relief in 
a post-judgment enforcement action, holding that the standard for preliminary injunctive relief 
was the same as a prejudgment action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a). Id at 516. 
Despite this recognition, the movant in.Al-Abood fell short because there was insufficient 
evidence that he would suffer irreparable harm: there was only speculative evidence of improper 
transfers of funds by the defendants, there was not sufficient evidence the defendant had 
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In FDIC v. Lewis1 an injunction prohibiting the defendant/judgment-debtor from 
5 transferring assets in a post-judgment proceecling was upheld under the ground for injunoti.ve 
7 about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the plaintiff's rights 
8 
9 
respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. 11 N.R.S. 
33.010(3). The Court in FDIC v. Lewis found that in a post-judgment proceeding, the defendant 
JO 
J1 had "transferred significant assets during the case and that any further transfers could violate the 

















Revised Statute 33.010(3) is almost identical to I.R.C.P. 65(c)(3) (supra), thus I.R.C.P.65(e)(3) 
should similarly apply in this maner to protect Wolford's rightS and prevent lhe judgment against 
tho Montccs from being rendered ineffectual. 
Overall, for any court to determine whether injunctive relief is appropriate, the key is 
whether the moving party will suffer irreparable harm. Al-Abood v. EI-Shamari, 71 F. Supp. 2d 
511. 514 (E.D. Va 1999) (citing Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90, 94 S. Ct. 937, 39 L. Ed. 
2d 166 (1974)). fuAl-Aboodv. El-Shaman. the court considered a motion for injunctive relief in 
a post-judgment enforcement actloo, holding that the standard for preliminary injunctive relief 
was the same as a prejudgment action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a). Id. at 516. 
Despite t.bis recognition, the movant in Al-Abood fell short because there was insufficient 
evidence that he would suffer irreparable harm: there was only speculative evidence of improper 
transfers of funds by the defendants, there was not sufficient evidence the defendant had 
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in,uffioiont funds to satisfy the judgmc.nt, and the plaintiffs did not exhaust all of their legal 
remedies to obtain satisf®tion of the judgment. 
Al-Abood is distinguishable from this matter because Wolford's efforts thus far to enforce 
s th.e judgment have been more extensive: including obtaining a writ of execution which was 
6 returned unsatisfied ( court file). an out-of-state charging order ~llingsen Aft'. fl 18-'1'2). and 






















efforts have been thwarted by the Mont.ees' actions to avoid satisfying the judgment by creating 
out-of.state entities to transfer and/or hide their assets. In addition, this Court has held the 
Montees in contempt of court for violations includin~ but not limited to: violating this Court's 
Order for Examination of Judgment Debtors requiring the Montees to produce financial 
documents, failing to appear to take discovery, and using unjustified delay tactics. Findings of 
Fact, ConclusioDS of Law & Order of Contempt Re Def. Shawn Montee and Heather Montee 
(Mar. 111 2015). Accordingly, the factual scenmio in this matter is more- akin to that in 
Conneclicut General Life Ins. Co. v. New Images of Beverly Hills, 321 F.3d 878,881 (9th Cir. 
2003) (supra), whercin the court found injunctive relief appropriate given the defendant's evasiv 
tactics of violating court-ordered discovery, committing intra.family transfers. and engaging in 
conduct to conceal or dissipate assets. 
As demonstrated in the Affidavit of Mark A. Ellingsen, the court pleadings and file to 
date, the Montees formed multiple legal entities to ttansfer assets and circumvent the judgment 
creditor's efforts to satisfy the judgment against the Montees. As a result, Wolford will suffer 
great and irreparable harm if the Montees are not enjoined from continuing such improper 
actions to avoid enforcement of the judgment against them in these post-judgment proceedings. 
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Wolford respectfully requests that the Court issue an Injunction enjoining Montee in a 
manner consistent with the terms of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court, 










Dated this 19t11 day of March, 2015 
WITHERSPOON KELLEY 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1S I certify that on this 19m day of March, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the 














the method(s) indicated below, to the following person(s): 
Paul W. Daugharty 
Paul W. Daugharty, P.A. 
Attorney at Law 
110 East Wallace Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
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PAUL W. DAUGHARTY 
PAUL W. DAUGHARTY, P.A. 
Attorney at Law 
110 E. Wallace A venue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone No.: (208) 664-3799 
Facsimile No.: (208) 666-0550 
E-mail: paul@pdaughartylaw.com 
ISB# 4520 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




SHAWN MONTEE and HEATHER MONTEE, 
husband and wife; SHAWN MONTEE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation dba SHAWN MONTEE TIMBER 
COMPANY; and ABCO WOOD RECYCLING, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-14-4713 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO EXTENSION OF TEMPORARY 
RESTRAING ORDER ISSUED 
WITHOUT NOTICE 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendants by and through their attorney Paul W. 
Daugharty of the law firm PAUL W. DAUGHARTY, P.A., and respectfully submit their 
Memorandum in Opposition to Extension of Temporary Restraining Order as follows: 
I. Statement of Facts 
On February 25, 2015, the Court issues an Order Granting Temporary Restraining Order 
("TRO"). The TRO was issued without notice to Defendants and no bond was required by the 
Court. Defendants have objected to the TRO and on March 9, 2015 the Court extended the TRO 
until March 23, 2015 at 11 :00 a.m. PST to allow briefing on the limited issue of whether the Court 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION - 1 
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can issue a preliminary injunction under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(e)(3). Defendants 
hereby renew all previous objections raised at hearing on March 9, 2015. Those include, but are 
not otherwise limited to, the argument that the TRO issued pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65(b) was issued without notice and without "specific facts" being established by 
affidavit. Specifically, the affidavit submitted by attorney, Mark Ellingsen was conclusory, lacked 
specific facts supporting the request and was nothing more than argument of counsel. Again, no 
notice was provide to Defendants. Additionally; no bond was required by the Court. See Id::ilio 
Rule of Civil Procedure 65( c) and Defendants argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction because 
final judgments had been entered and the underlying case had been decided. 
II. Legal Analysis and Argument 
There is no legal basis under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(e)(3) or Idaho law to 
support the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 
65(b) or extension of the same. 
In Farm Service, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 90 Idaho 570, 414 P.2d 898 (1966) the Idaho 
Supreme Court said in pertinent part that" ... a preliminary injunction to preserve the property in 
status quo pending final judgment, is proper ... " Id. at 5 86, 414 P .2d at 907. Furthermore, the Idaho 
Supreme Court said "such an injunction can be granted only after a full hearing and a showing of 
a clear right thereto." Id. at 587, 414 P.2d at 907. See also, Idaho Gold Dredging Corp. v. Boise 
Payette Lumber Co., 60 Idaho 127, 90 P.2d 688 (1939). 
At hearing the Court made reference to FDIC v. Lewis, 2014 WL 4929343. However, this 
case is distinguishable. Simply put the injunction was granted under NRS 33.010 which is found 
under Title 3 Remedies; Special Actions and Proceedings, Chapter 33 Injunction of the Nevada 
Revised Statutes. That Nevada Statute allowed for the injunction. Idaho has no such statute and 
Title 8 Provisional Remedies in Civil Actions, Chapter 4 Injunctions was repealed. It is important 
to note that Plaintiff did not seek injunctive relief in the underlying litigation. 
Preliminary injunctions are provided for in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(e). This rule 
sets forth the grounds for preliminary injunctions. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 65(e)(3) provided 
that a preliminary injunction may be granted "when it appears during the litigation that the 
defendant is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act 
in violation of the plaintiff's rights, respecting the subject of the action, and tendering to render 
the judgment ineffectual." However, as stated in McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F. 3d 1004 (9th 
Cir. 2012) the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said " ... the purpose of a preliminary injunction is 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION - 2 
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to preserve the status quo between the pai-ties pending the resolution of a case on the merits." 694 
F.3 at 1019, quoting U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N. V, 590 F. 3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2012). 
In U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N.V, 590 F. 3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2012) the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in discussing the purpose of a preliminary injunction and why it dissolves 
upon entry of final judgment said in pertinent part that "this principle stems from the very purpose 
of a preliminary injunction, which is to preserve the status quo and rights of the parties until a final 
judgment issues in the cause." 590 F.3 at1094. 
III. Conclusion 
In this case final judgment has been entered. The TRO should never have been entered and 
there is no basis for a preliminary injunction. It is respectfully submitted that the above cited 
authority clearly mandates the dissolution of the TRO issued in this case. 
DATED this _fl_ day of March, 2015. 
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PAUL W. DAUGHARTY, P.A. 
By~~~ 
PAUL W. DAUGHARTY 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing on this __f1_ day of 
March, 2015, to: 
Mark A. Ellingsen 
WITHERSPOON KRT .T .RV 
Attorneys & Counselors 
608 Northwest Blvd., Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Honorable John T. Mitchell 
Kootenai County Courthouse 
324 West Garden Avenue 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816 
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Via Mail, postage prepaid thereon 
Via Facsiinile: 208-667-8470 
Via Hand Delivery 
Via E-Mail: mae@witherspoonkelley.com 
[ ,{ Chamber Copy Via Hand Delivery 
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590 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2010), 08-56296, U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N.V. 
Page 1091 
590 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) 
U.S. PHILIPS CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
KBC BANK N.V., Movant-Appellee, 
and 
KXD Technology, Inc., a California corporation, Defendant. 
No. 08-56296. 
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. 
January 12, 2010 
Argued and Submitted Nov. 2, 2009. 
Page 1092 
Sean A. O'Keefe (argued), O'Keefe & Associates Law Corporation, P.C., Newport Beach, 
CA, Robert W. Pitts, Law Office of Robert W. Pitts, Irvine, CA, for plaintiff-appellant U.S. Philips 
Corporation. 
James M. Andriola (argued), Reed Smith LLP, New York, NY, Tony L. Richardson, Reed 
Smith LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for intervenor-appellee KBC Bank N.V. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Manuel L. 
Real, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:05-cv-08953-R-PLA. 
Before: RONALD M. GOULD and CARLOS T. BEA, Circuit Judges, and DONALD W. MOLLOY, 
[*] District Judge. 
GOULD, Circuit Judge: 
Appellant U.S. Philips (" Philips" ) appeals the district court's April 28, 2008 order granting 
non-party Appellee-lntervenor KBC Bank's motion to modify a preliminary injunction freezing the 
assets of the underlying defendants. We vacate the modification order and remand on an open 
record for any further proceedings in the district court consistent with this opinion. 
I 
The present appeal derives from a patent infringement action filed in 2005 in the United 
States District Court for the Central District of California by Philips against KXD Technology and its 
affiliates (the" KXD Defendants" ). On July 31, 2007, the district court found that the KXD 
Defendants were" in the process of liquidating and concealing their assets," and granted Philips a 
temporary restraining order (" TRO" ) freezing the KXD Defendants' assets. The terms of the TRO 
prohibited the KXD Defendants and " all persons in active institutions, brokerages, or others in 
possession or control of their assets" from "directly or indirectly transferring ... , concealing, 
secreting, distributing, disposing of, shipping in any way or otherwise hiding assets and making 
[assets] unavailable to [Philips]." In accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Philips 
deposited a $50,000 surety bond with the Clerk of Court as a condition for entry of the TRO. See 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(c). 
On September 17, 2007, the district court entered a preliminary injunction incorporating the 
terms of the asset-freeze TRO. However, on the same date-September 17, 2007-the district court 
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also entered a default judgment against all KXD Defendants. The default judgment imposed a 
permanent injunction prohibiting the KXD Defendants from infringing Philips's patents and 
awarded Philips treble compensatory damages in the amount of $87,765,249. The default 
judgment did not, however, incorporate the terms of the TRO or preliminary injunction, and it did 
not impose an ongoing asset freeze on the KXD Defendants. Why the district court entered a 
preliminary injunction on the same day that it entered a default judgment is unclear, and although 
the district court ordered the $50,000 bond returned to Philips, the district court did not state its 
unequivocal intent to dissolve the preliminary injunction. 
The KXD Defendants kept accounts in the Singapore and United States branches of 
Appellee-lntervenor KBC Bank. Between August 1, 2007, and October 26, 2007-after the TRO 
had been entered-a series of funds transfers were made into 
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those accounts. In total, approximately $2.6 million in funds were transferred. Some of these 
transfers may have violated the terms of the TRO, but we cannot be certain, because Philips has 
never sought relief in the district court to enforce the terms of the TR0.[1] 
KBC Bank contends that, despite the TRO, preliminary injunction, and default judgment 
entered against the KXD Defendants, KBC Bank's contractual and equitable rights, triggered by 
possession of the $2.6 million in funds, entitle it to "set off' the $2.6 million in funds against $2.86 
million in debts owed to KBC Bank by the KXD Defendants. KBC Bank's alleged contractual setoff 
right stems from a 2006 agreement between KBC Bank and certain KXD Defendants. Whether or 
not KBC Bank has an equitable right of setoff depends on what jurisdiction's banking laws govern 
the deposited funds. 
Philips, on the other hand, insists that the TRO, preliminary injunction, and default judgment 
entitle Philips to the $2.6 million, and that this entitlement is not subordinated to KBC Bank's 
asserted contractual and equitable setoff rights. 
On March 31, 2008, KBC Bank intervened in the underlying lawsuit between Philips and the 
KXD Defendants, moving to modify the district court's September 17, 2007 preliminary injunction 
to permit the bank to exercise its setoff rights regarding the $2.6 million in sequestered funds. The 
district court granted KBC Bank's motion. [21 Philips appealed, and we have jurisdiction over the 
interlocutory modification order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1 ). 
On appeal, KBC Bank argues that Philips's appeal is moot because the TRO and preliminary 
injunction automatically terminated on September 17, 2007, when the default judgment was 
entered. Alternatively, KBC Bank argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
modifying the TRO and preliminary injunction because KBC Bank's equitable and contractual 
setoff rights are superior to any rights Philips-a mere judgment creditor-could acquire to the $2.6 
million in funds. Philips argues that the preliminary injunction remains in effect, and that in any 
event, the district court's modification order was an inequitable nunc pro tune modification of the 
TRO and preliminary injunction that improperly vitiated whatever rights Philips acquired under 
those orders. 
II 
We review the decision to modify a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Taylor v. 
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Westly, 525 F.3d 1288, 1289 (9th Cir.2008) (per curiam). A district court" necessarily abuses its 
discretion when it bases its decision on an erroneous legal standard," and therefore issues of law 
underlying the modification order are reviewed de novo. Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 490 
F.3d 1041, 1057 (9th Cir.2007). 
Much argument on both sides of this case mistakenly assumes that the preliminary 
injunction was extant when modified. We restate the controlling rule governing the lifespan of a 
preliminary injunction: A preliminary injunction imposed according to the procedures outlined in 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 dissolves ipso facto when a final judgment is entered in the 
cause.See 
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Sweeney v. Hanley, 126 F. 97, 99 (9th Cir.1903) ; see a/so United States ex rel. Bergen v. 
Lawrence, 848 F .2d 1502, 1512 (10th Ci r.1988) (" With the entry of the final judgment, the life of 
the preliminary injunction came to an end, and it no longer had a binding effect on any one. The 
preliminary injunction was by its very nature interlocutory, tentative and impermanent." (quoting 
Madison Square Garden Boxing, Inc. v. Shavers, 562 F .2d 141, 144 (2d Cir.1977))); Fundicao 
Tupy S.A. v. United States, 841 F.2d 1101, 1103 (Fed.Cir.1988) (" [A]lthough a preliminary 
injunction is usually not subject to a fixed time limitation, it is ipso facto dissolved by a dismissal of 
the complaint or the entry of a final decree in the cause.") (internal quotation marks omitted); 
Cypress Barn, Inc. v. W. Elec. Co., 812 F.2d 1363, 1364 (11th Cir.1987); 11ACharlesAlan 
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 2947 (2005). This 
principle stems from the very purpose of a preliminary injunction, which is to preserve the status 
quo and the rights of the parties until a final judgment issues in the cause. See Univ. of Tex. v. 
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390,395,101 S.Ct.1830, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981) (" The purpose of a 
preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the 
merits can be held."); Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th 
Cir.1984) (" A preliminary injunction ... is not a preliminary adjudication on the merits but rather a 
device for preserving the status quo and preventing the irreparable loss of rights before judgment." 
). 
Here, Philips was awarded a default judgment against all defendants in the underlying 
action on September 17, 2007. The preliminary injunction against the KXD Defendants dissolved 
at that time. For that reason, it seems to us incorrect to entertain argument about whether the 
district court's subsequent modification order was permissible. At the time the district court entered 
that order, there was no preliminary injunction to be modified. 
However, we reject KBC Bank's argument that the dissolution of the preliminary injunction 
renders moot this appeal. The district court entered an order modifying the preliminary injunction 
at KBC Bank's behest. That modification order is still in effect. However, a modification order 
entered after a preliminary injunction has dissolved is void ab initio, because at that time there was 
no preliminary injunction to be modified. A district court cannot prospectively modify an injunction 
that is not in effect, nor may a district court modify a preliminary injunction nunc pro tune 
retroactively to expand or vitiate rights the parties have already accrued under an injunction. See 
Singh v. Mukasey, 533 F .3d 1103, 111 O (9th Cir.2008) (" [T]he power [of a nunc pro tune order] is 
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a limited one, and may be used only where necessary to correct a clear mistake and prevent 
injustice. It does not imply the ability to alter the substance of that which actually transpired or to 
backdate events to serve some other purpose." (quoting United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 
1009-10 (9th Cir.2000))); Cypress Barn, 812 F.2d at 1364 (" The failure of a court to act, or its 
incorrect action, can never authorize a nunc pro tune entry. If a court does not render judgment or 
renders one which is imperfect or improper, it has no power to remedy any of these errors or 
omissions by treating them as clerical misprisions."); Crosby v. Mills, 4.13 F.2d 1273, 1277 (10th 
Cir.1969) (" An order may be entered nunc pro tune to make the record speak the truth but it 
cannot supply an order which in fact was not previously made."). 
If the preliminaf'J injunction is dissolved, then a modification of that preliminary 
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injunction cannot stand, because it was entered in error. The district court's modification order was 
not entered until April 28, 2008, after the preliminary injunction had dissolved because of the entry 
of final judgment. The modification order is therefore void, and we vacate it.[31 
Congress empowers us to " remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate 
judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the 
circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2106. Both parties have an apparent claim to the $2.6 million in 
funds: Philips as a judgment creditor, and KBC Bank as a lender. Despite the parties' entreaties, 
we decline to determine whose claim is superior at this time, because material issues of fact 
remain unanswered.[4] Cf. Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp., 61 F.3d 94, 101 (1st 
Cir.1995) (concluding that there was no way to determine whether a bank's claim to funds was 
superior to the petitioner's claim "short of a remand, extensive further briefing and probably further 
fact-finding" ). The question whether Philips has a right as a judgment creditor that is superior to 
rights of the KBC Bank to funds that originated from the KXD Defendants cannot be resolved until 
factual disputes are resolved at an evidentiary hearing. That evidentiary hearing must arise in the 
course of a proceeding brought by the parties to adjudicate explicitly their claims to the funds. 
Such a proceeding is not now before us. 
Ill 
Because the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction dissolved when the 
default judgment issued, the district court's subsequent modification order is void ab initio and we 
vacate it. We remand on an open record for further proceedings in the district court not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
VACATED and REMANDED. 
Notes: 
[*] The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, United States District Judge for the District of Montana, 
sitting by designation. 
[11 KBC Bank asserts that it has presently sequestered the $2.6 million in funds. Philips has not 
indicated disagreement with that assertion. 
[21 Philips sought reconsideration of the modification order before the district court, and its motion 
for reconsideration was denied. 
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[3] Our hoiding does not affect Philips's continuing ability to seek damages, through contempt 
proceedings, for any violations of the TRO and preliminary injunction that may have occurred while 
those orders were in effect. If any time limit for seeking such relief creates a barrier to a claim by 
Philips, Philips may seek equitable tolling of any applicable limitations period. Because that issue 
is not before us now, we express no view on it. 
[4] These issues include: (1) when KBC Bank first had notice of the TRO, (2) whether Philips has 
properly executed its judgment in regard to the funds, (3) what jurisdiction the funds were 
transferred from, (4) what jurisdiction the funds were transferred to, (5) who transferred the funds, 
(6) which defendant's account received the funds, (7) the respective rights of the KXD Defendants 
to funds deposited in the KBC Bank accounts in question, and (8) possibly other facts .ve do not 
list here, but that the parties or the district court may view as relevant on remand. 
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Richard A. Hearn, Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge & Bailey, Chartered, Pocatello, ID, for the 
plaintiff-appellee and cross-appellant. 
Kathleen M. O'Sullivan, Perkins Coie, Seattle, WA, for amici curiae Legal Voice, Center for 
Reproductive Rights, and National Advocates for Pregnant Women. 
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, B. Lynn Win mill, Chief 
District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 4:11-cv-00433-BLW. 
Before: BETTY B. FLETCHER and HARRY PREGERSON, Circuit Judges, and DONALD E. 
WALTER, Senior District Judge_[*] 
OPINION 
· PREGERSON, Circuit Judge: 
On May 18, 2011, Mark Hiedeman, the Bannock County, Idaho prosecuting attorney, filed a 
felony criminal complaint in the district court of the State of Idaho, in and for Bannock C<?unty 
against Jennie Linn McCormack. The complaint charged McCormack with "the public offense of 
Unlawful Abortion, Idaho Code§ 18-606," which makes it a felony for any woman to undergo an 
abortion in a manner not authorized by statute. As a result, McCormack faced the possibility of up 
to five years imprisonment for allegedly violating Idaho Code§ 18-606, which specifically targets 
pregnant women. Idaho Code § 18-606(2). On September 7, 2011, the Idaho state district court 
dismissed the criminal complaint without prejudice. Prosecuting attorney Hiedeman has not 
determined whether he will re-file the criminal complaint. 
On September 24, 2011, McCormack filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho a 
class action lawsuit against the prosecuting attorney, Hiedeman. The suit charges, among other 
things, that Idaho Code § 18-606 violates various provisions of the United States Constitution. The 
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district court issued a preli ary injunction, restraining Hiedeman fr enforcing Idaho Code§§ 
18-606 and 18-608(1 ). Hiedeman appeals, arguing that (1) the federal district court erred in 
determining that McCormack would likely succeed on the merits; and (2) the injunction is 
overbroad. McCormack cross appeals, arguing that the federal district court should have enjoined 
enforcement of Idaho Code § 18-606 in conjunction with both §§ 18-608( 1) and 18-608(2). 
Additionally, McCormack argues that she has standing to challenge the enforcement of Chapter 5, 
the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act (including Idaho Code §§ 18-505- 18-507). 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in part the district court's grant 
of a preliminary injunction. 
A. Background 
McCormack is a resident of Bannock County, Idaho. In 2010, McCormack was unmarried, 
had three children ( ages 2, 11, and 18), and was unemployed. In 2010, McCormack had no 
source of income other than child support payments which were between $200 and $250 per 
month. 
In the fall of 2010, McCormack was pregnant and sought an abortion. She knew that 
abortions were not available in southeast Idaho. In fact, there are no licensed health care 
providers offering abortion services in the eight southeastern Idaho counties. McCormack knew 
that abortions are available in Salt Lake City, Utah, but at costs between $400-$2,000 
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depending on how far along the pregnancy is.[11 
But McCormack found out that abortions could be performed in Idaho using medications, 
rather than surgery and that the cost of such medical abortions was significantly less than the cost 
of a surgical abortion like those offered in Salt Lake City, Utah. She further learned that 
medications inducing abortions had been approved for use in the U.S. and could be purchased 
over the internet. 
In McCormack's complaint, she states that she " considered terminating her pregnancy ... by 
ingesting one or more medications she reasonably believed to have been prescribed by a health 
care provider practicing outside Bannock County, Idaho." During the hearing before the district 
court on McCormack's motion for a preliminary injunction, McCormack's attorney reiterated that 
tt·;e medications were prescribed by a physician. McCormack's attorney stated that McCormack 
went to " a provider over the [i]nternet." 
On May 18, 2011, Hiedeman, in his capacity as Bannock County prosecuting attorney, filed 
a criminal complaint in the district court of the State of Idaho, in and for Bannock County, charging 
McCormack with the felony of" the public offense of Unlawful Abortion, Idaho Code§ 18-606." 
The criminal complaint alleged: 
That the said JENNIE LINN MCCORMACK, in the County of Bannock, State of Idaho, on the 24th 
day of December, 2010, did induce or knowingly aid in the production or performance of an 
abortion by knowingly submitting to an abortion and/or soliciting of another, for herself, the 
production of an abortion; and/or who purposely terminated her own pregnancy other than by live 
birth. [21 
A magistrate judge dismissed the criminal complaint without prejudice on September 7, 
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2011. Hiedeman has not determined whether to re-file the criminal complaint. 
McCormack does not want to have additional children. If she became pregnant, she would 
seek an abortion again. Because there are no providers of medical abortions in southeast Idaho, 
McCormack would need to seek the assistance of providers of abortion services outside of 
southeast Idaho. 
B. Statutes 
This case requires the interpretation of three Idaho abortion statutes: Idaho Code § 18-606, 
Idaho Code§ 18-608, and Idaho Code§ 18-505. We summarize the substance of each statute. 
1. Chapter Six: Idaho Code § 18-606 
Idaho Code § 18-606(2) makes it a felony, except as permitted by the remainder of Title 8, 
Chapter 6 of the Idaho Code, for" [e]very woman who knowingly submits to an abortion or solicits 
of another, for herself, the production of an abortion, or who purposely terminates her own 
pregnancy otherwise than by a live birth .... " Anyone deemed guilty of violating§ 18..:606" shall be 
fined not to exceed five thousand dollars ($5,000) and/or imprisoned in the state prison for not less 
than one (1) and 
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not more than five (5) years." Idaho Code § 18-606(2). 
2. Chapter Six: Idaho Code § 18-608 
Idaho Code § 18-608, entitled " Certain abortions permitted- Conditions and guidelines" 
provides the statutory content for the limitation on the applicability of Idaho Code§ 18-606. 
Under§ 18-608(1 ), a woman may terminate her pregnancy during the first trimester if the 
abortion is performed by a physician 
in a hospital or in a physician's regular office or a clinic which office or clinic is properly staffed and 
equipped for the performance of such procedures and respecting which the responsible physician 
or physicians have made satisfactory arrangements with one or more acute care hospitals within 
reason'able proximity thereof providing for the prompt availability of hospital care as may be 
required due to complications or emergencies that might arise. 
Under§ 18-608(2), a woman may terminate her pregnancy during the second trimester of 
pregnancy, but the abortion must be " performed in a hospital and [must be], in the judgment of 
the attending physician, in the best medical interest of such pregnant woman." 
3. Chapter Five, the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act: Idaho Code § 18-505- § 
18-507 
Idaho Code§ 18-505, or the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act(" PUCPA" ), 
categorically bans non-therapeutic abortions at and after twenty weeks. " Any person who 
intentionally or recklessly performs or attempts to perform an abortion in violation of the provisions 
of section 18-505, Idaho Code, is guilty of a felony." Idaho Code § 18-507. The Act further states " 
No penalty shall be assessed against the woman upon whom the abortion is performed or 
attempted to be performed." Id. 
The Act also provides civil remedies in the form of actual damages to" [a]ny woman upon 
who111 an abortion has been performed in violation of the pain-capable unborn child protection act 
or the father of the unborn child .... " Idaho Code § 18-508(1 ). The Act also permits certain persons, 
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including a prosecuting a ney, to file an action for injunctive relie _ainst an abortion provider 
who violates§ 18-505. Idaho Code§ 18-508(2). 
C. Proceduial HistoiY 
On September 16, 2011, McCormack filed her class action complaint against Defendant 
Mark L. Hiedeman, in his capacity as Bannock County prosecuting attorney. As part of her 
complaint, she sought declaratory relief, and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. 
McCormack simultaneously filed a request for a temporary restraining order under 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(b). The parties stipulated to the entry of the temporary restraining order, and the 
district court approved the stipulation on October 7, 2011, consistent with the memorandum 
decision entered on September 23, 2011. The temporary restraining order expired on October 21, 
2011. On November 14, 2011, the district court issued a preliminary injunction that enjoined 
Hiedeman" from enforcing Idaho Code§§ 18-606 and 18-608(1) for those reasons and on those· 
grounds set forth in the Memorandum Decision and Order entered on September 23, 2011." 
Hiedeman filed a timely notice of appeal and McCormack cross-appealed. 
In this case, Hiedeman asserts that (1) the district court applied the incorrect legal standard 
for granting a preliminary injunction, and (2) based its decision on clearly erroneous facts. 
Additionally, Hiedeman asserts that the preliminary injunction is overbroad to the extent that it 
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grants relief beyond McCormack. In her cross-appeal, McCormack contends that the district court 
should have enjoined enforcement of Idaho Code§ 18-606 in conjunction with both§§ 18-608(1) 
and 18-608(2) . Additionally, McCormack asserts that she has standing to challenge the 
enforcement of Chapter 5, the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act (including Idaho Code 
§§ 18-505- 18-507). 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1 ). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Am. 
Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir.2009). A district court 
abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an erroneous legal standard or clearly erroneous 
findings of fact. Sierra Forest Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir.2009) (citation omitted). 
Application of an incorrect legal standard for preliminary relief or with regard to the underlying 
issues in the case are grounds for reversal. See Earth Island Inst. v. U.S.' Forest Serv., 351 F.3d 
.1291, 129e (9th Cir.2003); Sports Form, Inc. v. United Presslnt'I, Inc., 686 F.2d 750, 752 (9th 
Cir.1982), . .The district court's interpretation of underlying legal principles is subject to de novo 
review. Sw. Voter Reg. Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir.2003). 
DISCUSSION 
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that McCormack would likely 
succeed with her facial constitutional challenges to Idaho Code §§ 18-606 and 18-608(1 ). 
"A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that [s]he is likely to succeed on 
the merits, that [s]he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 
balance of equities tips in [her] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Winter V. 
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Natural Resources De"tense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. ~~5, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008). 
This case turns on the first factor- whether McCormack established that she was likely to 
succeed on the merits. Hiedeman contends that the U.S. District Court's conclusion concerning 
the probability of success is based on incorrect legal analysis and unsupported factual 
determinations. Hiedeman is wrong on both counts. 
1. The U.S. District Court did not employ an erroneous legal standard. 
The district court rested its decision to grant the preliminary injunction on the" undue 
burden test" set out in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 112 S.Ct 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 
67 4 (1992). Prosecuting attorney Hiedeman does not argue that the U.S. District Court's use of 
Casey is an erroneous legal standard. Instead, Hiedeman argues that" [t]he rationale for 
[abortion] statutes- the woman's health and safety- applies with no less force where the woman 
rather than another person performs the abortion." Thus, he argues that the U.S. District Court 
erred in determining that McCormack was likely to succeed on the merits. We disagree. 
a. History of Abortion Statutes. 
Historically, laws regulating abortion have sought to further the state's interest in protecting 
the health and welfare qf pregnant women, who alone bear the burden and risks of pregnancies. 
With this interest in mind, abortion statutes were first enacted to protect pregnant females from 
third parties providing dangerous 
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abortions. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 151, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) (recognizing 
that, the purpose of abortion " laws in the late 19th and early 20th centuries did focus on the 
State's interest in protecting the woman's health rather than in preserving the embryo and fetus." ); 
Abele v. Markle, 342 F.Supp. 800, 806 (D.C.Conn.1972) (" abortions performed before [1867], 
even under the best of then known medical practices, created grave risks for the health and life of 
the mother. There can be no doubt that this was an evil known to and appreciated by the 
Nineteenth Century legislators."); State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 340 (Fla.1997) (" At common 
law, while a third party could be held crimin·a11y liable for causing injury or death to a fetus, the 
pregnant woman could not be." (citing State v. Carey, 76 Conn. 342, 56 A. 632 (1904) 
(differentiating between those actions by a third party and those taken upon oneself))). 
As a result, abortion statutes have traditionally criminalized the behavior of third parties to 
protect the health of pregnant women. See id. As one court noted: 
The obvious purpose [of the abortion statute enacted in 1846] was to protect the pregnant woman. 
When one remembers that the passing of the statute predated the advent of antiseptic surgery, 
the Legislature's wisdom in making criminal any invasion of the woman's person, save when 
necessary to preserve her life, is unchallengeable. 
People v. Nixon, 42 Mich.App. 332,201 N.W.2d 635, 639 (1972); see also Gaines v. Wolcott, 119 
Ga.App. 313, 167 S.E.2d 366, 370 (1969) (recognizing that, "the appalling, unsanitary and 
unprofessional conditions under which ... illegal operations are in fact performed warrant the 
protection of the law to women."). 
Most modern state (?riminal statutes continue to apply criminal liability to third parties who 
perform abortion in a manner not proscribed by the statute. These statutes, known as physician-
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only statutes, impose criminal liability on anyone other than a licensed physician from performing 
abortions. But many of these same criminal statutes expressly exempt women from criminal 
liability for obtaining an abortion and do not hold them liable for actions or inactions that affect their 
pregnancy outcomes. [3] When state statutes do not expressly 
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exempt pregnant women, state courts interpreting them have concluded that pregnant women are 
exempt from criminal prosecution. [4] 
b. The Supreme Court has not authoriz_ed the criminal prosecution of women for seeking 
abortion care. 
Co~sistent with this history, there is no Supreme Court precedent that recognizes or 
suggests that third party criminal liability may extend to pregnant women who obtain an abortion in 
a manner inconsistent with state abortion statutes. Nevertheless, prosecuting attorney Hiedeman 
asserts that under current precedent physician-only provisions in abortion statutes can be applied 
with equal force to pregnant women who fail to comply with state abortion statutes. He argues that 
" [a] State ... has an interest in strict adherence to physician-only requirements and need not, as a 
constitutional matter, carve out an enforcement exception for women who take it upon themselves 
to self-abort." Prosecuting attorney Hiedeman mistakenly relies on Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 
705, Casey, .505 U:S: 833, 112 S.Ct. 2791, Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 96 S.Ct. 170, 46 
L.Ed.2d 152 (1975) (per curiam), and Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 117 S.Ct. 1865, 138 
L.Ed.2d 162 (1997) (per curiam), to argue that the Supreme Court has decided this issue, and 
thus, McCormack is not likely to succeed on her claims. 
First, Hiedeman asserts that under Roe, a state may constitutiOnally prohibit anyone other 
than a licensed physician from performing an abortion. In Roe, the Supreme Court recognized that 
the right to personal privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is broad 
enough to encompass a woman's decision to have an abortion. 41 O U.S. at 153-54, 93 S.Ct. 705. 
Roe recognized, however, that there are some limitations to this right because that right must be 
balanced against the state's important and legitimate interest in protecting prenatal !if~; and 
protecting women's health. Id. at 162, 93 S.Ct. 705. Hiedeman cites the follqwing passage from 
Roe to support his argument that McCormack can be held criminally liable for failing to comply 
with Idaho's abortion statutes: 
The State has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is 
performed· under circumstances that insure maximum safety for the patient. This interest obviously 
extends at least to the performing physician and his staff, to the facilities involved, to the 
availability of aftercare, and to adequate provision 
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for ~rny complication or emergency that might arise. . 
Id. at 150, 93 S.Ct. 705 (emphasis added). Further, Hiedeman notes that Roe held that" [t]he 
State may define the term 'physician' ... to mean only a physician currently licensed by the State, 
and may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician as so defined." Id.· at 165, 93 
S.Ct. 705. Hiedeman further argues that Casey did not disturb this long-standing Supreme Court 
-
precedent. 505 U.S. at 856, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (recognizing" the right of the woman to choose to 
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have an abortion before via 1lity and to obtain it without interference om the State," but noting 
that, JI [a]II abortion regulations interfere to some degree with a woman's ability to decide whether 
to terminate her pregnancy," thus the constitutionally critical concern is whether the regulations" in 
[a] real sense deprive[] women of the ultimate decision" ). 
Hiedeman's attempt to equate these Supreme Court principles with the Idaho statute at 
issue in this case is unpersuasive. These principles, embraced by the Supreme Court, recognize 
that women's health is an important interest for the state and one that is considered in crafting 
abortion statutes. These principles, however, in no way recognize, permit, or stand for the 
proposition that a state may prosecute a pregnant woman who seeks an abortion in a manner that 
may not be authorized by the state's statute, including when a pregnant woman receives 
physician-prescribed medication to terminate her pregnancy. Hiedeman's reading of Roe and 
Casey expands these Supreme Court holdings to reach an unintended result. 
Hiedeman's reliance on Connecticut v. Menillo is equally unpersuasive. In Meni/lo, the 
Supreme Court reinstated the conviction of Patrick Menillo for attempting to procure an abortion. 
Menillo, 423 U.S. at 9, 96 S.Ct. 170. JI Menillo, a nonphysician with no medical training, performed 
an abortion upon a female in normal good health for a $400 fee." State v. Meni/lo, 171 Conn. 141, 
368 A.2d 136, 137 (1976). A jury found Menillo guilty under a Connecticut statute, which 
prescribes that" any person who gives or administers to any woman, or advises or causes her to 
take cir use anything ... , with the intent to procure upon her a miscarriage or abortion, unless the 
same is necessary to preserve her life or that of her unborn child, shall be fined ... or imprisoned." 
Menillo, 423 U.S. at 10 n. 1, 96 S.Ct. 170. The Connecticut Supreme Court overturned Menillo's 
conviction, holding that the statute was" null and void" under federal law. Id. at 9, 96 S.Ct. 170. 
The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and reinstated Menillo's conviction. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court 
stated that Roe supported the JI continued enforceability of criminal abortion statutes against 
nonphysicians." Id. at 10, 96 S.Ct. 170. The Court explained: 
Roe teaches that a State cannot restrict a decision by a woman, with the advice of her physician, 
to terminate her pregnancy ·during the first trimester because neither its interest in maternal health 
nor its interest in the potential life of the fetus is sufficiently great at that stage. But the insufficiency 
of the State's interest in maternal health is predicated upon the first trimester abortion's. being as 
safe for the woman as normal childbirth at term, and that predicate holds true only if the abortion is 
performed by medically competent personnel under conditions insuring maximum safety for the 
woman .... Even during the first trimester of the pregnancy, therefore, prosecutions for abortions 
conducted by nonphysicians infringe upon no realm of personal privacy secured by the 
Constitution against state interference. 
Id. at 10-11, 96 S.Ct 170. 
Like Roe, Menillo also does not discuss the issue presented here: whether the 
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state can impose criminal liability on pregnant women for failing to abide by the state's abortion 
statutes. Menil/o does not uphold the prosecution of pregnant women who undergo abortions in a 
manner not prescribed by statute. The statute at issue in Menillo was directed only against the 
person who commits or attempts to commit the act on the pregnant woman (i.e., it criminalized the 
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actions of a third party- a nonphysician). See id. at 10 n. l 96 S.Ct . 70 (" Any person who gives 
or administers to any woman .... ") {emphasis added). Thus, Meni//o stands for the unremarkable 
proposition that states may prosecute unlicensed providers of unsafe, 11 back-alley'; abortions. 
Prosecuting attorney Hiedeman also erroneously relies on the more recent_ case of Mazurek 
v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 117 S.Ct. 1865, 138 L.Ed.2d 162 (1997) (per curiam). The Montana 
statute at issue in Mazurek was aimed at stopping a physician assistant, who had legally provided 
abortion services under the supervision of a physician, from continuing to provide that care. 
Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 F.3d 566, 566-67 (9th Cir.1996). This court, relying on Casey, held that 
the appellants in Mazurek had demonstrated a II fair chance of success on the merits." Id. at 568. 
The question before the Supreme Court in Mazurek was whether a state could bar medical 
professionals other than physicians from providing abortion services. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 
U.S. 968, 969-72, 117 S.Ct. 1865, 138 L.Ed.2d 162 (1997). Mazurek did not involve an attempt to 
prosecute a woman for seeking a pre-viability abortion. Consequently, like Hiedeman's reliance on 
Menillo, Hiedeman's reliance on Mazurek is unavailing. 
Here, Idaho Code§ 18-606(2) explicitly makes it a felony, for" [e]very woman who 
knowingly submits to an abortion or solicits of another, for herself, the production of an abortion, or 
who purposely terminates her own pregnancy otherwise than by live birth" in a manner 
inconsistent with Idaho's abortion statutes. Idaho Code § 18-606(2), which criminalizes the 
conduct of pregnant women- as opposed to the conduct of a third-party performing the 
abortion- is, as described above, different from any matter the U.S. Supreme Court or this court 
has considered since Roe was handed down. For the reasons explained below, it is likely that 
McCormack will succeed on the merits because § 18-606(2) imposes an undue burden on a 
woman's ability to terminate her pregnancy. 
c. The district court did not err in determining that McCormack is likely to succeed on the 
merits. 
The district court concluded that under Casey's " undue burden" test, McCormack 
established "that Idaho Code § 18-606 places an undue burden on women's decision to choose a 
previability abortion[5] because 
Page 1015 
it [ ] subjects women seeking abortions in Idaho to criminal prosecution if those women fail to 
ensure that their abortion providers comply with the requirements of Idaho Code § 18-608." We 
agree with the district court that at this stage, Idaho Code§ 18-606 places an undue burden on 
women's decision to terminate a pre-viability pregnancy. 
Although ·women have a Fourteenth Amendment right to terminate a pre-viability pregnancy, 
that right has some limitations. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895, 112 S.Ct. 2791. Women challenging 
an abortion statute must demonstrate that the challenged abortion statute places an " undue 
burden" on a woman's ability to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. Id. at 874, 112 S.Ct. 
2791. "A finding.of undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the 
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a 
nonviable fetus." Id. at 877, 112 S.Ct. 2791. 
Under Casey, the challenged Idaho abortion statute, § 18-606, constitutes a substantial 
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obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion of a nonviable fe us. Under Idaho Code § 18-
606, " [e]very woman who knowingly submits to an abortion or solicits of another, for herself, the 
production of an abortion, or who purposely terminates her own pregnancy otherwise than by a 
live birth" is subject to felony charges, unless the abortion was performed as permitted by the 
remainder of Title 8, Chapter 6 of the Idaho Code, including Idaho Code § 18-604 through 18-615. 
A pregnant woman who violates this statute is subject to the possibility of up to five years 
imprisonment. .Idaho Code § 18-606(2). The remainder of Chapter 6 details the manner in which a 
woman in Idaho may obtain a lawful abortion. [5] 
Chapter 6 puts an undue burden on women seeking abortions by requiring them to police 
their provider's compliance with Idaho's regulations. If a woman terminates her pregnancy during 
the first trimester but fails to ask the physician whether the office has made " satisfactory 
arrangements with one or more acute care hospitals within reasonable proximity thereof providing 
for the prompt availability of hospital care as may be required due to complications or emergencies 
that might arise," she would be subject to a felony charge if the physician has not made such 
arrangements. Idaho Code § 18-608(1 ). If a woman finds a doctor who provides abortions during 
the second trimester of a woman's pregnancy, but the doctor fails to tell the pregnant woman that 
the abortion will be performed in a clinic as opposed to a hospital, the pregnant woman would be 
subject to felony charges. Idaho Code§ 18-608(2). Or, as is the case here, if a woman elects to 
take physician prescribed pills obtained over the internet to end her pregnancy, which is not 
authorized by statute, she is subject to felony charges. Idaho Code§§ 18-608(1 )-18-608(3). 
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There can be no doubt that requiring women to explore the intricacies of state abortion 
statutes to ensure that they and their provider act within the Idaho abortion statute framework, 
results in an" undue burden" on a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus_[?] Under this 
Idaho statute, a pregnant woman in McCormack's position has three options: (1) carefully read the 
Idaho abortion statutes to ensure that she and her provider are in compliance with the Idaho laws 
to avoid felony prosecution; (2) violate the law either knowingly or unknowingly in an attempt to 
o~tain an abortion; or (3) refrain altogether from exercising her right to choose an abortion. 
This Idaho statute heaps yet another substantial obstacle in the already overburdened path 
that McCormack and pregnant women like her face when deciding whether to obtain an abortion. 
For many women, the decision whether to have an abortion is a difficult one involving the 
consideration of weighty ethical, moral, financial, and other considerations. [8] Gonzales v. Carhart, 
550 U.S. 124, 184 n. 7, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 167 L.Ed.2d 480 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see 
a/so Thomas D. Kerenyi et al., Reasons for Delayed Abortion: Results of Four Hundred Interviews, 
117 Am. J. of Obstetrics & Gynecology 299 (1973). Among other things, women must contemplate 
whether they are ready for a child or another child, including considering whether that child 
conforms with plans for future education and career goals. Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. 
Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 Persp. on Sexual and 
Re prod. Health 110, 113 (2005) (noting that a quarter of women cite that they are not ready for a 
child or another chifd as one of the most important reasons for not having a child). Additionally, 
women often take into account the perspective of their family members. See Aida Torres & 
. Wolford vs Montee , etal Supreme Court Docket #43007-2015 Page 120 of 149 
Jacqueline D. Forrest, Wh o Women Have Abortions?, 20 Fam. P . Persp.169, 176 (1988) 
( concluding 
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that more than 20 percent of women" chose to have an abortion at least in part because their 
-husband or partner wanted them to" and more than 25 percent of minors were influenced by their 
parents' wishes). 
Further, McCormack and other women in her position, have to grapple with the cost of the 
abortion itself as well as the long-term financial implications of not having one. See U.S. Dep't of 
Agric., Expenditures on Children by Families, at iv (2012) (finding that for a two-child, husband-
wife family, annual expenses ranged from $8,760 to $9,970, on average for households with 
befoie tax incorne less than $59,41 O and that the financial cost of having a child "generally 
increase[sJ with the age of the child" ). Because they do not have the financial wherewithal to 
confirm suspected pregnancies, low-income women are often forced to wait until later in their 
pregnancies to obtain an abortion. Lawrence B. Finer et al., Timing of Steps and Reasons for 
Delays in Obtaining Abortions in the United States, 74 Contraception 334, 343 (2006) (hereinafter 
Timing of Steps) (finding" [IJower-income women typically take more time to confirm a suspected 
pregnancy, which could relate to the cost of a home pregnancy test and the difficulty in getting a 
test from a clinic or a doctor."); see also Diana G. Foster et al., Predictors of Delay in Each Step 
Leading to an Abortion, 77 Contraception 289, 292 (2008) (finding that many women report being 
delayed by financial factors). Delayed confirmation compounds the financial difficulties, as the cost 
of abortion services increases throughout the gestational period. 
Many won:,en, like McCormack, must travel long distances to the closest abortion provider. 
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-86, 112 S.Ct. 2791.[9] This requires a pregnant woman take time to 
miss work, find childcare, make arrangements for travel to and from the hospital and/or clinic, and 
to possibly make arrangements to stay overnight to satisfy the 24-hour requirement. See id. at n. 9 
(Blackmun, J., concurring). In fact, this has been shown to be a significant factor when a woman 
delays an abortion, and low-income women are more likely to have this problem. Timing_ of Steps, 
at 343. OnQe at the clinic, pregnant women may have to further manage " the harassment and 
hostility of antiabortion protesters demonstrating outside a clinic." Casey, 505 U.S. at 885-86, 112 
S.Ct. 2791,(citation omitted); see Rachel K. Jones & Kathryn Kooistra, Abortion Incidence and 
Access to Services in the United States, 2008, 43 Persp. on Sexual and Reprod. Health 41, 48 
(2011) (finding that 57% of nonhospital providers experienced antiabortion harassment in 2008; 
levels of 
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harassment were particularly high in the Midwest (85%) and the South (75%)). 
While the Supreme Court has permitted many restrictions that make obtaining an abortion 
more difficult, particularly for low-income women, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 886-87, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 
it has not authorized the criminal prosecution of women seeking abortion care. Imposing criminal 
liability upon women for their providers' purported failure to comply with state abortion regulations 
places a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion. Accordingly, McCormack 
is likely to succeed on her claim that Chapter 6 constitutes an undue burden on a woman's 
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constitutional right to termi e her pregnancy before viability. 
2. The district court did not base its decision on clearly erroneous findings of fact. 
A district court's factual findings that underlie a preliminary injunction are reviewed for clear 
error, and may be reversed only if" illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may 
be drawn from the facts in the record." Am. Trucking Assn's, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 660 F.3d 
384, 395 (9th Cir.2011) (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1251 (2009)(en bane)). 
Prosecuting attorney Hiedeman asserts that the district court relied on clearly erroneous 
findings of fact. Specifically, he asserts that the evidence did not establish that McCormack used " 
FDA approved" medication prescribed by a physician. We disagree. 
The district court explained that for McCormack to succeed on the merits of her " facial 
challenge," she must meet the standard in Casey: demonstrate that the statute presents a 
substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an abortion. The district court agreed with 
McCormack that at the" early stage in the proceedings," Idaho Code§ 18-608 puts," a woman ... 
to the Hobson's choice [sic] of finding a means to police her healthcare provider's actions, or being 
threatened with criminal prosecution for her healthcare provider's failings." As in this court, 
Hiedeman argued before the district court that the " long line of [Supreme Court] cases" 
demonstrates that a pregn~nt woman who undergoes an abortion can be charged with a felony for 
violating abortion statutes. In addressing Hiedeman's argument, the district court sta~ed that, 
McCormack " clarified at oral argument that the FDA-approved medication she procured through 
the internet was prescribed by a physician." Emphasis added. The district court reasoned that 
based on this information, one could argue that the abortion was"' performed' by a physician." 
The district court explained that" [u]nder these facts, she could be criminally prosecuted if the 
state determined that the physician had not complied with Idaho statutory requirements." In sum, 
the court concluded that McCormack had demonstrated that she was " likely to succeed on the 
merits of her facial challenge to§ 18-606." Emphasis added. 
The district court's findings of fact, namely that McCormack received from a physician FDA-
approved medication used to induce an abortion, were not clearly erroneous. These facts were 
offered in both McCormack's declaration and her complaint. McCormack stated in her declaration 
that the medication was "approved for use in the United States" and that these medications" are 
currently offered for sa!e over the internet by abortion providers outside southeast Idaho." In her 
complaint, McCormack stated that " physicians providing abortion services in the United States 
often prescribe medications approved by the U.S. Federal Drug Agency (" FDA" ) to cause women 
to abort their 
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pregnancies medically, i.e., non-surgically." She also stated in her complaint that she considered" 
ingesting one or more medications she reasonably believed to have been prescribed by a health 
care provider practicing outside Bannock County, Idaho to induce [her] abortion." There is no 
disputing that an affidavit and a complaint may be the basis for a preliminary injunction unless the 
facts are substantially controverted by counter-affidavits. See K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 467 
F.2d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir.1972) (" A verified complaint or supporting affidavits may afford the basis 
· ·fora preliminary injunction .... "). Here, prosecuting attorney Hiedeman did not offer any 
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controverted affidavits as t hether the pills were obtained from a sician over the internet or 
whether they were FDA-approved. Additionally, the district court merely commented that oral 
argument provided clarity to the extent that the complaint and affidavit had to be carefully worded 
because of the potential for McCormack's prosecution. 
These factual findings cannot be said to be " clearly erroneous" such that the court is left 
with a definite ~nd firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment. 
United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1260-61 (9th Cir.2009) (en bane); A/aimalo v. United 
States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1060 (9th Cir.2011) (" To be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike [the 
court] as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must, as one member of this court recently 
stated during oral argument, strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated 
dead fish."). 
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous 
and the court did not abuse its discretion in relying on those findings. 
II. The district court abused its discretion in crafting an overbroad preliminary injunction. 
The scope of a preliminary injunction is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. SEC v. 
Interlink Data Network of Los Angeles, Inc., 77 F.3d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir.1996). 
The district court's preliminary injunction states that prosecuting attorney Hiedeman " is 
restrained from enforcing Idaho Code §§ 18-606 and 18-608(1 )." Hiedeman argues that the district 
court's preliminary injunction is overbroad to the extent that it grants relief beyond McCormack 
herself. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the preliminary injunction is overbroad 
and should be limited to enforcement of the applicable code sections against McCormack only. 
The Supreme Court has c;;autioned that " injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to 
the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs." Califano v. Yamasaki, 
442 U.S. 682, 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979). Injunctive relief is an " extraordinary 
remedy," Winter, 555 U.S. at 24, 129 S.Ct. 365, and" must be tailored to remedy the specific harm 
alleged." Park Viii. Apartment Tenants Ass'n v. Mortimer Howard Trust, 636 F .3d 1150, 1160 (9th 
Cir.2011 ). A district court abuses its discretion by issuing an " overbroad" injunction. Id.; see also 
Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F .3d 1109, 1119 (9th Cir.2009). Moreover, the purpose of a 
preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo between the parties pending a resolution of a 
case on the merits. U.S. Philips Corp. v. KBC Bank N. \!., 590 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir.2010). 
At least one Supreme Court decision suggests that federal courts should only enjoin 
enforcement of criminal statutes against the plaintiffs before the court. In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 
the Court said 
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" neither declaratory nor injunctive relief can directly interfere with enforcement of contested 
statutes or ordinances except with respect to the particular federal plaintiffs, and the State is free 
to prosecute others who may violate the statute." 422 U.S. 922, 931, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 
648 (1975). We recently held that a district court_abused its discretion in entering an overbroad 
preliminary injunction that enjoined "the rules themselves as opposed to enjoining their 
enforcement as to the plaintiffs before [it]." Stormans, 586 F.3d at 1140. 
There is no need for the preliminary injunction in this case to bar enforcement of § 18-606 
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against anyone except Mc ormack in order to preserve the status quo between the parties. The 
fact that McCormack may ultimately be entitled to a declaratory judgment stating that § 18-606 is 
unconstitutional on its face (which would clearly bar prosecution of any pregnant woman under the 
statute) does not mean that the preliminary injunction should apply so broadly, at least in the 
absence of class certification. 
Accordingly, we' conclude that the district court's preliminary injunction should be narrowed 
so that it enjoins only future prosecution of McCormack. 
CROSS-APPEAL 
In her cross-appeal, McCormack makes two arguments: (1) that the district court should 
have enjoined enforcement of Idaho Code § 18-606 in conjunction with both §§ 18-608(1) and 18-
608(2) ; and (2) that she has standing to challenge the enforcement of Chapter 5, the Pain-
Capable Unb~rn Child Protection Act(" PUCPA" ). 
Ill. The district court erred in not enjoining the enforcement of Idaho Code§ 18-606 in 
conjunction with both§§ 18-608(1) and 18-608(2). 
In her cross-appeal, McCormack contends that the district court should have enjoined 
enforcement of Idaho Code § 18-606 in conjunction with both §§ 18-608(1) and 18-608(2) . In 
granting McCormack's motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court limited the injunction to 
§ 18-608(1 ), which is the code section governing abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy. 
The district court refused to extend the preliminary injunction to cover§ 18-608(2), which is the 
code section governing abortions during the second trimester of pregnancy. In its order granting 
the preliminary injunction, the court stated that it relied on those reasons set forth in the court's 
September 23, 2011 memorandum. In its September 23, 2011 Memorandum Decision, the district 
court held that McCormack's potential punishment for violating Idaho Code § 18-606 did not 
extend to all challenged subsections. The district court found that" [b]ased on the facts alleged, 
there can be no argument that [McCormack] violated either§ 18-608(2) or§ 18-608(3)." Thus, the 
court found that McCormack" does not face any threat of prosecution under these subsections." 
Accordingly, the court found that there was not a case or controversy as to § 18-608(2) or § 18-
608(3). 
McCormack alleges that the district court erred because the basis for the district court's 
injunction against enforcement of Idaho Code § 18-608(1) applies with equal force to § 18608(2). 
She notes that the criminal complaint fails to cite which statute- either§ 18-608(1) or§ 18-
608(2)- Hiedeman was charging McCormack under, in connection with § 18-606. Further, the 
criminal complaint makes no reference to the trimester of McCormack's pregnancy at the time of 
the alleged abortion. Thus, the threat she faced (and still faces based on Hiedeman's affidavit that 
he has not yet determined whether to re-commence the criminal action) was that she would be 
prosecuted for violating either subsection of the statute. For the 
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reasons set forth below, we agree with McCormack that the district court erred in failing to extend 
the preliminary injunction to§ 18-608{2) because McCormack faces a genuine threat of 
prosecution under this subsection of the statute. 
This court has recognized that " neither the mere existence of a proscriptive statute nor a 
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generalized threat of prosecution satisfies the' case or controversy' r quirement" Thomas v. 
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 {9th Cir.2000) (en bane). Rather, a plaintiff 
musf face a·" genuine threat of prosecution." Id. In evaluating the genuineness of a claimed threat 
of prosecution, courts examine three factors: (1)" whether the plaintiffs have articulated a' 
concrete plan' to violate the law in question," (2) "whether the prosecuting authorities have 
communicated a specific warning or threat to initiate proceedings," and (3) "the history of past 
prosecution or enforcement under the challenged statute." Id.; see also Babbitt v. United Farm 
Workers Nat'/ Union, 442 U.S. 289,298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979) (holding that," 
[w]hen contesting the constitutionality of a criminal statute, it is not necessary that the plaintiff first 
expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge the statute that he claims 
r.it f"'\1 
deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.") (citation and alterations omitted).L iuJ 
Applying these principles here, McCormack faced prosecution and continues to be 
threatened with prosecution as a result of her alleged violation of Idaho Code§ 18-606, in 
conjunction with either§ 18-608(1) or§ 18-608(2). First, McCormack has allegedly already 
violated Idaho Code § 18-606, which makes it a felony to obtain an abortion in a manner not 
authorized by the Idaho abortion statutes. There is no question that prosecuting attorney 
Hiedeman filed felony charges against McCormack for allegedly yiolating Idaho Code § 18-606. 
But, the criminal complaint fails to specify whether in conjunction with § 18-606 Hiedeman brought 
charges under§ 18-608(1 ), regulating abortions during the first trimester, or§ 18-608(2), 
regulating abortions during the second trimester. Further, there is nothing in the criminal complaint 
that states the gestational age of the fetus or the trimester that McCormack was in when the 
alleged abortion occurred. It is also undisputed that the state court dismissed 
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these charges without prejudice and Hiedeman has not decided whether to re-file the charges 
against McCormack. Thus, McCormack is susceptible to Hiedeman recommencing the criminal 
charges against McCormack under§ 18-606 in conjunction with either § 18-608( 1) or§ 18-608(2) . 
Second, Hiedeman, in his capacity as county prosecutor, has communicated a specific threat on 
two occasions to bring felony charges against McCormack, when he: (1) actually brought a 
criminal complaint against McCormack, and (2) filed a declaration stating that he may still re-file 
the complaint. Finally, this history of past prosecution, in the form of an actual criminal complaint 
being filed against McCormack under Idaho Code § 18-606, weighs in favor of a preliminary 
injunction for McCormack with regard to § 18-606 in conjunction with both § 18-608(1) and § 18-
608(2). 
Thus the possibility exists that Hiedeman was going to (and may still) bring criminal charges 
against M~Cormack based on her alleged violation of either§ 18-608(1) or§ 18-608(2))111 · 
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred in failing to extend the preliminary injunction 
to § 18-608(2) in conjunction with § 18-606. 
IV. McCormack does not have standing to seek pre-enforcement prospective relief against 
the enforcement of the PUCP A. 
In her cross-appeal, McCormack also argues that she has standing to challenge the 
enforcement of Chapter 5, the" PUCPA." PU CPA categorically bans non-therapeutic abortions at 
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and after twenty weeks. " ny person who intentionally or recklessly performs or attempts to 
perform an abortion in violation of the provisions of section 18-505, Idaho Code, is guilty of a 
felony." Idaho Code§ 18-507. PUCPA further states: "No penalty shall be assessed against the 
woman upon whom the abortion is performed or attempted to be performed." Id. PUCPA also 
provides civil remedies in the form of actual damages to " [a]ny woman upon whom an abortion 
has been performed in violation of the [PUCPAJ or the father of the unborn child." Idaho Code § 
18-508(1 ). PUC PA further permits certain persons, including a prosecuting attorney, to file an 
action for injunctive relief against an abortion provider who violates § 18-505 by performing an 
abortion at or after twenty weeks. [1211daho Code § 18-508(2). 
PUCPA was not enacted without controversy. Idaho's own Attorney General explained in a 
17-page letter that PUCPA" plainly intends to erect a substantial obstacle 
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to the right to choose," and "there is strong reason to believe that [PUCPAJ is unconstitutional 
under existing precedent." [131 
The district court determined that McCormack lacked standing to challenge enforcement of 
PU CPA and, for that reason, refused to issue a preliminary injunction enjoining Hiedeman from 
criminally prosecuting or bringing any civil action for injunctive relief against abortion providers. 
The district court concluded that McCormack does not allege that she was pregnant when she 
filed this action nor does she allege that her past conduct in purchasing medication to induce an 
abortion would fall within the proscription of PUCPA. Further, the court found that her testimony 
that she would seek an abortion if she became pregnant did not suffice to give her standing. 
McCormack concedes that her challenge to PUCPA is" pre.:enforcement." McCormack has 
not been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution under PUCPA. But, McCormack argues that 
because no physician located in southeast Idaho offers pre-viability abortions to women beyond 
the 19th week of their pregnancy, no physician· will have standing to challenge the constitutionality 
of PUCPA. Nevertheless, McCormack relies on the fact that she was criminally charged under 
Chapter 6 (§ 18-606) as proof of potential future criminal charges under PUCPA (Chapter 5). She 
also argues that based on her prior status as a pregnant woman, she should have standing to 
challenge this statute. 
1. Standing based on the possibility of future criminal charges under PUCP A. 
In contrast to the previous issue regarding Chapter 6 (including § 18-606, § 18-608(1) and § 
18-608(2)), no charges were brought against McCormack under Chapter 5 (PUCPA). Hiedeman 
brought charges only under § 18-606, alleging that McCormack purposely terminated her own 
pregnancy in a manner not authorized by statute. Although McCormack was prosecuted for 
submitting to a pre-viability abortion, PUCPA was not even enacted at the time the criminal 
complaint was filed. 
McCormack argues, however, that she remains threatened with prosecution under PUCPA 
based on the prior Chapter 6 criminal case being dismissed without prejudice and Hiedeman's 
declaration that he may re-commence a prosecution. She argues: 
it is irrelevant which statute or subsection of a statute Hiedeman may choose to use to prosecute 
McCormack ... for terminating a pregnancy in Bannock County. McCormack is threatened by a 
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repetition of her alleged injury by the threat Hiedeman will prosecute er or her provider again 
under any applicable statute for terminating pregnancy in Bannock County. 
She asserts that to determine issues of standing, the court must look to the facts as they 
existed at the time the complaint was filed. American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. Lomax, 
471 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir.2006); 
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Clark v. City of Lakewood, 259 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir.2001) ( " Standing is determined by the 
facts as they exist at the time the complaint is filed" ). Here, when McCormack filed her civil 
complaint on September 16, 2011, PUCPAwas enacted. Idaho Code§ 18-501 (enacted April 13, 
2011 ). Thus, she asserts that the court can consider the effect that PU CPA has on McCormack's 
prospective chance of being criminally charged. 
McCormack cannot satisfy Thomas 'three-part test, set forth above, for determining whether 
a plaintiff faces a" genuine threat of prosecution" under PUCPA. See 220 F.3d at 1139. First, 
McCormack does not have a" concrete plan" to violate PUCPA. PUCPA explicitly excludes 
women from criminal liability. Idaho Code§ 18-507(" No penalty shall be assessed against the 
woman upon whom the abortion is performed or attempted to be performed."). Therefore, there is 
no II concrete" way for McCormack to violate the law as an individual pregnant woman because 
PUCPA specifically excludes women from criminal liability. Second, the" prosecuting authorities 
have [not] communicated a specific warning or threat to initiate proceedings" under PUCPA. 
Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1139. Hiedeman's declaration specifically states: " My office has not 
determined as of this date whether new or additional evidence is or may become available to 
warrant recommencing a prosecution under§ 18-606." Thus, the only threat of future prosecution 
is under Chapter 6, not Chapter 5 (PUCPA). Finally, the third Thomas factor does not tilt in her 
favor because there is no history of past prosecution or enforcement under PUCPA. McCormack 
was prosecuted under Chapter 6, not Chapter 5 (PUCPA). 
In short, McCormack does not face a genuine threat of prosecution under PUCPA sufficient 
to confer standing to challenge the statute. 
2. Standing based on her testimony that she would seek an abortion if she became 
pregnant. 
McCormack's testimony that she would seek an abortion if she !::)ecame pregnant does not 
suffice to give her standing. It is undisputed that McCormack was not pregnant when she filed this 
lawsuit. As a result, she does not have standing under any theory articulated in Roe. 
In contrast with Jane Roe and akin to McCormack's position, the Roe Court found that John 
and Mary Doe, a married couple who filed a companion complaint along with Roe's, did not have 
standing. Roe, 410 U.S. at 127-129, 93 S.Ct. 705. The Does alleged that they were childless, that 
Mrs. Doe was not pregnant, and. that they had been advised that Mrs. Doe should avoid 
pregnancy for medical and" other highly personal reasons." Id. at 127, 93 S.Ct. 705. They alleged 
that if Mrs. Doe became pregnant, they would want to terminate the pregnancy by abortion. Id. at 
128, 93 S.Ct. 705. They also alleged that they were injured because they were forced to choose 
between abstaining from normal sexual relations or putting Mrs. Doe's health at risk through a 
possible pregnancy. Id. The Court said, 11 [t]heir claim is that sometime in the future Mrs. Doe 
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might become pregnant be a use of possible failure of contraceptive . _ .easures, and at that time in 
the future she might want an abortion that might then be illegal under the Texas statutes." Id. The 
Court concluded that the Does did not have standing: 
Their alleged injury rests on possible future contraceptive failure, possible future pregnancy, 
possible future unpreparedness for parenthood, and possible future impairment of health. Any one 
or more of these several possibilities may not take place and all may not combine. In the Does' 
estimation, these 
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possibilities might have some real or imagined impact on their marital happiness. But we are not 
prepared to say that the bare allegation of so indirect an injury is sufficient to present an actual 
case or controversy. 
Id.; see also Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121, 1124-25(2d Cir.1971) (holding that non-pregnant 
plaintiffs had no standing to challenge abortion statute solely on basis of childbearing age because 
" [a]lthough some of them may in the future become pregnant and may in such event desire an· 
abortion ... it is also possible that they will not become pregnant or that if they do they will, upon 
further reflection, decide for other reasons against an abortion .... It is clear that any threat of harm 
to them is remote and hypothetical." ). 
As with the Does, in McCormack's case there are too many " possibilities that may not take 
place and all may not combine." Roe, 410 U.S. at 128, 93 S.Ct. 705. Therefore, McCormack does 
not have standing to challenge PUCPA based on the fact that she was pregnant before filing her 
civil complaint or based on a possible future pregnancy. 
3. Standing based on the alleged chilling effect PUCPA will have on doctors' willingness to 
provide abortions after nineteen weeks in Idaho. 
McCormack asserts she is injured by PUCPA because it will have the effect of ensuring that 
there are no providers willing to provide an abortion after 19 weeks of pregnancy in southeast 
Idaho. But the record demonstrates that there were no providers physically located in southeast 
Idaho willing to perform any abortions before the law was enacted. 
Even if a doctor could bring a challenge to PUCPA on the basis of potential prosecution, 
McCormack cannot do so on behalf of an unnamed provider. Accordingly, the district court did not 
err in determining that McCormack lacked standing to challenge PUCPA.[141 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, we affirm in part and reverse in part the district court's 
grant of a preliminary injunction. Specifically, we AFFIRM the district court's determination that 
McCormack will likely succeed with her facial constitutional challenges to Idaho Code §§ 18-606 
and 18-608(1) and; AFFIRM the district court's conclusion that McCor_mack lacked standing to 
seek pre-enforcement relief against the enforcement of PUCPA. 
We REVERSE the scope of the injunction to the extent that it grants relief beyond 
McCormack. We also REVERSE the district court's determination that McCormack did not have 
standing to enjoin enforcement of Idaho Code § 18-608(2) in conjunction with § 18-606. Each 
party shall bear its own costs on appeal. 
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. 
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Notes: 
[*] The Honorabie Donald E. Walter, Senior District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation. 
[1] It is about 138 miles from Bannock County, Idaho to Salt Lake City, Utah. This Court takes" 
judicial notice of a Google map and satellite image as a ' source[ ] whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned,' " at least for determining the approximate distance from Idaho to Utah. 
See United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d 1179, 1182 n. 1 (9th Cir.2012) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 
201 (b)). 
[21 The criminal complaint does not allege which trimester McCormack was in when she had the 
alleged abortion. It also does not state the estimated age of the aborted fetus. Further, it does not 
specify which statute in conjunction with § 18-606 the state was prosecuting McCormack under. 
[3] See e.g., Alaska Stat.§ 11.41.289(1iabilityfor II assault of an unborn child" does not apply to 
actions " committed by a pregnant woman against herself and her own unborn child" ); Ark.Code 
Ann.§§ 5-61-101 (c), 5-61-102(c) (" Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow the charging 
or conviction of a woman with any criminal offense in the death of her own unborn child in utero" ); 
Fla. Stat. § 782.36(" A patient receiving a partial-birth-abortion procedure may not be prosecuted 
under this act"); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9-1.2(b)(criminal liability for intentional homicide of an 
unborn child does not apply to " the pregnant woman whose unborn child is killed" ); Kan. Stat. 
Ann.§ 65-6703(e) (" A woman upon whom an abortion is performed shall not be prosecuted under 
this section .... " ); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 507A.010(3)(" nothing in this chapter shall apply to any acts 
of a pregnant woman that caused the death of her unborn child" ); La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 14:87(A)(2) 
(penalties for criminalized abortions 11ot applicable to pregnant women having abortions); 
Minn.Stat.§ 609.266 (excluding the" pregnant woman" from liability for" crimes against unborn 
children" ); Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-335 (providing " [n]o civil or criminal penalty ... against the patient 
upon whom the abortion is performed"); Ohio Rev.Code Ann.§ 2919.17(1)(expressly excluding 
women from liability for post-viability abortions); 18 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann.§ 2608 (exempting 
pregnant women from liability" in regards to crimes against her unborn child" ); Tex. Penal Code 
Ann. § 19.06(1) (exempting the woman from liability for" death of an unborn child" ); Utah Code 
Ann.§ 76-7-314.5(2) (" A woman is not criminally liable for (a) seeking to obtain, or obtaining, an 
abortion that is permitted.by this part; or (b) a physician's failure to comply [with specified 
statutes.]"); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 101 (" However, the woman whose miscarriage is caused or 
.attempted shall not be liable to the penalties prescribed by this section."); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 
940.13 (providing no fine or imprisonment for a woman who obtains an abortion or violates any 
provision of an abortion statute). 
[4] See e.g., State v. Ashley, 701 So.2d 338, 340 (Fla.1997) (holding that a woman possessed 
immunity from criminal prosecution "for causing injury or death to [her] fetus" ); State v. Aiwohi, 
109 ~awai'i 115, 123 P .3d 1210, 1224 (2005) (holding that, the definition of II person" in the Hawaii 
manslaughter statute did not include a fetus, and thus did not apply when a woman caused the 
death of her fetus by smoking crystal methamphetamine ); Hillman v. State, 232 Ga.App. 741, 503 
S.E.2d 610, 611 (1998) (holding that the Georgia criminal abortion statute does not criminalize a 
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pregnant woman's actions in securing an abortion, regardless of the means used); State v. 
Barnett, 249 Or. 226, 437 P.2d 821, 822 (1968) (recognizing that a reading of the Oregon criminal 
statute " indicates that the acts prohibited are those which are performed upon the mother rather 
than any action taken by her" ), Although these cases generally find that a woman cannot be held 
criminally liable, their decisions rest primarily on the state court's interpretation of state criminal 
law, and they did not involve an " undue burden" analysis. 
[5] Casey recognized " the right of the woman to choose to have an abortion before viability and to 
obtain it without interference from the State." 505 U.S. at 846, 112 S.Ct. 2791. Viability, according 
to Roe," is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 
weeks." Roe, 410 U.S. at 160, 93 S.Ct. 705. Viability is a critical stage in a pregnancy because it is 
at that time that " the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the 
mother's womb." Id. at 163, 93 S.Ct. 705. Subsequent to Roe, the Court in Planned Parenthood of 
Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 63-64, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976), affirmed 
that view but clarified that viability is" flexib[le]" and ultimately a" matter of medical judgment, skill, 
and technical ability." This is because the" time when viability is achieved may vary with each 
pregnancy," and thus, a "determination of whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a 
matter for the judgment of the responsible attending physician." Id. at 64, 96 S.Ct. 2831. Thus, it is 
" not the proper function of the legislature or the courts to place viability ... at a specific point in the 
gestation period." Id. 
[61 Under § 18-608(1 ), a woman may terminate her pregnancy during the first trimester if and 
when the abortion is performed by a physician 
in a hospital or in a physician's regular office or a clinic which office or clinic is properly staffed and 
equipped for the performance of such procedures and respecting which the responsible physician 
or physicians have made satisfactory arrangements with one or more acute care hospitals within 
reasonable proximity thereof providing for the prompt availability of hospital care as may be 
required due to complications or emergencies that might arise.Under§ 18-608(2), a woman may 
terminate her pregnancy during the second trimester of pregnancy, but it must be" performed in a 
hospital and is, in the judgment of the attending physician, in the best medical interest of such 
pregnant woman." 
[?] Because McCormack has established that she vvill likely succeed on the merits, we do not 
discuss whether" there is a serious question going to the merits." Alliance for Wild Rockies v. 
Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir.2011 ). As simply a reconfiguration of the four-element test in 
Winter, 555 U.S. at 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, the "sliding scale" approach to preliminary injunctions 
remains valid: "' A preliminary injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff ... demonstrates that 
serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the 
plaintiff's favor.'" Alliance for Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1134-35(quoting Lands Council v. McNair, 
537 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir.2008) (en bane)). Given that McCormack has demonstrated a 
likelihood of success on the merits, McCormack would also succeed under this lesser standard. 
[81 The mental anguish discussed here should not be confused with the mental health issues that 
allegedly arise after a woman has an abortion. Numerous medical studies have denounced any 
link between having.an abortion and later mental illnesses. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 184 n. 7, 127 
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S.Ct. 1610 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting"' neither the weight of ... e scientific evidence to date 
nor the observable reality of 33 years of legal abortion in the United States comports with the idea 
that having an abortion is any more dangerous to a woman's long-term mental health than 
delivering and parenting a child that she did not intend to have' " (quoting Susan A. Cohen, . 
Abortion and Mental Health: Myths and Realities, 9 Guttmacher Policy Rev. 8 (2006))); see also 
Nancy E.Adler et al., Psychological Responses After Abortion, 248 Sci. 41 (1990); American 
Psychological Association, Report of the APA Task Force on Mental Health and Abortion 4 (2008), 
available athttp://www. apa. org/ pi/ women/ programs/ abortion/ mentalhealth. pdf (concluding 
that " [t]he best scientific evidence published indicates that among adult women who have an 
unplanned pregnancy the relative risk of mental health problems is no greater if they have a single 
elective first-trimester abortion than if they deliver that pregnancy") (emphasis omitted). 
[9] Eighty-seven percent of all counties in the United States are without an abortion provider. 
Guttmacher Institute, In Brief: Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States 2 (2011 ), available at 
http://www. guttmacher. org/ pubs/ fb_ induced_ abortion. pdf. Rural women are even more 
affected by the lack of abortion providers. Ninety-seven percent of nonmetropolitan counties have 
no abortion provider. American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Health Disparities 
for Rural Women (Opinion No. 429), at 2 (2009). Nonhospital abortion providers estimate that 19% 
of their patients travel 50-100 miles, and 8% travel more than 100 miles. Id. It is even worse in 
Idaho. In Idaho in 2008, there were only 4 abortion providers and 95% of Idaho counties were 
without an abortion provider. Guttmacher Institute, State Facts about Abortion: Idaho 1-2 (2011 ), 
available athttp://www. guttmacher. org/ pubs/ sfaa/ pdf/ idaho. pdf. In fact, in 2010, of the 1,510 
abortions performed on Idaho residents, nearly half were performed out of state. Idaho Bureau of 
Vital Records and Health Statistics, Induced Abortion Annual Report 129 (2010), available at 
http://www. healthand welfare. idaho. gov/ Portals/ 0/ Health/ Statistics/ 2010% 
20Reports/l n ducedAbortion. pdf. 
[1 O] These principles extend to the abortion context. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
481, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), the Supreme Court concluded that a medical director 
who had been convicted for giving information, instruction, and medical advice regarding 
contraception had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Connecticut law. Then in 
Carey v. Population Servs., Int'!, 431 U.S. 678, 682-84, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977), the 
Court held that a corporation that had been advised by New York authorities that they were 
violating the New York statute prohibiting sale of contraception to minors under 16, and had at 
least been threatened with prosecution on at least one occasion, had standing to challenge the 
statute. Finally, in Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376 F.3d 908, 916-18 (9th 
Cir.2004 ), an abortion provider, Dr. Glenn Weyhrich, stated his clear intention to continue to 
perform abortions for his patients, including some minors, despite a statute prohibiting him from 
performing abortions on minors. Id. at 916. We concluded that Dr. Weyhrich's clear intention 
resulted in a " sufficiently concrete and imminent injury-possible prosecution and imprisonment-to 
challenge the provisions that ban abortion providers from performing abortions on minors." Id. 
(citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) (" A physician 
· has standing to challenge an abortion law that poses for him a threat of criminal prosecution.")). 
Wolford vs Montee , etal Supreme Court Docket #43007-2015 Page 131 of 149 
Therefore, we held that Dr. Weyhrich had standing based upon a threat of prosecution by the 
county prosecuting attorney. Id. at 917. 
[
11
] It appears to some extent Hiedeman concedes this argument. In his reply brief, Hiedeman 
states in a footnote that, "As [he] understands the injunction, he is precluded from initiating any 
prosecution under § 18-606 against the mother of an allegedly aborted fetus." Therefore, 
Hiedeman appears to agree that he cannot bring criminal charges under either§ 18-606(1) or§ 
18-606(2). 
[
121 It is worth noting that this law is directed at a relatively small percentage of abortions, both 
nationally and within Idaho. In 2008, the most recent year for which abortion statistics are available 
from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, there were approximately 825,564 abortions 
performed in the United States. Karen Pazol et al., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
Abortion Surveillance-United States, 2008, at 1 (2011 ). Of these abortions, only 7.3% were 
performed at 14-20 weeks' gestation, and only 1.3% performed in or after the 21st week of 
gestation. Id. In Idaho, in 2010, there were 1,510 abortions. Idaho Bureau of Vital Records, supra 
at 129; id. at 167(The Idaho population in 2010, was 1,567,582). Of the 1,510 abortions, only 6 
were performed at 16-20 weeks' gestation, 5 performed at 21-24 weeks' gestation, and 1 
performed in or after the 25th week of gestation. Id. at 133. 
[
131 The Attorney General noted that Supreme Court precedent establishes: 
the Act's various restrictions operate, at least in part, prior to viability. First, twenty weeks 
precedes the usual viability point, as recognized in Roe and Danforth, by at least four weeks .... 
Second, although technology advances since the 1970s have made it easier to sustain life outside 
the womb at an earlier state, it seems clear that, in at least a fair percentage of pregnancies today, 
the fetus is not viable by twenty weeks.Thus, "[b]ecause the Act's restrictions apply at twenty 
weeks, they operate pre-viability for at least some portion of pregnancies." With regard to the 
legislative findings, the Idaho Attorney General admits that these findings" do not disturb [its] 
analysis." 
· [141 Our holding does not foreclose other constitutional challenges to PUCPA, in the event that a 
party can demonstrate standing. 
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United States District Court, 
D. Nevada. 
FDIC as Receiver for Am.Trust Bank, 
savings bank, et al., Plaintiff(s), 
v. 
Rex H. LEWIS, et al., Defendant(s). 
No. 2:10-CV-439 JCM 
(VCF). I Signed Oct. 1, 2014. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
Abran E. Vigil, Matthew David Lamb, Timothy R. Mulliner, 
Ballard Spahr LLP, Las Vegas, NV, for Plaintiff(s). 
Leland E. Backus, Backus-Carranza, Las Vegas, NV, for 
Defendant(s). 
ORDER 
JAMES C. MAHAN, District Judge. 
*1 Presently before the court is defendant/judgment debtor 
Rex H. Lewis's ("Lewis") motion to dissolve the court's order 
enjoining Lewis from transferring assets, or, alternatively, 
for permission to withdraw funds to pay legal fees and 
living expenses. (Doc. # 71). Plaintiffs/counter-defendants 
Iota Cinnamon, LLC, Iota Coral, LLC, Iota Red, LLC, Iota 
Royal, LLC, and Iota Violet, LLC, ("IOTA entities") filed a 
response in opposition, (doc.# 72), and Lewis filed a reply. 
(Doc.# 75). 
I. Background 
This is a real property foreclosure case. The court's November 
28, 2012 order granted summary judgment in favor ofIOTA 
entities on their claims against Lewis and entities controlled 
by Lewis. (Doc.# 41). On April 25, 2014, the court entered 
an amended judgment in favor of IOTA entities and against 
Lewis for approximately $55,000,000. (Doc.# 59). .. 
On July 3, 2014, the court granted IOTA entities' ex parte 
motion enjoining Lewis from transferring assets worth $5,000 
or more. (Doc.# 65). Pursuant to the order, Lewis must move 
the court for leave before engaging in any such transfers. 
Further, the injunction is to remain in effect until it is 
dissolved or the amended judgment against Lewis is satisfied. 
The judgment against Lewis has not been satisfied. On 
August 15, 2014, Lewis filed the instant motion. (Doc.# 71). 
II. Legal Standard 
The procedure for executing a money judgment in federal 
court "must accord with the procedure of the state where the 
court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent 
it applies."Fed.R.Civ .P. 69(a)(1). Under Nevada law, a court 
may enter an injunction to prevent a defendant from taking 
any act 'in violation of the plaintiffs rights respecting the 
subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment 
ineffectual."NRS 33.010(3). 
II. Analysis 
a. Motion to dissolve order enjoining transfer of assets 
Lewis argues the order enjoining him from transferring assets 
should be dissolved. He argues that dissolution is proper 
because the order is essentially a temporary restraining order 
that should have expired 15 days after entry or, alternatively, 
because the order is an injunction which was issued without 
a bond. 
The order enjoining Lewis from transferring assets is clearly 
authorized under NRS 33.010(3) as an injunction to protect 
the enforceability of the judgment against Lewis. The court 
found that Lewis had transferred significant assets during this 
case and that any further transfers could violate the rights 
of IOTA entities and render the judgment against Lewis 
ineffectual. (Doc # 65). Based on this finding, the court 
entered the order enjoining Lewis from transferring assets. 
Since the order was entered after judgment had been entered 
against Lewis, the order is not "essentially a temporary 
restraining order", as argued by Lewis. Rather, the order is 
a permanent injunction. The court rejects Lewis's argument 
that the order should have expired 15 days after entry as a 
temporary restraining order. 
'./i"estl~·.vNext @20i5 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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*2 Lewis's argument that the order should be dissolved 
because it was issued without a bond is likewise unpersuasive. 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) explicitly refers to 
posting ofbond only in connection with temporary restraining 
orders and preliminary injunctions. The rule does not require 
an applicant to post bond in connection with entry of a 
permanent injunction. See G. C. and K.B. lnvs., Inc. v. Wilson, 
326 F.3d 1096, 1108 n. 8 (9th Cir.2003). Because the order 
was entered post-judgment it is a permanent injunction and 
no bond is required. 
Moreover, even if the order enjoining Lewis from transferring 
assets was a preliminary injunction, the mere absence of a 
bond would not render it invalid. Rule 65 ( c) does not require 
the posting of security in connection with a preliminary 
injunction in every instance. Rather, Rule 65(c)"invests the 
district court 'with discretion as to the amount of security 
required, if any.' "Jorgensen v. Cassiday, 320 F .3 d 906, 919 
(9th Cir.2003) (italics in original; quoting Barahona-Gomez 
v. Reno, 167 F.3d 1228, 1237 (9th Cir.1999)). 1 
Accordingly, the court rejects Lewis's claim that the 
injunction should be dissolved because it was issued without 
a bond. Accordi;igly, Lewis's motion to dissolve the order 
enjoining him from transferring assets will be denied. 
h. Motion to transfer assets for legal fees and living 
expenses 
Alternatively, Lewis moves for permission to withdraw funds 
from an IRA account owned by him containing $128, l 05 .05, 
to pay legal fees and living expenses. (Doc# 71). Lewis has 
retained Leland Eugene Backus, Esq., of Backus, Carranza, 
& Burden to represent him in ongoing litigation stemming 
from the amended judgment in the instant case. 2 The firm has 
requested a retainer in the sum of $55,000 to undertake this 
representation. (Id. at 6). 
Footnotes 
IOTA entities contend Lewis has no need to hire an 
attorney simply to respond to discovery requests pertaining 
to his assets. This argument is unpersuasive. Lewis must 
respond to the judgment creditors' complex interrogatories 
and document requests in addition to undergoing a judgment 
debtor examination. Toe court will grant Lewis permission 
to withdraw the retainer fee of $55,000 so that he has 
representation in these proceedings. 
Lewis also requests permission to withdraw $15,000 for 
upcoming dental implant surgery and $5,000 per month for 
living expenses. The order enjoining Lewis from transferring 
assets only requires him to seek leave of court for transferring 
any asset he currently owns which is worth $5,000 or more. 
The order does not prohibit Lewis from buying goods or 
services which are individually worth less than $5,000. 
Therefore, Lewis need not seek court permission to transfer 
$5,000 per month for living expenses. 
Finally, Lewis has not provided sufficient proof to warrant 
permission to withdraw $15,000 for dental implant surgery. 
Lewis's motion does not state which dental implant surgery 
he plans to undergo, what necessitates the surgery, where he 
plans to undergo the surgery, or even what date he plans to 
undergo the surgery. Therefore, the court will deny Lewis's 




IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 
that defendant Rex H. Lewis's motion to dissolve order 
enjoining Lewis from transferring assets, or, alternatively, for 
permission to withdraw funds, (doc.# 71), be, and hereby is, 
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, consistent with the 
foregoing. 
1 Oth~r circuits have also construed Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(c) as investing the district court with discretion as to the amount of security 
reqmre~ or "."he_ther to require posting of security at all. See, e.g., Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 985 (2d Cir.1996) 
(a~~mg d1stnct court's decision not to require bond); Mo/tan Co. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th Cir.1995) 
(district court has discretion to require posting of security). · 
2 Mr. Backus also represented Lewis during all pre-judgment proceedings in the instant case. 
1/'./estlawNexr@ 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 
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§ 33.010. Cases in which injunction may be granted. 
Nevada Statutes 
Title 3. REMEDIES; SPECIAL ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Chapter 33. Injunctions 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Current through Chapter 4 of the 2015 Legislative Session 
§ 33.010. Cases in which injunction may be granted 
An injunction may be granted in the following cases: 
1. When it shall appear by the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded, 
and such relief or any part thereof consists in restraining the commission or continuance of 
the act complained of, either for a limited period or perpetually. 
2. When it shall appear by the complaint or affidavit that the commission or continuance of 
some act, during the litigation, would produce great or irreparable injury to the plaintiff. 
3. When it shall appear, during the litigation, that the defendant is doing or threatens, or is 
about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act in violation of the plaintiff's 
rights respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual. 
Cite as NRS 33.010 
History. 1911 CPA§ 195; RL § 5137; NCL § 8693 
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4 The Spokesman Review Building 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 300 
5 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-2146 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




SHAWN MONTEE and HEATHER MONTEE, 
husband and wife; SHAWN MONTEE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation d/b/a SHAWN MONTEE 
TIMBER COMPANY; and ABCO WOOD 





This matter having come on for hearing on March 9, 2015 at 9:00 a.m. and March 23, 
2015 at 11 :00 a.m. regarding Plaintiffs (hereinafter referred to as "Wolford") Motion for 
Injunction and having appeared through his counsel of record, Mark A. Ellingsen of the firm 
Witherspoon Kelley; and the Defendants having appeared through their counsel Paul W. 
Daugharty and the Court having considered the Affidavit of Mark A. Ellingsen in Support of 
Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction, Defendant's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Extension of Temporary Restraining Order and Plaintiffs Brief in Support of 
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Injunction, and the pleading files and records in this matter, with oral argument. This Court 
issued oral findings and conclusions which this Court articulated at the hearing on March 23, 
2015 regarding Wolford's Motion for Injunction. In addition to these oral Findings of Pact and 
Conclusions of law as stated at the hearing, the Court makes these additional Findings of 











(1) Woiford has already prevailed on the merits of his claims in this lawsuit and a 
judgment has been entered in this case against Defendants Shawn Montee and the marital 
community comprised of Shawn Montee and Heather Montee (hereinafter collectively referred 
to as "Montee") in the sum of $2,321,037.71. 
(2) Wolford will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief is not entered and 
Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee are allowed to continue those acts which have 
been identified in the Affidavit of Mark A. Ellingsen filed in support of Wolford's Motion for 
Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. The damage which will be suffered by 
Wolford will be immediate and irreparable if Montee is permitted to create business entities as a 













collections efforts on the underlying judgment as ineffectual. 
(3) Wolford will suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief is not entered and 
Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee are not barred from removing, concealing, 
hiding, encumbering, selling, tra..risferring, or conveying any asset in which Shawn Montee or 
Heather Montee has an interest, or in which any business entity of Shawn Montee or Heather 
Montee has an interest without first obtaining approval of this Court. If Montee is permitted to 
conduct these particular acts, then such acts which could render Walford's collections efforts on 
the underlying judgment as ineffectual. 
(4) Given the judgment which has already been entered in this matter against Montee 
in favor of Wolford, in terms of bond or security for the preliminary injunction, the Court finds 
that the unpaid balance of the existing judgment which is due and owing Montee to Wolford 
fNJUNCTION ORDER-PAGE 2 
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I 
1 I constitutes sufficient security for the issuance ofthis preliminary injunction. In the event that 




























simply offset those damages against the balance due and owing Wolford by Montee on the 
underlying judgment. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Wolford's motion for Preliminary Injunction is hereby GRANTED. 
2. Shawn Montee and Heather Montee, and their agents, servants, employees, 
attorneys and other persons acting under, in concert with, or for them, are enjoined and 
restrained from creating or forming any further business entities, which would include, but not 
be limited to, limited liability companies, corporations, or limited partnerships without first 
obtaining approval by this Court. 
3. Shawn Montee and Heather Montee, and their agents, servants, employees, 
attorneys and other persons acting under, in concert with, or for them, are enjoined and 
restrained from removing, concealing, hiding, encumbering, commingling, selling, conveying, 
disposing of, or transferring any asset of BKSMM Investments, LLC, a Florida limited liability 
company, BKSMM Investments, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, or any other asset of 
an entity in which Shawn Montee, Heather Montee, or any other business entity in which Shawn 
Montee and Heather Montee have an interest without first obtaining approval by this Court. 
4. Shawn Montee and Heather Montee, and their agents, servants, employees, 
attorneys and other persons acting under, in concert with, or for them, are enjoined and 
restrained from removing, concealing, hiding, encumbering, commingling, selling, conveying, 
disposing of, or transferring any asset in which Shawn Montee and Heather Montee have an 
interest without first obtaining approval by this Court. 
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5. Shawn Montee and Heather Montee, and their agents, servants, employees, 
attorneys and other persons acting under, in concert with, or for them, are enjoined and 
restrained from making any further inter-company or intra-company asset transfers, mergers, or 
from committing any fraudulent conveyances without first obtaining approval by this Court. 
This would include any asset transfers between entities in which either Shawn Montee or 
Heather Ivfontee have an interest or any entities which are either managed or controlled by either 
Shawn Montee and/or Heather Montee. 
6. The unpaid balance of the existing judgment which is due and owing from 
Montee to Wolford shall constitute the security for the issuance of this preliminary injunction. 
the event that Montee establishes any costs or damages incurred by a wrongful enjoinment, then 
this Court will simply offset those damages against the balance due and owing to Wolford from 
Montee on the underlying judgment. 
DATED this Z 5~ay of March, 2015. 
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3 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, certify that on the /}6 day of March, 2015, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the INJUNCTION ORDER to be forwarded, with all required charges prepaid, 


























Mark A. Ellingsen 
Witherspoon Kelley 
Attorneys & Counselors 
608 }Jortlr\.vest Boulevard, Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Paul W. Daugharty 
Paul W. Daugharty, P.A. 
110 East Wallace A venue 
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83 814 
INJUNCTION ORDER-PAGE 5 
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Via Fax: (208) 666-0550 
IlM BRANNON, Kootenai County 
Clerk of District Court 
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1 
PAUL W. DAUGHARTY 
PAUL W. DAUGHARTY, P.A. 
Attorney at Law 
110 E. Wallace A venue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814 
Telephone No.: (208) 664-3799 
Facsimile No.: (208) 666-0550 
E-mail: paul@pdaughartylaw.com 
ISB# 4520 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 




SHAWN MONTEE and HEATHER MONTEE, 
husband and wife; SHAWN MONTEE, INC., an 
Idaho corporation dba SHAWN MONTEE TIMBER 
COMP ANY; and ABCO WOOD RECYCLING, 
LLC, an Idaho limited liability company, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
CASE NO. CV-14-4713 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, ROBERT WOLFORD AND YOUR 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, MARK A. ELLINGSEN, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE 
ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants, SHAWN MONTEE and HEATHER MONTEE, husband 
and wife, SHAWN MONTEE, INC., an Idaho corporation dba SHAWN MONTEE TIMBER 
COMP ANY, and ABCO WOOD RECYCLING, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
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(" Appellants") appeal against the above named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
decision rendered March 9, 2015 and Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Contempt 
entered March 11, 2015 and decisions rendered March 23, 2015 in the above entitled action 
granting Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the Honorable John T. Mitchell presiding. 
2. Appellants assert they have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court under and 
pursuant to I.A.R. l l(a)(7). 
3. Appellants submit the following preliminary statement of issues on appeal: 
a. Did the District Court err in Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction? 
4. Has an order been entered sealing all or a portion of the record? If so, what 
portion? No. 
5. Is a reporter's transcript requested? YES. Appellants request the preparation of 
the following portions of the reporter's transcript in both hard copy and electric format: The entire 
reporter's transcript made by Court Reporter, Julie Foland of the hearings held March 9, 2015 and 
March 23, 2015 as defined by I.A.R. 25(a) and (c). 
6. The appellants request the following documents to be included in the Clerk's record 
pursuant to I.A.R. 28(a): 
a. Affidavit of Mark Ellingsen m Support of Motion for Non-Summary 
Contempt Proceedings/Charges of Contempt against Judgment Debtors filed December 23, 2014; 
b. Motion for Non-Summary Contempt Proceedings/Charges of Contempt as 
against Judgment Debtors filed December 23, 2014; 
c. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Non-Summary Contempt 
Proceedings/ Charges of Contempt as against Judgment Debtors filed December 23, 2014; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
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d. Written Appearance by Counsel, Denial of Allegations of Contempt, 
Affirmative Defenses and Request for Trial; 
e. Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Contempt Regarding 
Defendants Shawn Montee and Heather Montee; 
f. Plaintiff's Ex Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction 
fiied February 24, 2015; 
g. Affidavit of Mark Ellingsen in Support of Ex Parte Temporary Restraining 
Order and Injunction filed February 24, 2015; 
h. Order Granting Temporary Restraining Order entered February 25, 2015; 
i. Brief in Support oflnjunction filed March 19, 2015; and 
j. Memorandum in Opposition to Extension of Temporary Restraining Order 
Issued without Notice filed March 19, 2015. 
7. I certify that: 
a. A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served upon Court Reporter, Julie 
Foland at 324 West Garden Avenue, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000. 
b. The Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript pursuant to I.AR. 24( c ). 
c. The Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the Clerk's record pursuant to I.A.R. 27(d). 
d. The appellate filing fee has been paid. 
e. Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
I.A.R. 20. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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DATED this~ day of March, 2015. 
PAUL W. DAUGHARTY, P.A. 
~\~~-~ 
By:._ l_ -------\---------
PAUL W. DAUGHARTY 
Attorney for Defendants/ Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this --15__ day of March, 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be delivered to: 
Mark A. Ellingsen 
WITHERSPOON KELLEY 
Attorneys & Counselors 
608 Northwest Blvd., Suite 300 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Julie Foland, Court Reporter 
324 W. Garden A venue 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
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[ } Via Mail, postage prepaid thereon 
[ "] Via Facsimile: 208-667-8470 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery 
[ '-1" Via E-Mail: mae@witherspoonkelley.com 
[ ] Via Mail, postage prepaid thereon 
[ ] Via Facsimile: 
[ ] Via Hand Delivery [v1 Via E-Mail: Julie_foland@yahoo.com 
PAUL W. DAUGHARTY, P.A. 
~,~~ By: r- ~---,. • 
PAUL W. DAUGHARTY 
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TO: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 West State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
Juli ,. Foland 
Official Court RepQrter. - . ,ID CSR, No. 6~9 
324 West Garden 11~J!b;-.\1flxf~iqr SS 
Coeur d'Alen~ s:H316'-~860 
Phone: (2 46-1130 
Email: jfoland@k~ov.us 
2016 MA' -l+ AM 9: 30 
M 14-4, ts 
DOCKET NO. 42719(43007) 




( SHAWN MONTEE, et al 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on May 4, 2015, I lodged a transcript 
of 102 pages in length, including the March 3, 2015, Motion to Quash, the 
March 9, 2015, Hearing on Preliminary Injunction; Hearing on Contempt, 
and the March 23, 2015, Continued Hearing on Preliminary Injunction in the 
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of the County of 
Kootenai in the First Judicial District. 
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SHAWN MONTEE and HEATHER 










MONTEE, INC., an Idaho corporation dba ) 
SHAWN MONTEE TIMBER COMPANY; ) 
and ABCO WOOD RECYCLING, LLC, ) 





CASE NO. 42719-2014 
SUPREME COURT 
CASE NO. 43007-2015 
I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State ofldaho, in and for the 
County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the above entitled cause was 
compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and 
documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I further certify that no exhibits were offered in this case. 
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the Clerk's Record was 
complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of town, the copies were mailed by U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid on the 13th day of May, 2015. 
I do fiuther certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at Kootenai County, 
Idaho this 13th day May, 2015. 
Wolford vs Montee , etal 
TIM BRANNON 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: __ 0___,_-~-'....C.·i_ ... •  .. -~_ ... _.,··.--'-:--"·:·:·_._l_· 
Deputy Clerk 
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SHAWN MONTEE and HEATHER ) 
MONTEE, husband and wife; SHAWN ) 
MONTEE, INC., an Idaho corporation dba ) 
SHAWN MONTEE TIMBER COMPANY; ) 
and ABCO WOOD RECYCLING, LLC, ) 




CASE NO. 42719-2014 
SUPREME COURT 
(" A CP 11.Tll 11 '2(1(1'7 'l(I 1,: 
'-'£1..U.L.J .1. ~'--'• -rJVV / -LU 1 J 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Jim Brannon, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have personally 
served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the 
Attorneys ofrecord in this cause as follows: 
PAUL W. DAUGHARTY 
110 E. WALLACE AVE. 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814 
MARK A. ELLINGSEN 
608 NORTHWEST BL VD., STE. 300 
COEURD' ALENE, ID 83814 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have unto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this 13th day of May, 2015. 
Jim Brannon 
Clerk of District Court 
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